AN

ESSAY

On the CAUSES of the DECLINE of the

FOREIGN TRADE,

CONSEQUENTLY

Of the Value of the Lands of BRITAIN,

AND

On the MEANS to Reſtore both.

By Sir Matthew Decker.

Trade has always been the beſt Support of all Nations, and the principal Care of the wiſeſt.

Ld. *Cheſterfield's* Speech, *Dublin*, *Oct.* 8. 1745.

EDINBURGH:

M,DCC,LVI.

VII
MVSEVM
BRITANNICVM

THE PREFACE.

THE Merchant, the Manufacturer, and the Sailor, who at firſt view appear to have the greateſt intereſt in trade, will, upon examination, be found not to be ſo deeply concerned in its well or ill being as the Land-holder, whoſe intereſt ſeems more remote, and who (with ſorrow it muſt be ſaid) too often, by his indifference, gives occaſion to ſuſpect, that he thinks he hath no concern in it at all.

The former are not fixed to a country; their effects are all moveables, vendible in many parts of the world; if they are oppreſſed in one place, they can ſoon pack up and fly to another, where greater freedoms invite them; they may indeed be bound by leaſes of lands or houſes, but parchment chains ſeldom prevent deſpairing fugitives: therefore the num-

ber of people in any country, as well as their well-being, depends intirely on trade.

The Land-holder hath an immoveable property, valuable only to ſome few of his neighbours or countrymen; the produce of which, if trade carries not off, nor brings in people to conſume, but on the contrary, by its decay, drives the conſumers away, his Tenants muſt decay, break, fly, his lands be untenanted: he may indeed ſell at one price or another; but when the bulk of his neighbours are in as bad a ſituation as himſelf, and all rents declining, the value of untenanted farms and empty houſes muſt be very low.

The Traders are indeed the firſt pinched; but then they have the firſt warning to avoid the calamity, which coming but by degrees to the ultimate, the Landholders, they are the longer lulled in a deceitful ſecurity.

Who then is the moſt concerned in point of intereſt with regard to trade; he whoſe property is in moveables, who

hath

hath the firſt warning, and the greateſt choice of purchaſers; or he whoſe property is immoveable, who feels not the danger until it is far advanced, hath the leaſt choice of purchaſers, and thoſe declining ones too, like himſelf?

As men naturally purſue their own intereſt, this indifference in our Landholders is monſtrous. Is it pride which makes them think the ſubject beneath them? All foreign courts are now ſtudying it attentively. Is it the fear that the ſubject is too intricate? A little attention will make it as eaſy to them as to Foreigners. Is it their places that engroſs all their time? What they think they get by theſe, they may doubly loſe in their lands. Is it their pleaſures they now make their chief buſineſs? Alas! they are paying very dear for them, and deſervedly too, if that is the caſe. Theſe cauſes may affect ſome few; but the general one I take to be the craft, covetouſneſs, or falſe notions of intereſt in our anceſtors, who thought to lay the burden of taxes as remote as poſſible from

their lands, by laying them on trade, and to buttreſs that up by prohibitions; both which have had quite contrary effects, and their children's feet are catched in the traps their forefathers laid for others; which cynical ſpirit, it is to be feared, is not yet quite worn out.

To remove all falſe prejudices with regard to trade, from our Land-holders, to point out to them their true intereſt, to clear a plain eaſy ſubject from the imputation of intricacy, to remove thoſe deſtructive diſtinctions without any difference of landed and trading intereſts; or, to ſum up all, to prove the ſtrong connexion, in point of intereſt, between land and trade, is the occaſion of publiſhing this Eſſay.

An attempt is here made to ſhew the ſymptoms of our decay, the difficulties and diſcouragements our trade at preſent labours under, by which only Foreigners can rival us; the prodigious artificial value we thereby put upon our goods, to the hindrance of their ſale abroad; the fictitious value they make in the rents the Land-holder now receives, compared with

with the real, true, intrinſic value, a Free-trade would make; the great natural advantages our country is bleſſed with ſuperior to any nation in *Europe*; the means proper to preſerve theſe, by unburdening our trade, which will employ our poor, increaſe the ſtock of people, and increaſe our riches; all which muſt terminate in increaſing the value of lands.

As of all the methods of raiſing taxes on the people, the eaſieſt and moſt equal muſt naturally raiſe the moſt money and the feweſt murmurs; a propoſal is here offered to the conſideration of the Public, for one tax on the voluntary Conſumers of luxuries, to ſupply all our preſent, poſitive, and involuntary taxes, without their ill conſequences, more eaſy, more equal, ſpeedier raiſed, productive of more money; which will at the ſame time reſtore trade, and increaſe the value of our lands.

The conſideration of our numerous Monopolies naturally lead to an inquiry into the nature of a Free-port trade, as well as the ſtrong prejudices now ſubſiſting

ing againſt it: and tho' a difference in opinion will herein be found with ſeveral great men who have wrote on this ſubject; yet it is not intended to caſt any reflexion on their memories, or leſſen that eſteem which their paſt endeavours for their country's good juſtly intitles them to; but only to ſet the ſubject in that general light they ſeem not to have viewed it in, and put it to the ſtrongeſt trial it is capable of.

Perhaps it may ſeem ſtrange that no bounty ſhould be propoſed as a means to reſtore trade; but if a Free-port will gain us all thoſe trades we are naturally capable of, it will appear to be itſelf the greateſt bounty, and in endeavouring to force nature, the expence is certain, but the ſucceſs doubtful.

As an impartial ſearch after truth was the author's ſole motive for writing upon this ſubject; ſo he deſires the Reader to be aſſured that he has not publiſhed any thing but what appears to him as ſuch; and as an earneſt of his ſincerity he declares, that, whatever miſtakes are

proved

proved to be committed, no perſon ſhall be more willing to retract, or more grateful for the favour of better information; and which he will not fail to own, whenever this Eſſay ſhall be found to deſerve another edition. If the ſeveral propoſals here offered for the reſtoring of our trade, and therewith the value of our lands, ſhall appear to be founded on reaſon and the nature of commerce, he flatters himſelf that there is virtue and public ſpirit enough left in the nation to carry them into execution; which, whether done or not, ſignifies no more to him than to any other perſon whatever, except the deſire of a portion of that heart-felt joy which thoſe obtain, whoſe labours are bleſſed with their country's good.

The Bookſeller deſiring a ſecond edition, the opportunity of correcting the miſtakes in the firſt, was a ſufficient inducement to comply with his requeſt; as to ſuch errors which may ſtill have eſcaped,

eſcaped, the former promiſe of acknowledging is now renewed.

Conſiderable alterations have happened in the finances, by the late war; additional taxes and great deficiences. What the true general produce will be, a year or two of peace cannot ſhew; therefore the ſame calculations are continued, as were in the former impreſſion.

Our late ſuperiority at ſea has ſo checked the *French*, that, until they get their hands at liberty, our trade may ſeem to flouriſh for a little time: but increaſed cauſes muſt have increaſed effects; above thirty millions of new debts, and above a million of additional taxes, muſt be felt. Time will ſhew whether ſuch advantages as might have been made by a ſea war, can on the preſent footing be maintained by the peace.

During a confined knowledge of trade, the clamours of oppreſſive taxes, overloading debts, a threatning public-bankruptcy, will have weight, and diſtreſs every adminiſtration. But if a general knowledge

knowledge was obtained of the extenſive nature of a Free-Trade, the increaſe of the Revenue with a liquidation of the National Debt, would (I think) appear extremely eaſy; and a general proſperity ſtop the mouths of all gainſayers.

THE

THE

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ESSAY

ON THE

CAUSES *of the* DECLINE *of the*

FOREIGN TRADE.

THE Foreign Trade of *Britain* may be defined to be, its Exports and Imports of commodities to and from other countries, with the navigation and intercourſe of exchanges thereby cauſed.

The general Meaſures of the Trade of *Europe* at preſent are Gold and Silver, which, tho' they are ſometimes commodities, yet are the ultimate objects of Trade; and the more or leſs of theſe metals a nation retains, it is denominated *rich* or *poor*.

Thoſe nations that have no mines of gold and ſilver, have no means to get them but by foreign trade; and according to the degree of thoſe metals they retain, the prices of their commodities, the numbers of their people, and

 therewith

therewith the value of their lands, riſe and fall in proportion.

Therefore, if the exports of *Britain* exceed its imports, foreigners muſt pay us the balance in treaſure, and the nation grow rich.

But if the imports of *Britain* exceed its exports, we muſt pay foreigners the balance in treaſure, and the nation grow poor.

The imports cannot exceeed the exports in any country where the trade is free, eſpecially if the country abounds with home commodities; becauſe theſe, not being raiſed to artificial prices by taxes, muſt be ſo cheap to the inhabitants, that foreign commodities could not anſwer the charges of tranſporting for the conſumption of ſuch a country, unleſs the people exported ſo much of their beſt commodities, as to want, or content themſelves with a ſupply of inferior ones from other nations: ſo that the chief imports of a Free-port Trade in a fruitful country, can't be for the conſumption of the people, until they make room for them with advantage to themſelves; but muſt be either materials to be manufactured, which will afterwards be re-exported in goods improved by the people's labour at leaſt twice, it may be ten times their firſt coſt, increaſing thereby a nation's treaſure in proportion; or elſe goods to lay up in ſtore-houſes; for it being the intereſt of merchants to buy any commodities that offer in cheap times

times to ſell again when the markets are advanced, part of ſuch imports, tho' they be luxuries, as moſt of our *India* goods are, and purchaſed with treaſure, do become at ſome time or other advantageous exports; and, beſides paying for what is conſumed at home, do bring in plenty of treaſure, as was the caſe of our *Eaſt-India* trade formerly: of which *Holland* is at preſent an example. Tho' it affords neither corn, naval ſtores, nor materials of manufacture to ſubſiſt the eighth part of its people; tho' it conſumes great quantities of *French* wines and brandies; yet, becauſe its trade is almoſt free, its merchants bring the balance in its favour with almoſt all countries.

The Barometer of Trade between any two nations is the Courſe of the Exchange, the nation over-balanced having always its money undervalued.

The Barometer of the general Trade of a nation is its Mint; if plenty of treaſure is brought in, and little carried out, part of it will be continually coining, and much new money will appear; the certain ſymptom of a flouriſhing trade.

But if much treaſure be brought in, yet more be carried out, the Mint muſt lie idle, little new money will appear; the ſure ſign of a decaying trade.

That the Foreign Trade of *Britain* declines, will appear by the following ſymptoms.

The many petitions to Parliament complaining of the decay of the woollen manufacture.

The ſtarving condition the poor are reduced to in the clothing countries.

The low price of wool.

The long credit Shop-keepers take.

The great numbers of bankrupts.

The Exchange being againſt us this *Feb.* 3. 1740, to places where formerly it was for us, *viz. Hamburgh*, *Holland*, *Venice*, and *Genoa*.

The Exchange being more againſt us with *France*, than in the times of open trade, tho' its goods are loaded with ſuch high duties as amount almoſt to a prohibition.

The Exchange being leſs for us with *Portugal* than it was during Queen *Ann*'s war, tho' we had troops and ſubſidies to pay there.

The great exportation of Bullion.

The Mints lying idle, little or no new coin appearing.

The preſent ſcarcity of money, eſpecially ſilver.

The great arrears of rent the Tenants are in all over *England*, which the Landlords every where complain of.

The great numbers of farms thrown upon the Landlords hands.

The vaſt increaſe of the Poor's Rates.

Theſe ſymptoms of the decline of our Foreign Trade being ſo very plain, the cauſes are the things to be found out, and then the remedy

remedy may be eaſy. It is a maxim in Philoſophy, Take away the cauſe, and the effect will ceaſe; but we have troubled our heads ſo little of late days with this good maxim, that our remedies of high taxes, prohibitions, and penal laws, have been applied to ſtop effects, while the cauſes have never been thought on; and ſince they have not had any ſucceſs, or ever can in our preſent circumſtances, and would appear needleſs were the cauſes underſtood and removed: I ſhall attempt to ſhew what are,

I. The cauſes of the decline of our foreign trade.

II. The reaſons why the decline of foreign trade ſinks the value of lands.

III. Offer ſome means to reſtore both.

PART I.

THE cauſes of the decline of our Foreign Trade will appear to be,

I. Our preſent taxes, ſome of which are unequal, and all of them fraught with oppreſſive conſequences.

II. Monopolies, whereby the many are oppreſſed for the gain of a few.

III. Ill-judged laws.

IV. Our large national debt.

I. *Our preſent taxes*, conſiſting of 1*ſt*, the ſtamp-duties; 2*dly*, the window-tax; 3*dly*, the coal-tax; 4*thly*, the land-tax; 5*thly*, the ſalt-duty; 6*thly*, the exciſes on ſope, candles, leather, &c. 7*thly* and *laſtly*, the cuſtoms; the oppreſſive conſequences of which I ſhall endeavour to ſhew.

Firſt, the *Stamp-duty*.

This ſeems to be a hardſhip on the oppreſſed; for if knaves defraud honeſt people of their property, theſe laſt are deterred from endeavouring to recover it by this exceſſive tax on law, and a poor man ſuing for 20 *l*, pays the ſame ſtamp-duties as a rich man who ſues for 20,000 *l*.; which greatly prevents the poor, and oftentimes the rich from recovering their juſt rights.

Perhaps

Perhaps the ſtamps on bonds, deeds *&c.* at a very moderate rate, may be neceſſary to prevent forgeries; and thoſe on cards and dice tend to diſcourage gaming: but on law-proceedings the ſtamp-duty is certainly a great grievance.

Secondly, the *Window-tax.*

This is an old tax new-modelled, with what equality is to be conſidered: the rates are according to the numbers of windows; but theſe are no juſt foundations for taxing. Mechanics work-houſes, inns, lodging-houſes, *&c.* may have as many windows as a Nobleman's ſeat, and the poſſeſſors pay equal ſums upon very unequal fortunes: ſome old houſes have many windows, ſome modern ones in the *Italian* taſte but few; here the ſums are unequal, let the fortunes be what they will. Again, the idle may ſhut out the light, the induſtrious can't work without; the former favour, and the latter tax themſelves; for what? for working. Well may we pray, Lighten our darkneſs.

Thirdly, the *Coal-tax.*

Gee on trade, in *page* 103, ſays, "That "coals brought to *London* pay about 10 *s. per* "chaldron duty. *Ditto*, Water-born to "other parts of the kingdom, 5 *s.* *Ditto*, "Exported to foreigners, 3 *s.*"

This favours foreigners more than our own people, more eſpecially the inhabitants of

London

London and its neighbourhood, who pay about 7 *s.* more duty *per* chaldron than foreigners; ſo that we hereby encourage them to underwork the *Londoners* more immediately in iron-wares, and ſomething likewiſe in all manufactures where *Coals* are uſed. A tax on a commodity of ſuch general uſe to the poor as well as the rich, muſt, like our *Exciſes*, add to the dearneſs of the poor's living, raiſe the wages of their labour, and the price of manufactured goods, which likewiſe inſenſibly affects the rich: but who can expreſs the hardſhips and miſeries of the poor, when hard winters (ſuch as that in *January* 1739-40) raiſe the price of coals exceſſively, and yet a heavy tax on them ſtill adding to the oppreſſion?

Fourthly, the *Land-tax*.

This being now at 4 *s.* in the pound, is paid by ſome to the full, but by many not to above 2 *s.* in the pound, and that without any reaſon, but becauſe the eſtates happen to be in different Counties which were variouſly affected to a new King when the preſent aſſeſſment was made; whereby ſome members of the community being ever ſince put undeſervedly in a worſe condition than others, are a dead weight againſt even our moſt neceſſary enlarged expences; wrong policy, that increaſes diſſenſion always in times of difficulty. The tedioufneſs of the coming in

of

of this tax, which is generally two years, is a great diſadvantage; in times of ſafety, creates annual expenſive loans; but in times of the greateſt danger, leaves us quite in diſtreſs: 'Tis the higheſt impropriety to call that the aid of the preſent year which is to be paid in the two next enſuing. This tax has beſides been attended with a very bad conſequence to the nation, in having made a diſtinction where there is no difference, *viz.* of *Landed* and *Trading Intereſts*. Country Gentlemen, finding the *Land-Tax* a heavy burden on them, thought to eaſe themſelves by loading the Trader, whom they looked upon with a jealous eye, thinking his ſituation eaſier, whereby that trade which had raiſed the value of their eſtates, and which only could ſupport the increaſed value, being deprived of their protection, and cramp'd with duties without mercy on all occaſions, has indeed been brought ſufficiently low, and is bringing down with it the rents of their lands; and they may ſee the fatal error when it is perhaps too late, trade being like a coy dame, difficult to be brought back when ſlighted.

Mr. Locke, in his *Conſiderations of the conſequences of the lowering of intereſt, and raiſing the value of money*, *page* 86. aſſerts it to be an undoubted truth, "That he (*i. e.* the land-"holder) is more concerned in Trade, "and ought to take a greater care that it be

"well

" well managed, than even the merchant
" himſelf; for he will certainly find, that
" when a decay has carried away one part of
" our money out of the kingdom, and the
" other kept in the merchants or tradeſmen's
" hands, that no laws he can make, nor any
" little arts of ſhifting property among our-
" ſelves, will bring it back to him again;
" but his rents will fall, and his income every
" day leſſen, till general induſtry and fruga-
" lity, joined to a well-ordered trade, ſhall
" reſtore to the kingdom the riches and
" wealth it had formerly."

Fifthly, the *Salt-tax*.

This is collected with the greateſt expence of any, in proportion to its amount, conſequently is more grievous to the ſubject, and leſs beneficial to the Government: is attended with more pernicious conſequences than any ſingle tax; for it has an univerſal influence on all manufactures, by laying great hardſhips on the working poor, whoſe chief food is bacon and ſalted fleſh, and who in many places, are forced to lay in a ſtock of ſalted proviſions for the winter: the ſame with reſpect to the farmers all over the kingdom: is prejudicial alſo to our navigation, by inhancing the expence of victualling of ſhips, which raiſes the freights on *Engliſh* bottoms, to the great advantage of foreigners; or forces the merchant to victual abroad, to the great damage

mage of our lands: prevents even the very improvement of our lands, ſalt being the beſt manure, and, on account of its eaſy carriage, the cheapeſt. But the greateſt prejudice of all is, its preventing the improvement of our Herring-fiſhery, that great nurſery of Seamen, by enhancing its expences, to the great profit of the *Dutch*: for tho' we allow a bounty on exported fiſh, yet the home-conſumption, which would be a vaſt help to promote the fiſhery, being taxed, has made the trade languiſh, and little is done either for the home or foreign demand: and notwithſtanding that this article of cured herrings is ſo neceſſary for the ſupport of the working poor, yet are they loaded with ſo heavy a duty, as makes them too chargeable a morſel for the poor to encourage the fiſhery.

The States-General, in their proclamation, dated at the *Hague* 19th *July*, 1624, call the great fiſhing and catching herrings, "The "chiefeſt trade, and principal gold mine of "the united provinces, whereby many thou-"ſands of houſholds, families, handicrafts, "trades and occupations, are ſet on work, "well maintained, and proſper; eſpecially "the ſailing and navigation, as well within "as without theſe countries, is kept in great "eſtimation."

Should ſo beneficial a trade that well maintains handicrafts, trades, *&c.* and keeps in great

great eſtimation a navigation, ſhould ſuch a trade as this, I ſay, be obſtructed for the ſake of a paltry tax, that produces but about 150,000 *l. per annum* neat to the government: Have we loſt all our ſenſes, and ſhall we leave the *Dutch* unrivall'd for ever in a trade, which they declare to be a principal gold mine, and yet is the neglected product of our own Coaſts?

Sixthly, the *Excijes*,

Tho' the Exciſes on ſope, candles, leather, *&c.* by their manner of raiſing, are ſo diſagreeable to the nation in general, that any invective againſt them at this time would be needleſs, having been ſo largely treated on already by our greateſt political authors: And as the intent of this Eſſay is only to ſet things in that ſingle point of view which relates to trade, I ſhall conſider them no otherwiſe than as taxes on commodities, but attempt to ſhew the augmentative faculty of all ſuch taxes, and the great prejudice they do to trade; for whatever raiſes the neceſſaries of life, raiſes labour, and of courſe the price of every thing that is produced by labour. And it will be made appear hereafter by a calculation of the oppreſſive conſequences of the Exciſes, *&c.* that they almoſt treble themſelves to the people for what they raiſe to the Government; and it is to be feared it would appear much more, if we could go to the bottom of the oppreſſion; for if it be conſidered that tradeſmen

Tradeſmen in a country, by their mutual dependence on each other, are like wheels in a machine, in which, if one is touched, the others are affected. Amidſt ſo many trading movers, to what degree the oppreſſion is increaſed is impoſſible to know; nor muſt we be ſtartled at the largeneſs of ſuch calculations as being too great for us to pay; for being circulated chiefly among ourſelves, and going out by dribblets, we hardly perceive them; but yet are ſurpriſed to find wages and neceſſaries grow dearer and dearer, becauſe few uſe themſelves to conſider the immenſity of ſuch collected advances in ſmall ſums; but if we compare the difference of the prices of neceſſaries between *England* and *France*, we ſhall find that difference plainly accounting for the vaſt amount of the conſequences of our taxes; nor can it be a trifle that makes ſuch a fruitful country as *England* is, ſo dear, and its trade decline ſo faſt; for our working people being forced to purchaſe the neceſſaries of life dear, muſt work dear to live, until their willing working hands are quite tied up by Foreigners, who live leſs taxed, and of courſe work cheaper, ſo that they muſt and do underſell us at all markets for manufactured goods, where they come in competition with us, and in time muſt ſtop all ſuch exports. And I appeal to the experience of every honeſt man converſant in trade, whether it does

not decline year after year, more eſpecially our woollen trade, which has been eſtimated to be as neceſſary to us as bread is to the life of man; for our dearer goods muſt lie unſold, or be ſold with loſs, which muſt ſtop or break our merchants; they our clothiers and weavers; theſe laſt their journeymen, who muſt either ſtarve, turn beggars, thieves, or fly to our enemies, and help them to ruin us the faſter; which has happened too much of late years. Oppreſs trade, and the generality of the common people become miſerable and burdenſom to the rich; every little accidental ſlackening of Trade increaſes that wretched number, as the following caſe will fully illuſtrate.

A poor man, either by hard weather, the dead time of the year in his particular trade, (for all trades have ſuch times) ſickneſs, or various other accidents, cannot work; but having ſaved ten good ſhillings, is determined to allow himſelf only bare neceſſaries, which, if untaxed, might coſt about 4 *d. per* day; his money then will hold out thirty days.

But if neceſſaries are advanced by the conſequences of our taxes 2 *d. per* day on his conſumption, in that caſe 6 *d. per* day is only equal to the above 4 *d.* for his maintenance, and he can then hold out but twenty days, and is forced the earlier by ten days (in which

which poſſibly he might get employment) to ſtarve, beg, or ſteal.

Abſolute ſtarving, we muſt hope, ſeldom or never happens amongſt ſo humane a people as the *Engliſh*; but want of neceſſaries may ſo impair a poor man's health, that he may never recover it; and then an uſeful ſubject, part of the riches of the nation, is loſt.

Begging but ten days, learns the poor man an idle way of life, that few ever get rid of; and then, inſtead of an uſeful ſubject, he becomes a burdenſom, and oftentimes a villainous one.

Stealing, whereby he becomes the bane of ſociety, and, not contented with injuring his neighbour in his property, is prompted ſometimes to take away his life; and in both caſes expoſes himſelf to be cut off by the hand of juſtice. Every way a loſs to the nation.

In all theſe caſes, the poor man may have a large family of children, adding miſery to miſery.

Encourage but trade, by knocking off one of thoſe fetters, its *Exciſe*, and the children of the poor will be trained up to labour, become uſeful induſtrious ſubjects, live comfortably as Journeymen, or perhaps as Maſters, and contribute their aſſiſtance to add more power to the nation, and help to eaſe the Rich of their taxes; for the greater number of individuals there are in a country

capable of paying, the leſs the tax will be on each of them if equally laid. It is the intereſt of the Rich to let the Poor be able to get money for their aſſiſtance; for by preventing them, they bring the greater weight on their own ſhoulders; for theſe oppreſſions do not ſtop with the Poor, but extend like a plague to the Rich and the Noble, whoſe fortunes inſenſibly moulder away by them; are the chief cauſes of the preſent declining condition of their tenants, that great increaſe of the Poor's tax the nation now labours under, which in ſome places has lately been at above 8 *s.* in the pound, and muſt by degrees inevitably ſink the value of their eſtates, until one ruin involves all.

Several Authors have thought *Exciſes* and *Land-taxes* to be the moſt equal methods of raiſing ſupplies; but, if ſtrictly attended to, they will appear far otherwiſe; any thing poſitive and involuntary cannot avoid oppreſſion, which humanity ſhould always make the firſt conſideration in raiſing money from the people, and good policy the ſecond, in order to prevent evaſion and fraud, the children of oppreſſion.

A working Bachelor pays the Exciſe, *&c.* on his own ſhoes only.

A working Married-man does the ſame for himſelf, the ſame for his Wife, the ſame for

for his five Sons, the ſame for his five Daughters; twelve in family.

A landed Bachelor of 1000 *l. per annum*, when the *Land-tax* is at 2 *s.* pays 100 *l.*

A landed Married-man of the ſame eſtate does the ſame, having a wife and ten children.

Will any one ſay in theſe caſes, that the *Exciſe* on *Leather*, and the *Land-tax*, are equal taxations? in the firſt caſe, is not the oppreſſion increaſed twelve articles to one; and in the ſecond, at leaſt four to one? for the landed Married-man, with ſuch a family, cannot, ſhould not live more comfortably on his whole eſtate, than the Bachelor can do on the quarter of his; and how are the landed Gentlemen that are married, oppreſſed, who are now in both caſes?

And here it may not be improper to examine the inconveniencies of a *Poll-tax*, ſuch as the States of *Holland* iſſued an ordonnance, on the 28th of *March*, 1742, for eſtabliſhing: in the preamble to which it is ſaid, "That the ſafety of the country, and its "inhabitants, requiring a greater number "of troops to be kept up than ordinary, "their Noble and High Mightineſſes have "been obliged to ſearch for the moſt proper "means to provide for the expences of that "augmentation, and they have not found "any more fitting than the eſtabliſhment of "a poll-tax, proportioned to the abilities of

" every one. The firſt claſs is of thoſe who
" earn, ſpend, or poſſeſs an income of

600 Florins,	out of which they ſhall pay 6 Florins		
700 Ditto	8 Florins	4000 Florins	75 Florins
800 Ditto	12 Ditto	4500 Ditto	90 Ditto
1000 Ditto	15 Ditto	5000 Ditto	120 Ditto
1200 Ditto	18 Ditto	6000 Ditto	140 Ditto
1500 Ditto	25 Ditto	7000 Ditto	160 Ditto
2000 Ditto	32 Ditto	8000 Ditto	180 Ditto
2500 Ditto	40 Ditto	9000 Ditto	200 Ditto
3000 Ditto	50 Ditto	10000 Ditto	250 Ditto
3500 Ditto	60 Ditto	12000 Ditto	300 Ditto

" and ſo on, increaſing on the foot of 50
" florins, for every 2000 florins income."

With due reſpect to their Noble and High Mightineſſes, I ſhall beg leave to repeat what I have juſt before aſſerted, *viz.* that any thing poſitive and involuntary cannot avoid oppreſſion, *&c.* and add a few remarks on this *Poll-tax* to ſupport that aſſertion.

1ſt, *It is unequal, conſequently unjuſt and oppreſſive.*

By this tax a Married man of 600 florins income with ſix, eight or ten children, whoſe family is ſo numerous that his income is ſcarce ſufficient to maintain them, and who at the year's end has hardly one florin left, is to pay the ſame as a Bachelor who hath only himſelf to maintain, and perhaps lays up ſixty florins a-year: what injuſtice and oppreſſion is here? Six florins are exacted from one man, who has not conveniently, cannot have

have one to ſpare, and no more from another who can ſpare ſixty; and yet this is not the worſt view this tax is capable of being put in; for, ſuppoſe the Bachelor's 600 florins income to ariſe from the intereſt of his ſtocks in *Holland* or *England*, and the married man's by his labour; here is a farther ſhocking piece of injuſtice, whereby induſtry and idleneſs are put on the ſame footing.

2dly, *It injures trade, conſequently impoveriſhes a country.*

By raiſing the prices of labour and goods; for a man who earns by his trade 600 florins a-year, and whoſe numerous family conſumes the whole, if ſix florins are exacted from him, he muſt raiſe them by advancing the prices of his labour or his goods; elſe he cannot live; and the dearer goods grow, the leſs vendible they are, conſequently the leſs trade this man will have; ſo that this tax increaſes his expences, and at the ſame time leſſens his income; if this is not oppreſſion, I know not what is.

All taxes on neceſſaries or trade do the ſame.

3dly, *It tends to corrupt the manners of the people, conſequently to make them tumultuous and leſs governable.*

For being to pay in proportion to what they earn, ſpend, or poſſeſs, the juſt value whereof is impoſſible to be known but by themſelves,

themſelves, and to force them to a declaration, an oath is always impoſed, which makes a ſtruggle between intereſt and conſcience; an extreme wiſe law, whereby an honeſt man is put on a worſe footing than a perjured knave: he that forſwears himſelf, pays leſs than his due and ſaves his money; but he that is conſcientious, pays to the full; which latter ſuſpecting others to evade, is piqued at paying more than his neighbours, and wonders why a falſe oath ſhould not ſit as eaſy on him as on ſo many others; whereby the moſt ſolemn pledge of truth among men becomes frequently violated, is deſpiſed, diſregarded, and intereſt rides triumphant over conſcience; which latter being to men as a dike to keep out the torrent of vice, if once a thorough breach is made, a deluge of iniquity enſues, whereby all good principles are drowned: and the more vicious men grow, the readier they are to oppoſe authority.

Seventhly, and *laſtly*, The *Cuſtoms*.

Cuſtoms are duties collected in Sea-port or Frontier-towns, by authority of State, on goods coming in or going out of a country.

All authors agree that low cuſtoms are one of the cauſes of the great trade of *Holland*.

If low cuſtoms cauſe great trade, it follows that high cuſtoms cauſe little trade; which is comparatively our caſe now.

If

If the lower the cuſtoms the greater the trade, no cuſtoms or Free-ports muſt carry trade to its utmoſt height; which caſe might be ours.

If low cuſtoms have ſuch good effects in *Holland*, which hath the moſt natural diſadvantages of any country; a Free-port muſt have the greateſt and beſt effect in *Britain*, whoſe natural advantages are beyond thoſe of any country in *Europe*, as will be proved hereafter.

That the above obſervations are founded in truth will appear, by ſhewing how cuſtoms, eſpecially high ones, obſtruct the trade of theſe nations.

Firſt, *They prevent our country's being an univerſal Storehouſe.*

Becauſe our duties being ſo great an additional diſburſement to the firſt coſt of the goods, no merchant will let ſo much of his capital lie dead for duties here, when he can have it all circulating in commodities in other countries; nor can ſuch goods be re-exported, becauſe the officers fees in and out, which always remain, and the intereſt of the money lying dead for duties paid (tho' they be moſtly drawn back) are ſo great a charge, (the natural intereſt of money being much higher with us than in *Holland*) that the goods cannot come near ſo cheap from us to any foreign market, as from a Free-port where

where nothing is paid in or out; therefore they prevent our country's having the beſt choice of goods at the cheapeſt prices, to tempt our cuſtomers: the great duties on *India* goods diſcourage foreigners buying at our ſales, who pay an extraordinary charge of commiſſion on that advanced price, and are forced to lie ſome months out of their money for the draw-back; beſides, the ſtrict rule of declaring goods at the *Cuſtom-houſe*, makes public to every one each tranſaction of trade, and thereby prevents ſhipping for foreign ports ſuch goods as are there prohibited, which deprives us of ſeveral beneficial branches of trade that are carried on from *Holland*, or Free-ports, to the great advantage of foreigners.

Secondly, *They prevent the increaſe of our navigation*;

By enhancing the expences of building and navigating our ſhips.

Boards, hemp, flax, ſail-cloth, and iron, paying duties, thoſe materials muſt be dear, and ſeveral neceſſaries of life paying ſome cuſtoms (and ſome exciſes) the Ship-builders labour muſt be dear; alſo the proviſion and ſtores put on board the ſhips.

The *Engliſh* Sailor paying, on his own and family's neceſſaries, cuſtoms, (and exciſes) muſt have, and hath higher wages than moſt other countries give.

So

So that a *Britiſh* veſſel built and rigged with dear materials, by dear labour, ſupplied with dear ſtores, and navigated by Sailors at dear wages, muſt have dear freights, bring in all foreign neceſſaries and materials for manufacture dear, and carry out all our own products and manufactures dear to foreign markets, much to the diſadvantage of their ſale.

This ſhews the reaſon why we could never rival the *Dutch*, *Hamburghers*, *&c.* in the *Greenland* trade, the navigation of the *Baltick*, or the Herring-fiſhery, which being trades carried on for ſmall profits, our dear navigation effectually excludes us from making any increaſe thoſe ways.

By not having an univerſal Store-houſe, our ſhips, like empty houſes, lie by idle in our harbours, waiting months for freights, the intereſt of the money they coſt eating out their profits; or elſe are obliged to loſe their time, and be at great expences in going from one port to another to endeavour to get a cargo.

Thirdly, *They prevent the increaſe of Sailors, the true ſtrength of this Nation.*

This is a conſequence of the two laſt remarks; for no trade breeds ſo many or ſo good Sailors as the Free-port and Carrying-trades, the employment being the greateſt, and

and the experience the largeſt, as the voyages are the moſt various and extenſive; for 'tis no leſs than the trade of the whole world.

As cuſtoms are inconſiſtent with ſuch a trade, of courſe they debar us of that increaſe of Sailors which muſt be neceſſary to carry it on, and who would protect us from, or carry vengeance to thoſe enemies that durſt inſult us.

The cuſtoms upon foreign ſalt, a commodity ſo neceſſary to our fiſhery, is likewiſe a great prevention to the increaſe of Sailors; the numbers employed in *Holland* by their fiſhery are prodigious, I fear ours bear no compariſon.

The *Britiſh* Sailor being forced by cuſtoms and exciſes to live dear, muſt have dear wages, which excludes him from employment wherever foreigners can be legally had, to the great diſcouragement of our Sailors, and prevents their increaſe.

All this is not only deſtructive to our riches, but alſo to our ſecurity, it being difficult in time of war to man our Navy, not improperly called our Floating Caſtles, and occaſions that hard cuſtom of Preſſing, which puts a free-born *Britiſh* Sailor on the footing of a *Turkiſh* Slave: the Grand Signior cannot do a more abſolute act, than to order a man to be dragged away from his family, and againſt his will run his head before the mouth

mouth of a cannon; and if ſuch acts ſhould be frequent in *Turkey* upon any one ſet of uſeful men, would it not drive them away to other countries, and thin their numbers yearly? and would not the remaining few double or treble their wages? which is the caſe of our Sailors in time of war, to the great detriment of our trade and manufactures.

Fourthly, *They leſſen the capitals of our Merchants.*

By keeping a great part of their ſtocks by them idle, to pay the duties of the goods they import; which is, in effect, making them not only advance their money for the ſervice of the State, but likewiſe run the riſk in the credit they give of ever being reimburſed, and is diverting a ſtream of riches that ſhould water trade; for it often happens that when our merchants are ſhort of caſh, and they have both cuſtoms and manufactures to pay, ſo much money goes for the firſt, that nothing is left for the latter, which cauſes a circulation of diſappointments ſeldom known in *Holland* on that account; and the *Dutch* merchants can carry on the ſame trade with much leſs ſtock than ours, ſell cheaper, extend their commerce farther, and of courſe give better encouragement to their working-people, whereby they cauſe them to be more induſtrious than ours.

The following caſe will ſhew the difficulties and diſcouragements our Merchants labour under more than the *Dutch* our great rivals in trade.

Suppoſe a merchant in *Roterdam* to ſhip corn for *Bourdeaux*, and the neat produce to amount to the value of 2000 *l.* ſterling; if he orders it to be inveſted in wines, and ſhipped for *Holland*, he will not pay for duties 40 *l.*

Suppoſe a merchant in *London* to ſhip corn for *Oporto*, and the neat produce to amount to the value of 2000 *l.* ſterling; if he orders it to be inveſted in wines, and ſhipped for *England*, he will pay for duties above 2000 *l.*

Therefore the *Dutch* merchant's prime coſt and duties of his cargo will be, *L.* 2040

The *Engliſh*, *Ditto*, 4000

1960 *l.* of the *Engliſh* merchant's diſburſe more than the *Dutch* merchant's in the amount of the duties, is impriſoned until the people he truſts pay him, which may be a year or a year and a half; whereas if the *Dutch* merchant's capital be equal, he has had 1960 *l.* to employ in buying up goods to freight another adventure, may be of woollens, giving quick employment to the navigation and manufactures of his country.

Suppoſe the retailers they truſt break about the year's end, and make a compoſition amounting

amounting to 25 *per cent.* on the prime coſt and duties of the wines:

The *Dutch* merchant's loſs will be, *L.* 1530
The *Engliſh*, *Ditto*, 3000

This alſo makes our merchants riſk in trade greater, and their loſſes heavier than in *Holland*.

Fifthly, *They encourage and force the conſumption of foreign ſuperfluities.*

The dearer outlandiſh luxuries are, the more are they eſteemed by our people of taſte: 'tis the expence that makes the elegancy; therefore duties on them only further their ſale; as Mr. *Locke* clearly proves in his *Conſiderations*, *&c.* p. 93. "For it being vanity, not uſe, that makes the expenſive "faſhions of your people, the emulation is, "who ſhall have the fineſt, that is, the dearеſt things, not the moſt convenient or "uſeful? How many things do we value and "buy, becauſe they come at dear rates from "*Japan* and *China*, which, if they were our "own manufacture or product to be had "common, and for a little money, would "be contemned and neglected? Have not "ſeveral of our own commodities, offered to "ſale at reaſonable rates, been deſpiſed, and "the very ſame eagerly bought and bragged "of when ſold for *French* at a double price? "You muſt not therefore think that the raiſing their price will leſſon the vent of

" faſhionable foreign commodities amongſt " you, ſo long as men have any way to pur- " chaſe them, but rather increaſe it."

But beſides encouraging, our cuſtoms force the conſumption here of moſt foreign ſuperfluities that are imported: for tho' the duties be moſtly drawn back on ſome articles, yet the intereſt of the money lying dead for duties and fees in and out, hinder in ſome degree their re-exportation, and in many articles the duties are only in part drawn back; ſo that what remains is ſuch an additional load, as prevents ſuch goods being ſaleable at any other market, conſequently forces us to conſume all ſuch ſuperfluities. This makes a people luxurious, who can do nothing with foreign ſuperfluities but riot and indulge; whereas the *Dutch* having the object of gain always before their eyes, by the advance of foreign markets for thoſe ſuperfluities they have in their Store-houſes, are checked from indulging in what appears to them common, and of no great value for the preſent, but may be attended with great profit hereafter; which accounts for the *Dutch* frugality, ſo juſtly celebrated by all authors.

It is the exceſſive conſumption, not the trade of foreign ſuperfluities that ſhould be diſcouraged; and which is beſt done by taxing the conſumers, letting the goods as objects of trade go quite free: whereas our high duties

duties on them do juſt the reverſe; for they encourage the conſumption and deſtroy the trade, to the immenſe loſs of the nation.

Sixthly, *They encourage ſmuggling.*

Where the avoiding high cuſtoms makes the profit great, no riſk, no danger can prevent men's attempting it; it is throwing out a bait to a greedy fiſh, he will ſnap at it tho' ruin enſues. This prejudices and diſcourages the Fair Trader, either tempts, or forces him to turn Smuggler, and aſſociate himſelf with thoſe many examples of depravity we have at this time among our people, living in a ſtate of war with the Government, in defiance of laws; whereby an univerſal corruption of manners and contempt of authority muſt enſue, if not early prevented: beſides, it being chiefly the articles of luxury that are ſmuggled, as brandy, tea, *French* wines, laces, ſilks, *&c.* it ſpreads their conſumption among the lower claſs of people, who are tempted to imitate at a leſs expence the luxuries of their ſuperiors; and the ſame Smugglers that bring us theſe ſuperfluities, carry off vaſt quantities of raw wool, to the great prejudice of our manufactures, and the nation in general.

Seventhly, *They ruin manufactures, more eſpecially the woollen.*

Cuſtoms prevent the bartering away our manufactures for foreign goods, not only for

our own conſumption, but alſo for exportation, which might enlarge the vent of our goods ten times more than it now is; for if a Merchant now exports woollen goods, and would barter them for wines, the duties on them would amount to more than the coſt of his woollen goods; ſo that he muſt have a double capital for ſuch an adventure, or let it quite alone, whereby the ſales of great quantities of woollen goods are loſt to the nation.

As cuſtoms enhance the expences of our navigation, the freights muſt be raiſed accordingly, whereby the prices of the ſope, oil, and dye-ſtuffs uſed in manufacturing our wool, are advanced to the maker, and the freights on the cloths or ſtuffs exported being alſo raiſed, are additional clogs upon the ſales of our woollen goods.

Cuſtoms prevent the Carrying and Fiſhing trades, the great nurſeries of Seamen; whereby our Sailors being few, and their expences raiſed by taxes, they have the higheſt wages of moſt people in *Europe*; which is another additional advance on the freights, to the prejudice of our woollen trade as above.

Cuſtoms taking away ſo great a part of our Merchants ſtocks, they are thereby deprived of driving that great trade, and purchaſing thoſe quantities of woollen goods they would otherwiſe do: beſides, our Merchants riſk in trade being greater than in *Holland*, and their loſſes

loſſes heavier by our cuſtoms, their bankruptcies muſt be more frequent. This ſenſibly affects our Manufacturers, who are generally conſiderable creditors; for broken merchants may be well compared to nine-pins, one of which ſeldom falls without beating down many others.

Cuſtoms recommend foreign manufactures of fine goods, by making them expenſive; which vanity, on that account, ſoon renders faſhionable, whilſt our own are deſpiſed, tho' ſuperior in goodneſs, and are a great diſcouragement to our manufactures.

Cuſtoms are the cauſe of the ſmuggling of wool, becauſe the gain being great by running tea, brandy, and *French* goods, on account of the high duties, hath raiſed the contraband trade to a great height, and the Smugglers cannot make their returns in any commodity of ſo quick and certain a vent, or that gives ſo good a profit as our wool; for the *French* being leſs taxed than we, can work cheaper, and their own wool being coarſe, *Engliſh* and *Iriſh* wools are ſo much in demand, that they will give great prices for them; for which reaſon they receive vaſt quantities, to the ruin of our manufactures.

Cuſtoms on aſhes, bay-ſalt, cotton, copper, coals, drugs, foreign ſope, flax, fruit, furs, hemp, iron, leather, linens, oil, paper, rice, tobacco,

tobacco, tallow, threads, tapes, ſilk and ſugar, being neceſſaries of life, or materials of manufacture, muſt neceſſarily make all our commodities dear, not only to our own people, but to foreigners likewiſe, (tho' our workmen ſhould have no exciſes to pay); and ſuch diſcouragements give opportunity to foreigners to ſend their manufactures cheaper to foreign markets, and ſmuggle them, in defiance of all laws, into our own country, to the ruin of our manufactures; for all the above cuſtoms are as much taxes on our woollen manufacture, as if they were laid on the wool itſelf, or more; for the Workman muſt raiſe the money on the woollen goods he makes, to pay the duties of what he uſes of the above articles, with the advances, in all the hands they paſs through before they come to him. 'Tis by theſe, that we ourſelves drive away our own manufactures, and prevent our ever getting more; and foreigners could not rival the people of ſo fruitful a country as *Britain*, if we did not furniſh them with the means, by our high taxes and reſtraints, that are always prejudicial to trade, tho' deſigned to amend it, and never effect the thing intended, tho' fortified with the moſt rigorous penal laws, of which Mr. *Locke* gives an inſtance in his *Conſiderations*, *&c.* p. 116. " 'Tis death in *Spain* to export " money; and yet they who furniſh all the world

" world with gold and ſilver, have leaſt of it " among themſelves; trade fetches it away " from that lazy and indigent people, not- " withſtanding all their artificial and forced " contrivances to keep it there; it follows " trade againſt the rigour of their laws, and " their want of foreign commodities makes " it openly be carried out at noon-day."

This ſeems to be a parallel of the ſtate we are coming to, and which ſome foreigner may by and by make.

'Tis felony in *England* to export wool; and yet they who furniſh all the world with wool, have leaſt of the manufacturing of it among themſelves. The ſmuggling-trade fetches it away from that exciſed and cuſtom-loaded people, notwithſtanding all their artificial and forced contrivances to keep it there: it follows the ſmuggling-trade againſt the rigour of their laws, and their want of taking off the taxes on their manufactures, makes it openly be carried out at noon-day.

By this we ſee that neither death or baniſhment can force trade to an unnatural channel; and it may be compared in one reſpect to water which cannot be compreſſed within its natural dimenſions; the more force is exerted, the ſooner is the veſſel broke that contained it, and the water let looſe never to return. The great *De Wit*, in his *Memoirs*, *Ratiſbon edit. p.* 77, aſſerts, " That the " navigation,

" navigation, the fiſhery, the trade, and ma-
" nufactures, which are the four pillars of
" the State, ſhould not be weakened or en-
" cumbred by any taxes; for 'tis they that
" give ſubſiſtence to the moſt part of the in-
" habitants, and which draw in all ſorts of
" ſtrangers; unleſs the neceſſity was ſo great
" that the country was threatned with an
" intire deſtruction, and theſe fundamentals
" ſhould be attacked upon the hopes that theſe
" taxes would not laſt long; at leaſt haſte
" ſhould be made as ſoon as the ſtorm was
" over, to take them off; again, this diſtin-
" ction ſhould be made, that manufactures
" ſhould not or cannot be taxed at all, be-
" cauſe they are not fixed to the country,
" and we muſt fetch from foreign countries
" the ſtuffs and materials to work them up."

Eightly, *They ſend away our ſpecie.*

Britain having no mines of gold or ſilver, has no other means of getting or preſerving its treaſure but by foreign trade. As cuſtoms confine our trade to mere importation for our own neceſſaries or vanities, and at the ſame time ruin our manufactures; what we want in exports to balance the imports, muſt be paid in ſpecie, making the balance of trade every year more and more againſt us: for as we raiſe the prices of our goods ſo high by taxes, that foreigners won't take them, and yet continue to import their ſuperfluities, which

we

we now chiefly, and in time muſt intirely pay for with our gold and ſilver, as appears by the bills of entry in every week we are beginning to do; and our high duties encouraging Smugglers who have ſeldom a ſettled habitation, or any ſtock of our manufactures by them, they carry out vaſt quantities of ſpecie to purchaſe their cargoes; ſuch large draughts make our Mint lie idle, we ſee but little new coined gold, and hardly any ſilver; we find our money diſappear, and grow ſcarcer and ſcarcer every year; our Trade declines, and our People ſtarve.

To ſhew how *Exciſes*, *Cuſtoms* and *Salt-duties*, increaſe the expences of the people, and conſequently ruin our trade, the following account may not be improper.

Firſt, the *Duties* themſelves.

The net produce of the taxes following, was before the war computed to be, one year with another, as under:

Exciſes,	about *L.*	2,800,000
Cuſtoms,	about	1,700,000
Salt,	about	150,000
		4,650,000
The charges of raiſing theſe duties are about ten *per cent.*		465,000
		5,115,000

Secondly, The *advanced price of thoſe goods* the above duties are laid on.

Woful experience teaches us that every ſmall duty laid

Brought over L. 5,115,000

on commodities, raiſes the prices of them conſiderably to the Conſumer, beyond the groſs duty.

By the fees given to Officers, the tyrants of traders.

By Tradeſmen's loſs of time in attending upon Exciſemen or at Cuſtom-houſes: a Trader's time is his bread.

By taking away, a quarter part of our Traders ſtocks for duties, and forcing them to take as great profit on ¾ of their ſtocks laid out in goods, in order to live, as they would on the whole if duty-free.

By tradeſmens profits on the duty and advances in all the hands, all taxed goods come through to the Conſumer; as for example:

Suppoſe there ſhould be no other tax but that on leather, let us ſee how many advances that would make on the price of our ſhoes.

The Grazier lays (1) on the beaſt he fats his advanced price of ſhoes; he ſells to the Butcher, who (2) takes his profit on the Grazier's advanced price of the beaſt, and raiſes (3) on the hide his advanced price of ſhoes; he ſells to the Tanner, whoſe journey-men raiſe (4) their wages on account of their advanced price of ſhoes; the

Tanner

Brought over L. 5,115,000

Tanner pays (5) the tax of 2 *d.* *per* pound on leather; takes (6) his profit on the before-mentioned five advances, and raiſes (7) on the tann'd hide his advanced price of ſhoes; he ſells to the Leather-cutter, who takes (8) his profit on the before-mentioned ſeven advances, and raiſes (9) on the hide he cuts his advanced price of ſhoes; he ſells to the Shoemaker, whoſe journeymen raiſe (10) their wages on account of their advanced price of ſhoes; the Shoemaker takes (11) his profit on the before-mentioned ten advances, and raiſes (12) on the ſhoes he makes, the advanced price of the ſhoes he wears; he ſells to the Conſumer with all theſe *twelve Advances*, highly magnified beyond the bare duty.

So much for the tax on leather only: but the Grazier, Butcher, Tanner, Leather-cutter and Shoemaker uſe ſope; that ſope, like leather, is taxed, and, like that leather-tax, muſt be raiſed; but that cauſed twelve advances on our ſhoes, true; place therefore twelve advances more on ſhoes for the ſope-tax. Theſe tradeſmen uſe candles, twelve advances more for the tax on them; and the ſame for every other tax on neceſſaries.

All which duly conſidered,

Brought over	L. 5,115,000
might be computed at above *cent. per cent.* on the groſs produce of the duties. But though the large duties cauſe ſome farther advance on all the goods they are laid on, charged with profit upon profit through every hand they paſs; yet as they keep not pace with the ſmall duties, and all calculations appear faireſt when moderate, I chooſe to abate in the advances, and to ſet them only at fifty *per cent.*	2,557,500
The amount of the advanced price of the goods the above duties are laid on	7,672,500

Let us ſee how this 7,672,500 circulates through the people, advances the prices of our goods, conſequently ruins our trade.

Firſt, This dearneſs of all neceſſaries which raiſes the firſt coſt of goods, muſt advance the price of all labour.

The *Spectator* N° 200, computes, that the people, without property, who work for their daily-bread, do conſume $\frac{2}{3}$ of our Cuſtoms and Exciſes; therefore they pay $\frac{2}{3}$ of them and their conſequences. As theſe people live but from hand to mouth, whatever is laid on them, they muſt there-

fore

fore ſhift off, or they can't live; & ſince theſe various taxes have been projected, they muſt earn enough when they do work to pay the taxes, the advanced price of taxed goods, and the advanced prices of all other neceſſaries, *viz.* meat, bread, cloathing, or whatever they can uſe, not only for the conſumption of the days they are employed, but for thoſe alſo that they are not; therefore they are the cauſe of raiſing the wages of the working people $\frac{2}{3}$ of 7,672,500 *l.* the amount of the advanced price of the goods the above duties are laid on, which makes 5,115,000

Secondly, This dearneſs of all neceſſaries forces the Maſter-tradeſmen to raiſe on their cuſtomers the taxes and advances on their conſumption.

The above *Spectator* allows $\frac{1}{3}$ conſumption of our Cuſtoms and Exciſes to the people with property; but as theſe may be divided into two claſſes, *viz.* in trade, and out of trade, and the proportion conſumed by each not being aſcertained by any author, I ſhall compute them at half and half. Therefore the Maſter-tradeſmen, or people with property in trade, *viz.* Merchants, Manufacturers, Mechanics, Farmers, Wholeſale-dealers, and Retailing

Brought over *L.* 5,115,000

Shop-keepers, muſt each lay on the goods they ſell the advanced price of the taxed goods they conſume; whether food, cloathing, or utenſils: their $\frac{1}{6}$ conſumption of 7,672,500 *l.* the amount of the advanced price of the goods the above duties are laid on, makes 1,278,750

6,393,750

Thirdly, Tradeſmen's paying advanced prices on their goods muſt have advanced profits; for whether they lay out their ſtocks of money in goods that bear their natural value only, or goods that bear double that value by taxes, ſtill a living profit muſt be obtained on the ſtocks they employ.

For the wages of the Manufacturer, the Mechanic, the Labourer, and the expences of the Maſter-tradeſman, being of neceſſity raiſed, the firſt coſt of goods muſt be ſo too; and conſidering the various Tradeſmen's hands that goods paſs through from the Workman or Labourer, to the Conſumer, charged with profit upon profit by each of them, (which in the little trades muſt be very great, otherwiſe their returns being ſmall, they could not live) the advance thereby occaſioned may, at a moderate rate, be computed at 50 *per cent.* to the

Conſumer

Brought over		*L.* 6,393,750
Conſumer on the above two articles, which raiſe the firſt coſt of goods, and makes	3,196,875	
		9,590,625
People with property out of trade, their $\frac{1}{6}$ conſumption of 7,672,500 *l.* the amount of the advanced price of the goods the above duties are laid on, makes		1,278,750
Total advance,		*L.* 10,869,375

This is part of the amount of the conſequences of raiſing 4,650,000 *l.* for the Government, by our preſent manner of taxing goods.

Our other taxes are, the *Land-Tax*, the groſs produce, at about 4 *s.* in the pound is about	1,960,000
The *Stamps*, *Windows*, *Poſt-Office*, &c. their computed groſs produce about	500,000
The *Poor's Tax* is computed, on a middling rate, to equal the *Land-Tax*, but muſt be much more when trade is reduced, and the price of proviſions high; however, to reckon it at no more than the *Land-Tax*, or	1,960,000
General amount of all our taxes, and part of their conſequences, before the war,	*L.* 15,289,375

Let us ſee now the amount of our taxes, with regard to our expences: The *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* 1. *p.* 165.

computes our people at ſeven millions, and their expences at 7. *l. per* head; but as neceſſaries are grown dearer ſince the year 1713, when he wrote, and the number of people increas'd, I ſhall compute the people at eight millions, and their expences at 8 *l. per* head, which makes our total expence annually — *L.* 64,000,000

Of which 64 millions the people pay for the taxes, and their conſequences, as above, — 15,289,375

Which being ſubtracted, their expences, if untaxed, would be only — *L.* 48,710,625

15,289,375 *l.* charged on 48,710,625 *l.* is a tax of above 31 *per cent.* on the expences of the people, which muſt add a prodigious artificial value to our goods, conſequently render them leſs ſaleable, and ruin our trade.

If it is aſked, whether foreigners, for what goods they take of us, do not pay on that conſumption a great portion of our taxes?

The anſwer is, That it muſt be admitted they do; but if that was originally intended and expected to continue the ſame as at the firſt laying on of our taxes, it will be the ſtrongeſt argument againſt them; for as our taxes on neceſſaries are proved to be ſo burdenſom and extenſive, by raiſing the prices of our goods, foreigners take leſs of them yearly; and when the demand is reduced, the people having leſs work, find leſs money to pay,

pay, and yet have their taxes proportionably increaſed on them as they loſe their trade: for, as the Government abates neither expences or taxes, and if one method of taxing fails, another is tried; what foreigners ceaſe to pay, we muſt; or, in other words, the leſs trade and money, the more taxes; and the more our taxes are, the leſs and leſs trade and money we know we muſt expect. Is not this like adding to a horſe's burden, and diminiſhing his meat? and muſt we wonder if he ſinks under his load? perhaps figures may explain this ſtill clearer, by ſtating a ſimilar account thro' 30 years.

Suppoſe that in the year 1710, all our taxes, and part of their conſequences, were as they are now, *viz.* 15,289,375 *l.* that foreigners paid then $\frac{1}{7}$ of them, and our own people $\frac{6}{7}$; that foreigners going to cheaper markets ſince, have ceaſed taking goods from us yearly in proportion to one *per cent.* only on their former $\frac{1}{7}$ part of our taxes and their conſequences, the account every five years will ſtand thus:

	Foreigners paid of our Taxes, &c.	Our own People paid
Anno 1710	*L.* 2,184,196	*L.* 13,105,179
1715	2,074,987	13,214,388
1720	1,965,778	13,323,597
1725	1,856,569	13,432,806
1730	1,747,360	13,542,015
1735	1,638,151	13,651,224
1740	1,528,942	13,760,433

By

By this it plainly appears, in what manner our preſent taxes drive away our trade, and burden our people, who have by this account 655,254 *l* more to pay in 1740, than they had in 1710, with $\frac{3}{10}$ leſs trade to pay it with.

To conclude this head. Two of our greateſt authors clearly foreſaw, at the laying on our numerous exciſes, cuſtoms, *&c.* that theſe unhappy conſequences muſt neceſſarily follow; and their arguments are a full proof of what has been already advanced.

Mr. *Locke*, in his *Conſiderations*, &c. *p.* 90. ſays, " That for raiſing three millions on com-
" modities, and bringing ſo much into the *Ex-*
" *chequer*, there muſt go a great deal more
" than three millions out of the ſubjects
" pockets; for a tax of that nature cannot
" be levied by officers to watch every little
" rivulet of trade without a great charge,
" eſpecially at firſt trial; but ſuppoſing no
" more charge in raiſing it than of a *Land-*
" *Tax*, and that there are only three millions
" to be paid, 'tis evident that to do this out
" of commodities, they muſt to the Conſumer
" be raiſed $\frac{1}{4}$ in their price; ſo that every
" thing to him that uſes it, muſt be a quar-
" ter dearer. Let us ſee now who, at the
" long-run, muſt pay this quarter, and where
" it will light; 'tis plain the Merchant and
" Broker, neither will, nor can; for if he
" pays

" pays a quarter more for commodities than " he did, he will ſell them at a price pro- " portionably raiſed; the poor Labourer " and Handicraftſman cannot; for he juſt " lives from hand to mouth already, and all " his food, cloathing, and utenſils, coſting a " quarter more than they did before, either " his wages muſt riſe with the price of things " to make him live, or elſe, not being able " to maintain himſelf and family by his la- " bour, he comes to the pariſh."

And afterwards he proves, that in the home-conſumption the whole burden falls on land at laſt.

Dr. *Davenant*, in his *Eſſays on Trade, vol.* 3. *p.* 30. aſſerts, that " As to manufactures, " high exciſes in time of peace are utterly " deſtructive to that principal part of *Eng-* " *land*'s wealth; for if malt, coals, ſalt, lea- " ther, and other things bear a great price, " the wages of ſervants, workmen, and ar- " tificers, will conſequently riſe; for the in- " come muſt bear ſome proportion to the ex- " pence; and if ſuch as ſet the poor to work " find wages for labour, or manufactures ad- " vance upon them, they muſt riſe in the " price of their commodity, or they cannot " live: all which would ſignify little, if no- " thing but our own dealings among one an- " other were thereby affected; but it has a " conſequence far more pernicious in relati-

" on

" on to our foreign trade, for 'tis the ex-
" portation of our own product that muſt
" make *England* rich."

And in *page* 31. " But the conſequence of
" ſuch duties, in times of peace, will fall moſt
" heavily upon our woollen manufactures, of
" which moſt have more value from the
" workmanſhip than the material; and if the
" price of this workmanſhip be enhanced, it
" will in a ſhort courſe of time put a neceſ-
" ſity upon thoſe we deal with of ſetting up
" manufactures of their own, ſuch as they
" can, or of buying goods of the like kind
" and uſe from nations that can afford them
" cheaper."

II. *Of Monopolies, whereby the many are oppreſſed for the gain of a few.*

Beſides the misfortunes ariſing from our taxes, we have ſome Monopolies very deſtructive to a trading nation, and inconſiſtent with a free one; which encourage idleneſs, villany, and extravagant demands for wages or goods, whereby the many are deprived of their rights, without having committed any crime to forfeit them, and for the benefit of a few only; a country that ſuffers them, cannot ſend its goods ſo cheap to a foreign market as its neighbours; for never yet was a monopolized trade extended to the degree of

a

a free one; therefore any country abounding in monopolies muſt decline in trade.

To apply this to *Britain* which hath more Monopolies than are generally thought on.

Firſt Monopoly. *Britain againſt its other dominions.*

The trade of exporting woollens, and ſome other ſorts of goods, with the trade to ſome particular countries given to companies, we monopolize to ourſelves; and, in our abundant wiſdom, pay all the charges of Government; our fellow-ſubjects in *Scotland* pay but a trifle to the general ſupport; in *Ireland* and the Plantations, nothing at all: theſe trade under the protection of fleets that coſt them not a farthing: our generous wiſe land-wars, to maintain the balance and liberties of *Europe* at the riſk of our own, coſt them not a doit; all that we endeavour is to ſtarve them without expence, and ourſelves with; for that is the caſe, we drive one part of our people out of trade by Monopolies, and the other by Taxes. We bleed ourſelves almoſt to death, and think to recruit our ſpirits by devouring three millions of ſtarved *Iriſh* and *Americans*, and by exceſs of cunning make the ruin general.

Second Monopoly. *Companies with excluſive charters, viz. Eaſt-India, South-Sea, and Turkey Companies.*

Theſe

Theſe Companies prevent the increaſing the vent of our manufactures abroad; conſequently they ſtarve our poor; as will appear by the following reaſons.

1. By being all of them confined to *London*, the prices of the woollens they export are enhanced by long land-carriages up to town, with the additional charges of commiſſion, ware-houſe-rent, porterage, *&c.* much to the prejudice of their ſale; and what materials of manufacture they import are diſperſed over many parts of the kingdom by the like expenſive conveyance, to the great diſadvantage of the nation in general.

2. The *Turkey* Company, whoſe trade is almoſt dwindled away, can prevent diſpatching their ſhips for one year, if they pleaſe, to raiſe the price of ſilk at home for their own advantage, though the nation thereby loſes one whole year's vent and conſumption of its woollen goods in *Turkey*, which it's ſaid hath happened formerly; and if an iniquitous riſe is given to ſilk here, we cannot manufacture it with ſuch advantage as our neighbours. The reader will be pleaſed to conſider the fine ſituation our poor employed in the woollen and ſilk manufactures muſt be in at ſuch a time.

3. It is not the intereſt of the *Eaſt-India* Company to increaſe the quantities of the woollens they export, but rather to contract them

them (which I ſuppoſe was the reaſon for obliging them by their charter to export woollens to a certain value); for at all markets where there are any demands for goods, the ſmallneſs of the quantities naturally enhances the price; and if the company can gain as much on 5000 cloths as on 10000, is it not their intereſt to prefer the leſſer quantity on account of the leſs diſburſement and riſk? tho' it's plain the nation would loſe the ſale of one half of the manufactures capable of being vended; whereas private traders puſhing againſt one another, ſtudy to increaſe the vent of their goods by ſelling at moderate profits, making the quantities anſwer to themſelves and their country.

4. The large charges the *Eaſt-India* and *South-Sea* Companies are forced to be at for the ſalaries of the Directors, Governors, Supercargoes, *&c.* beſides what may ſlip thro' their fingers ſometimes, muſt make theſe Companies neglect all trades that will not yield extraordinary profits to defray them; which trades private Merchants would be glad of, and turn to good account for themſelves and their country, were they not debarred by excluſive charters.

5. The *Eaſt-India* and *South-Sea* Companies buying at home by Directors, and ſelling abroad by Servants, who may have an eye to their own or friends intereſt, and the

foundation of all being the Company's money, they cannot naturally be ſuppoſed to be ſo induſtrious as thoſe who trade only on their own ſtocks; therefore Companies can never extend trade like private Dealers, but muſt decay where Interlopers are admitted; of which our *African* Company is a ſtrong inſtance.

6. What confirms the whole is the prohibition of the *Eaſt-India* Company againſt their ſervants carrying out cloth; which would be needleſs, did they not know that their ſervants can underſell them; for the Company wants not money to ſupply all the cloth that can be vended with the uſual profit. In the year 1741, a Seizer was made, in one of the out-ports, of a large quantity of cloth deſigned for *India*, belonging to one of the company's ſervants; when at the ſame time, by the decay of our woollen trade, the Poor's Rates were at 8 *s.* in the pound, in ſome of our clothing-towns; from whence this abſurdity aroſe, That whilſt our Clothiers were ſtarving, the exportation of cloth was a contraband trade.

It is impoſſible to make any inquiry into our Companies, without taking notice of their paſt villanies; which, as they have been made ſufficiently public, few can be ignorant of: therefore the bare mention of them is enough; ſuch as, the fatal *South-Sea* ſcheme, that ruined

ed thouſands of families. What need to mention former Directors receiving ſalaries from Companies, and, tho' contrary to law, being notwithſtanding concerned in the *Oſtend* trade to *India*, whereby they were cutting the throats of their benefactors; the ſelling goods by falſe ſamples, and buying them for their private accounts; carrying on private trade contrary to treaty, and bribing officers to wink at them with the Company's money, and charged to account by the genteel name of *preſents*, ſubjecting thereby the Company's effects to ſeizures, and their country to perpetual jars. The rapaciouſneſs of Governors abroad, who by engroſſing goods, nay even the neceſſaries of life, have oppreſſed the people by arbitrary prices, and drove away our trade. Supercargoes, cheating by falſe invoices. Captains, quitting or loſing ſhips, to defraud Inſurers and Bottomree-lenders: are not theſe things written in the books of their chronicles?

But the greateſt miſchief of all is, that the honeſty of the people hath been corrupted, by having preſented to their eyes roguery lightly puniſhed, if not triumphant.

Theſe Companies prevent the increaſe of our navigation.

By their excluſive charters, debarring us from a free trade to ¾ parts of the known world. The dominions of the Grand Signior

in *Europe*, *Aſia*, and *Africa*, are confined to the *Turkey* Company. All *South*, and part of *North America*, from *Vera Cruz* to *Carthagena*, from *Buenos Ayres* round *Cape Horn* to *California*, that vaſt extent of coaſt, is the portion of the *South-ſea* Company. All the coaſts of *Africa*, *Aſia*, from the *Cape of Good Hope* to *Japan*, are the lot of the *Eaſt-India* Company. And what a ſmall number of ports do they all trade to, and what a trifling navigation do they all maintain? there are a greater number of ſhip-tonage employed in the trade to the free port of *Leghorn* only, than all theſe three companies employ in their Monopolies to ¼ parts of the world, like the fable of the *dog in the manger*, not eating *themſelves*, but preventing *thoſe* who would.

Third Monopoly. *city and corporation-charters.*

Where freemen exclude by charter any of the ſame trade from ſettling in their towns, have they not a Monopoly againſt the reſt of the inhabitants? Cannot they impoſe extravagant prices for their goods on their Cuſtomers, and do they not do it?

Where no Journeymen but freemen can work in towns, have they not a monopoly for wages againſt their Maſters? do not both theſe caſes advance the firſt coſt of goods, to the prejudice of their ſale abroad, and account

count for foreigners reckoning our country ſo dear?

If a Journeyman, not being a freeman, gets into work in a city or town-corporate, what an outcry is there not made of a foreigner's being come among them, to eat the bread out of their mouths? How! can a free-born *Briton* be reckoned a foreigner in any part of his own country? what an abſurdity is here! yet nevertheleſs true. Can one man eat the bread out of another's mouth without being more induſtrious than he? impoſſible! it muſt therefore be idleneſs and luxury they contend for, not bread.

This is one of the reaſons why foreigners flock to our plantations, inſtead of ſettling here; and, by our decay of trade, many of our own people go over to live there yearly; ſo that many going, and few coming to ſupply their places, a ſcarcity of people will hereafter enſue, to the great damage of the mother-country.

Mr. *Stanyan*, in his excellent *account of Switzerland*, *page* 140, obſerves, "That the "tradeſmen citizens of *Berne*, are generally "eſteemed to be proud and lazy; which "qualities proceed chiefly from two privi-"leges they enjoy: one is their right of be-"ing choſen into the government by virtue "of their burgerſhip, which makes them "proud; and the other is, that of hindering

" any but a citizen from exerciſing any trade
" within the cities, which makes them lazy.
" From whence two inconveniences natural-
" ly flow, one that the inhabitants pay very
" dear for their goods, and the other that
" the workmen are bad; for where there is
" no great choice of artificers one muſt be
" contented not only with bad work, but to
" pay ſuch a price for it as they pleaſe to im-
" poſe."

Mark the dainty effects of monopolizing charters, pride, lazineſs, dearneſs of price, and bad work.

Fourth Monopoly. *Laws to prevent the importation of cattle, butter, &c. from* Ireland.

This gives a Monopoly to a few breeding counties to impoſe upon the reſt of the people high prices for cattle, *&c.* to the ruin of our manufactures, forces the labourer to live dear, and of courſe to raiſe his wages: is greatly prejudicial alſo to our navigation; for whatever enhances the expences of a ſhip, enhances its freight, and gives opportunity to foreigners to victual cheaper in *Ireland* than we can do at home.

But it will be objected to me, That this is done to raiſe or keep up the value of our lands?

To which I anſwer: That there is always a great noiſe made about encouraging the home-conſumption; by which is meant making neceſſaries bear a great price; which can

can ariſe only from an improper knowledge of the true nature of trade: for this is ſo far from being beneficial, that it has juſt the contrary effect. Certainly the leſs is conſumed within, the more will be left to export; the cheaper things are, the more of them will be exported, and it is exportation only that makes a nation rich. This Monopoly, with reſpect to the people, is unjuſt, and the benefit of it to the land-holders only imaginary; as for inſtance, *A* hath a grazing eſtate, to raiſe the value of which, all cattle from *Ireland* are to be prohibited: *A* having the ſole market, raiſes the prices of his cattle upon the reſt of the people, *B*, *C*, *D*, down to *Z*, twenty three in number; and their pockets are to be emptied only to fill his; a very equitable project indeed! But tho' theſe people were as blind as puppies, yet neceſſity, and the natural courſe of things, will force them to retaliate upon him; for as a Monopoly raiſes the price of cattle, their dearneſs raiſes the price of labour; dear labour makes dear goods: ſo that the food, cloathing, utenſils, labour, every thing *A* wants, comes dearer to him; an imaginary value is given to every thing, ſo that tho' *A* ſhould have more rent for a time (which yet the decline of foreign trade muſt bring down afterwards), the money he receives is of leſs value, not going ſo far, or being able to purchaſe ſo much,

much, as when goods bore their natural value only: ſo that what he thinks he puts in with one hand, is pulled out by the other; 'tis all a *deceptio viſûs*, ſetting people together by the ears to prey upon one another, letting foreigners in the mean while eat the bread out of their mouths; for a nation that adds an artificial value to its commodities by Monopolies, cannot export them in ſuch quantities to foreign ports, where they are rivalled by thoſe that bear only their natural value; and their home-conſumption will likewiſe ſink in price by the nation's having leſs money brought in by foreign trade; ſuch a two-edged ſword are Monopolies to lands. Every home-commodity in a free trade will find its natural value; for tho' that fluctuates, as of neceſſity it muſt, according to the plentifulneſs or ſcarcity of ſeaſons, yet for the home-conſumption, every home-commodity muſt have great advantage over the foreign, as being upon the ſpot, and free from freight, inſurance, commiſſion, and charges, which, on the produce of lands, being all bulky commodities, muſt in the general be about 15 *per cent.* and a greater advantage cannot be given without prejudice; for 15 *per cent.* makes a great difference in the price of neceſſaries, between the nation ſelling and the nation buying, and is a great difficulty on the latter; but ariſing from the natural courſe of things,

cannot

cannot be helped; tho' it's a ſufficient ſecurity to the Land-holders, that foreigners can never import more neceſſaries than are abſolutely required; and I preſume, in ſuch caſes, they have more charity than to ſtarve the people merely for an imaginary profit, which yet would prove their ruin in the end; for it is a fallacy and an abſurdity to think to raiſe or keep up the value of lands by oppreſſions on the people that cramp their trade; for if trade declines, the common people muſt either come upon the pariſh, or fly for buſineſs to our neighbours: in the firſt caſe, they become a heavy tax upon the rich, and, inſtead of buying the produce of the lands, muſt have it given them; and, in the ſecond caſe, when the conſumers are gone, what price will the produce of land bear? a ſmall conſumption makes a ſmall demand, and a ſmall demand makes a ſmall price for any commodity; ſo that when in converſation the wiſdom of our laws is magnified to prevent the importation of cattle, *&c.* from *Ireland*, or corn from any nation, unleſs it firſt bears an immoderate price here (as keeping up the value of lands), how would a *Hollander* or *Frenchman* ſmile when he reflected, that in his country the poor getting proviſions from any place where they can be had the cheapeſt, are thereby enabled to work at prices the *Engliſh* can't live on, and by working cheaper, work more, that

is,

is, run away with their trade, their money and their working-people; and when theſe are gone, we may as well give them the land into the bargain, for any value it will be of. Beſides, the value of our land is at preſent but nominal. To prove which,

It won't be ſuſpected to be an under computation to reckon the rental of *England* at	*L*, 20,000,000
The exports and freights at	8,000,000
In page 42, the expences of the people of *England* are computed at	64,000,000
The general amount of taxes, and part of their conſequences, is	*L*, 15,289,375
If our exports and freights make $\frac{1}{8}$ of the expences of the people, they muſt be computed to pay $\frac{1}{8}$ of the laſt article, which makes	1,911,171
Which being deducted, the remainder is what falls on land.	13,378,204

Mr. *Locke*, in his *Conſiderations*, *&c. page* 95, treating of taxes on commodities ſays, "It is in vain, in a country whoſe great "fund is land, to hope to lay the public "charge of the government on any thing "elſe, there at laſt it will terminate. The "merchant (do what you can) will not "bear it, the labourer cannot, and therefore "the land-holder muſt." If Foreign Trade will pay but $\frac{1}{8}$, Land muſt pay the remaining

ing $\frac{7}{8}$, which amounting to 13,378,204, and falling on a rental of 20,000,000 *l.* is above 13 *s.* in the pound tax upon all the lands of *England*; ſo that land with the preſent taxes at 20 *s. per* acre, or without the preſent taxes at 7 *s. per* acre, are equal, and the land is more reduced by our taxes and monopolies, than by any poſſible free importation; and this prohibition, by us called a *remedy*, is only a forwarding our general decay of trade, and conſequently our general decay of rents; which actually happened after paſſing this prohibitory law, as *Roger Coke* informs us in his treatiſe, *That the church and ſtate of England are in equal danger with the trade*, publiſhed in 1671; in *page* 64. His words are, "That the ends deſigned by the acts a-"gainſt the importation of *Iriſh* cattle, of "raiſing the rents of the lands of *England*, "are ſo far from being attained, that the "contrary hath enſued. And here I wiſh a "ſurvey were taken how many thouſand "farms are thrown up ſince this act; how "many thouſand farms are abated, ſome "above $\frac{1}{6}$, others above $\frac{1}{4}$, others above $\frac{1}{3}$; "ſome I know, which after two years lying "waſte, are abated one half."

Fifth Monopoly. *Laws to prevent the importation of moſt ſorts of fiſh by foreigners.*

This gives a Monopoly to our few fiſhermen and fiſhmongers againſt our own people; and

and the conſequence is, that fiſh bears five times the price at *London* that it does at *Amſterdam*, or more; great quantities of fiſh being thrown away by our dealers to keep up extravagant prices, to the great grievance of our induſtrious poor. And it has prevented our gaining the *Scotch* fiſhery, by baniſhing from our coaſts the *Dutch* fiſhermen, who would in time have ſettled with us, our own country being better than *Holland*; nothing but taxes and monopolies can keep them away; for who would pay heavy taxes to live in a bad country, when he could live free and untaxed in a good one? this obſtruction hath enabled the *French* to commence fiſhermen on our coaſts, who employ already a great number of veſſels; how dangerous this may in time prove, I leave every honeſt *Engliſhman* to judge. And what a melancholy figure do we make, ſurrounded by fiſheries, yet ſo bound down by taxes, monopolies, *&c.* that we cannot undertake them, but ſit tamely idle, and ſee foreigners ſwarming upon our coaſts, and carrying away our riches!

Sixth Monopoly. *The navigation act.*

Altho' this act is beneficial to us under our preſent diſeaſes in trade, but would be needleſs were they perfectly remedied, yet is it even now not without its inconveniences: for a law that confines, in any degree, our imports or exports to particular ſhips or men, gives

gives a monopoly to thoſe for whoſe benefit the reſtraint is framed, which in this caſe is either the navigation of the countries whoſe growths we import, or elſe our own. And this Monopoly is very prejudicial to our manufactures; for 'tis enacting that ſeveral neceſſaries and materials of manufacture ſhall not be imported by the cheapeſt navigation, but by a dear one, and of courſe that they ſhall pay dear freights, which muſt raiſe their price; and if the Manufacturer buys his materials dear, he muſt ſell his manufacture in proportion. Beſides it is enacted, that theſe neceſſaries, *&c.* ſhall not be brought from any country but the place of growth, or moſt convenient uſual port of ſhipping; which gives a Monopoly to Foreigners, and to our Merchants, againſt our own people; for foreigners will always know our neceſſity for any ſort of goods, and if our ſole dependence lies upon any one nation, they will not fail to make us pay for it. Beſides, this gives opportunity and ſecurity to our Merchants for engroſſing; becauſe, if they import or buy up large quantities of commodities at the uſual times of ſhipping, they are ſecured in what extravagant prices they think proper to impoſe on our people till that time returns, all foreign nations who have laid up ſtocks being excluded our market, tho' they could afford

them ever ſo cheap. Accordingly, the Author of the *Britannia languens*, *page* 65. informs us, "That the *Danes*, taking the advantage of this act, raiſed their prices and cuſtoms upon us for pitch, tar, and timber, near double; and the *Leiflanders* the ſame for hemp and flax." And in *page* 68. he ſays, "That the excluding great numbers of foreign ſhips from our ports, muſt hinder the vending of great proportions of our beef, pork, corn, beer, clothing, and other neceſſaries. And *page* 69. the *Dutch* allow free commerce to all foreigners and their ſhips." Now, as this act makes our Navigation dear, it for that reaſon deprives us of the Fiſhing-trade, the great nurſery of Seamen, which cannot be carried on but by a cheap navigation to vie with the *Dutch* and *French*, in which we make no progreſs worth ſpeaking of: therefore, in this caſe, this act has deprived us of Seamen, inſtead of increaſing them; and the acquiſition of foreign Seamen, in any degree, being prevented by this act, gives a monopoly to our own Sailors; by which means, in war-time, or any ſpurt of trade, they exact near double the wages that foreign ſeamen are content with; which oppreſſes our Merchants, brings our goods dear to all markets, giving foreign manufacturers a great advantage againſt our own; and our Sailors lying hid in order to get greater wages

wages by their monopoly in the Merchants ſervice, is one, amongſt other reaſons, of the difficulties we find in manning the King's ſhips. *Roger Coke*, in his *Diſcourſe on Trade*, publiſhed in 1670, *page* 27. ſays, "That two "years after the *Rump* making this law, the "building of ſhips became ⅓ pemy dearer, "and Seamen's wages ſo exceſſive, that we "have wholly loſt the trades to *Muſcovy* "and *Greenland* thereby."

Seventh Monopoly. *Laws to prevent the exporting of woollen manufactures from* Ireland.

After the fear that the value of our lands ſhould be leſſened by the improvement of *Ireland*, had produced a deſtructive prohibition of *Iriſh* cattle, as has been proved already; the people of that country being neceſſitated to find out ſome other employment for their lands, turned their thoughts to the breeding of ſheep and raiſing a growth of wool; no ſooner was this effected, but a prohibition enſued on our part to export the manufactures made of that wool. This prohibition on the *Iriſh* hath ruined the woollen-trade of *Britain*, and raiſed that of *France*; for unleſs the *Iriſh* are ſuffered to export woollen goods, they muſt ſell their raw wool to the beſt bidder, and that is *France*; one pack of *Iriſh* wool works up two packs or more of *French* wool, which is double the damage to *Britain*, that the opening the exports of woollen goods

from *Ireland* would be; and *France*, by leſſening her taxes in times of peace, enabling thereby her people to work cheap, could afford to give large prices for *Iriſh* wool, and became the chief market for it, having thereby raiſed for exportation an immenſe cheap ſaleable manufacture, which their own wool was not capable of doing: as this increas'd, that of *Britain* declined; and tho' they are now increaſing and we declining, yet ſtill this fear, or rather infatuation, about the value of our lands, makes us perſiſt in a prohibition that not only hurts the *Iriſh*, ruins ourſelves, but enriches the *French*: for as the caſe now ſtands, either *Ireland* or *France* muſt have the Woollen-manufacture; *Britain*, by reaſon of its heavy taxes and monopolies that make labour dear, being out of the queſtion. The *Iriſh* export clandeſtinely ſome camblets to *Liſbon*, and underſell the *French*; therefore the *Iriſh* can recover the Woollen-trade out of their hands: And ſhall we compliment the *French* with a trade that we deny our own ſubjects? Nay, one third of what *Ireland* gets, centers here at laſt: and ſhall we refuſe ſuch a ſum which the *Iriſh* would ſnatch from our enemies, and preſent to us?

III. *Of*

III. *Of Ill-judged Laws.*

The laws which give a bounty on exported corn, fiſh and fleſh, are very prejudicial to our manufactures.

For wages depending on the high or low price, corn, fiſh and fleſh bear, the bounties on their exportation ſerve only to feed foreigners cheaper than our own people, to run away with our trade: the pretence of encouraging tillage by a bounty on corn can have no weight now ſince our great improvements on huſbandry, much leſs if we erected magazines of corn in every county againſt times of ſcarcity: Foreigners never buy proviſions till they want them, and then they muſt have them whether we give bounties or no. The *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* 2. *p.* 247. ſays, "If we "were to become a province to *France*, "we ſhould be obliged to give a bounty on "wool as we do on our corn, that *France* "might have it cheaper than our people." And in *p.* 400. "he computes the value of "the manufacture in our woollen-goods in "general, at three times the value of the "wool." Now I appeal to all men of ſenſe, whether it be not much more prejudicial in this caſe, to feed the workman cheaper, than to ſell cheaper the material: the manufacture being as three to one in our woollen-trade only, a bounty on exported wool, tho' abſurd and deſtructive, ſtops there; but boun-

ties on exported corn, fiſh, and fleſh, ſerve to feed the *French* cheaper than our own people, to run away not only with our woollen, but alſo our ſilk, linen, and iron manufactures; every thing we can undertake, all trade, all navigation. Is not this conduct more abſurd, more deſtructive? Could we have acted more ſervilely had we become a province to *France*, or rather is not this the way to make us ſo? All attempts to confine our wool at home muſt prove vain until our people are eaſed of Taxes, Monopolies, and Ill-judged Laws equally with or beyond foreigners: for while the *French* can underwork us ſo much, they can afford to give vaſt prices for our wool; and what effect any prohibition will have againſt vaſt profits, the reader may judge. The penalty of death hinders not bullion from being brought away from *Spain* and *Portugal*. Sir *Joſiah Child* remarks upon this ſubject of our wool, in his *Tract of Trade*, *p.* 157. "That they that can give the beſt price for "a commodity, ſhall never fail to have it by "one means or other, notwithſtanding the "oppoſition of any laws, or interpoſition of "any power by ſea or land; of ſuch force, "ſubtlety, and violence, is the general courſe "of trade." It ſeems ſomething ſurpriſing, that ſuch ſmall countries as the *Britiſh* Iſlands ſhould be ever ſuppoſed to grow ſufficient quantities of wool, and that of peculiar ſorts too,

too, to glut all the world with its manufactures; or that it ſhould be thought a reaſonable anſwer to the queſtion, How comes our woollen-trade to decay? to ſay, The quantities made are too great for the conſumption, did we not frequently meet with it in converſation. Theſe Iſlands are not the 350th part of the computed ſuperficies of the whole earth; to think that one part with only what it can ſpare from its own conſumption, ſhould be able to overſtock with a commodity univerſally neceſſary 349 other parts, is ſtrange. But the ſolution of the myſtery is this, that we, by our taxes and monopolies, cannot give the manufacture the vent it formerly had, or is now capable of; for the material is ſo far from being a drug, that foreigners give any price for it, and we are forced to attempt the preventing its exportation by ſevere penal laws. 'Tis therefore the manufacture, that being raiſed to an extravagant price by taxes and laws, which make proviſions dearer to our own people than to foreigners, we cannot give vent to near home, and are deprived doing of it in the remote trades to ¾ parts of the world by our monopolizing companies, whereby great quantities of woollen-goods being crowded for ſale into a few ports, become conſequently deſpis'd and undervalued; whereas, was our trade quite free, we ſhould ſend but ſmall quantities

quantities of woollens to the reſpective numerous ports we then traded to, which would naturally increaſe their price; for being the beſt manufactured, as they grow ſcarce, they would become eſteemed and demanded, inſomuch that we might be obliged to import wools ourſelves to anſwer the demand. 'Tis our ill management of our trade, and that only, which enables Foreigners to deprive us even of our natural advantages, of which our woollen-trade is one.

Our laws relating to our poor are a vaſt encouragement to Idleneſs.

By obliging Pariſhes to maintain their own poor, we intitle them to a certain maintenance, whether they deſerve it or no; ſo that when proviſions are cheap, they won't work above half the week, but ſot or idle away half their time, laying nothing up for ſickneſs or old age, becauſe the Pariſh muſt provide for them then. This is one of the reaſons why the wages of our ſervants and labourers are ſo exceſſive high, becauſe our laws providing for the idle, none will work without being extravagantly paid; whereas, had they nothing to depend upon but their induſtry, or the character of it to recommend them to the charitable in their misfortunes, they would be glad of conſtant work at moderate prices, to ſupport themſelves; be more frugal to make a reſerve againſt times of adverſity,

adverſity, and more ſtudious to deſerve that relief they might want.

Beſides, theſe laws are vaſtly unjuſt; for the Poor's Rates being very high, are a heavy tax on the induſtrious to maintain the idle; and as every poſitive tax muſt raiſe the prices of labour and goods, the induſtrious are thereby ſtill more oppreſſed, and the ſale of our goods hindered abroad; for our labour is grown ſo exceſſively dear, that we loſe all trades where foreigners come in competition with us.

Idleneſs is ſtill more encouraged by the defects of our laws againſt vagabonds: a free people are always brave, and the brave always compaſſionate; which being a diſtinguiſhing character of our people, they are eaſily impoſed on by the leaſt appearance of diſtreſs; ſo that ſome beggars who can counterfeit miſery well, get more money in a day than many diligent labourers, to the great diſcouragement of the induſtrious, who ſee idleneſs ſo well rewarded; whereby our roads and ſtreets ſwarm with beggars, all the diſturbance they meet with being, now and then, turned by a Beadle out of his pariſh into the next; which is only ſhifting the evil from one door to another, but works no reformation. And if an inquiry could be made into the manner that our poor now ſpend thoſe

thoſe alms they receive from their pariſhes, I believe the greateſt part thereof would appear to be ſquandered away in drams, and that the bulk of them are maintained only to get drunk.

The ſuffering people to fine for pariſh-offices is one of the greateſt defects in theſe laws; for the better ſort of houſe-keepers paying to ſave themſelves the trouble of putting our laws in force, the execution of them is left to the inferior, who have not time to ſpare from their callings to do it well; who are too often tempted to ſquander away the money raiſed for the poor in feaſting, or turn it to their profit by furniſhing work-houſes with neceſſaries at extravagant prices; whereby the pariſhioners are high-rated, and the pariſhes brought into debt.

It is a common ſaying, That our laws are good, but ill executed: to which I anſwer, That a law not executed, is worſe than no law at all; therefore cannot be good: for the weakneſs of a law appearing by its being evaded, makes the people have a mean opinion of the wiſdom of the legiſlature, and brings a contempt on our laws in general; therefore muſt be bad. A law that, by its rewards or puniſhments, does not enforce obedience to its commands, is in effect no law at all; and what has no effect, does no good.

Our

Our laws that create high duties and penalties are extremely cruel.

The humane ſtudiers of the art of government are deſired to reflect, how like ſuch laws are to the character the Parſons give us of the devil; the high duties make the temptations, and the penalties deſtroy men for falling into them. Beſides, the bulk of mankind muſt live as they can, not as they will; if ſome means fail, they muſt try others: now to make trade criminal, when in the nature of things it is not ſo, is cutting off the means the people have of living, *i. e.* ſtarving them.

Our laws that fix and ſettle the proportion between our gold and ſilver coins, are very prejudicial.

For as the metals themſelves vary here in value weekly as the proportion changes abroad, one or other of our coins muſt be carried away with loſs to the nation, as is often the caſe with our ſilver coins; as for example, A pound of ſtandard ſilver is coined into 62 *s.* ſo that one pound and $\frac{1}{6}$ therefore make 63 *s.* and exchanges for three guineas. By *Caſtaing*'s paper of *February* 3. 1740. ſtandard ſilver was at 5 *s.* 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d*, *per* ounce, which makes for one pound and $\frac{1}{62}$ 68 *s.* 7 $\frac{4}{62}$ *d.* being above 5 *s.* 7 $\frac{4}{62}$ *d.* more than the currency; almoſt nine *per cent.* loſs to us, and gain to foreigners who carry away our ſilver coin. Can we wonder

wonder at the ſcarcity of it when we make it ſo profitable an article to be carried away? Mr. *Locke* obſerves in his *Conſiderations*, &c. *page* 167. "If your law ſet it, *i. e.* the proportion of gold to ſilver at 15, when it is "at the free market-rate in the neighbouring countries as 16 to 1, will they not ſend "hither their ſilver to fetch away your gold "at $\frac{1}{16}$ loſs to you? Or if you will keep its "rate to ſilver as 15 to 1, when in *Holland*, "*France*, and *Spain*, its market-value is but "14. will they not ſend hither their gold "and fetch away your ſilver at $\frac{1}{15}$ loſs to "you? this is unavoidable, if you will make "money of both gold and ſilver at the ſame "time, and ſet rates upon them by law in "reſpect of one another."

And here it may not be improper to obſerve, that our expenſive law-ſuits are deſtructive to trade, making traders often ſubmit to impoſitions rather than ſeek a remedy, that by its expence often proves worſe than the diſeaſe; or where juſtice is uncertain to be obtained through the unſkilfulneſs of the courts of law, which ſeldom fully comprehend the intricacy of mercantile diſputes and accounts. The council confeſs it in open court, and often perplex a cauſe by their ignorance, which they ſhould clear up by their knowledge; and many times the Judge in ſumming up the evidence, will ſay to the Jury, that

that the diſpute is a matter of trade which I don't underſtand, and you do; and many cauſes have by cautious Judges been recommended to be left to the reference of ſome of the Jury, ending at a great expence what might have been done without any worth mentioning. It would be juſt as reaſonable for Lawyers to conſult Merchants in points of law, as Merchants them in points of trade, caſes in which they are equally ignorant. Beſides, to what a vaſt expence are not creditors put in taking out commiſſions againſt bankrupts, which of all caſes ſhould be attended with the leaſt, and where loſſes are already but too bad; is it not barbarous to make them worſe by a heavy expence? for the reſt, the reader is referred to Sir *Joſiah Child*'s *Diſcourſe on Trade*, *page* 141. where this ſubject is finely treated on.

I ſhall now attempt to ſhew in ſome degree, the amount of our Monopolies and Ill-judged Laws.

Though it be above my capacity to point out exactly the advance in the prices of our goods, occaſioned by each ſeparate Monopoly or Ill-judged Law, that ruins our trade, or to fix the utmoſt degree that our taxes joined to them carry the artificial value to; yet an attempt at ſome amount, ſufficient for our pur-

poſe, may be made. As our woollen-trade is our greateſt concern, the example ſhall be drawn from that.

De Wit in his *Memoirs*, *page* 57, ſays, "That the making a piece of cloth in *Holland* "coaſts 70 livres, of which the workmen "pay 20 for taxes." That work then untaxed would be only 50 livres, and 20 livres charged on 50, is juſt 40 *per cent.* tax on labour. The *Dutch* taxes have been conſiderably raiſed ſince *De Wit*'s time to ſupport two *French* wars, which may amount to as much again for ought I know; but to make the calculation appear the fairer by being moderate, I ſhall ſuppoſe the increaſe only at 10 *per cent.* making in all 50 *per cent.* tax on *Dutch* labour.

"The war in 1672. created ſo large a "debt, that the province of *Holland* only, "paid 80 tuns of gold, which is near "800,000 *l.* Sterling *per annum* intereſt." *vide The View of the Taxes, &c. during Queen Anne's war*, reprinted in 1743. *p.* 4.

Engliſh wool ſmuggled to foreigners, ſells at above 50 *per cent.* advance on the *Engliſh* price; they find it anſwers as well or better than any other foreign wools they import, otherwiſe they would not covet it ſo much as they do; or we make ſo many ſevere laws in vain, to prevent their having it.

In

In the *Obſervations on Britiſh wool*, *p.* 53, the author ſuppoſes the value of a pack of *Engliſh* combing-wool, at 6*l.* The weight of a pack of wool being 240 pounds, is juſt 6*d per* pound. In *p.* 23. he ſays, The price of *Engliſh* and *Iriſh* combing-wool at *Abbeville* was (about the year 1738) at 10*d.* and 10½ Sterling the pound; which laſt price is 10*l.* 10*s.* a pack, and juſt 75 *per cent.* advance on the *Engliſh* price; which will not be thought extraordinary, when a ſurvey is taken of the penalties the ſmugglers incur by our laws, if detected, (beſides the charges of ſhipping, *&c.*) for,

By the 9th and 10th of *William* III. wool found carrying towards the ſea in *Kent* and *Suſſex*, unleſs entered, and ſecurity given, is forfeited, with 3*s. per* pound penalty.

By the 9th and 10th of *William* III. wool laden on any ſhip for exportation, unleſs entered, and ſecurity given, is forfeited, with 3*s. per* pound penalty.

By the 12th of *Charles* II. maſter and mariners knowing thereof, and aſſiſting, to forfeit all their goods and chattels, and ſuffer three months impriſonment.

By the 7th and 8th of *William* III. perſons aſſiſting in the exportation, to ſuffer three months impriſonment, without bail or mainprize.

By *ditto*, The inhabitants of a place out of, or through which the wool is carried or exported, are to forfeit 20*l.* if the goods be under the value of 10*l.* but if above, triple the value, and triple coſts of ſuit.

By *ditto*, To be recovered by action againſt the owners and their aſſiſtants.

By the 5th of *George* II. wool ſeized on board any veſſel without cocket or warrant, the veſſel, her guns, tackle and furniture to be forfeited.

By the 4th of *George* I. perſons not paying the ſum recovered in three months, the Court may order tranſportation for ſeven years, as for felony.

The *Dutch* have intirely beat us out of the trade to *Portugal* in the middling ſorts of cloth, between 8 and 11 *s. per* yard; and I appeal to our Clothiers, if the mixt cloths made for exportation, between thoſe prices, are not reduced to a mere trifle in quantity, to what they were formerly; or rather, if hardly any be made. A *Dutch* cloth then may be fairly computed to have 50 *per cent.* advance upon it in the price of its wool and taxes on its labour, and yet comes cheaper to a foreign market than an *Engliſh* one; the latter muſt have a fictitious value of above that ſum upon it; and as 1 *per cent.* is ſufficient to turn the ſcale of a trade that is *in æquilibrio*, I ſhall compute the fictitious value of an *Engliſh* cloth but at 51 *per cent.*

In page 42 the amount of our Taxes on the expences of our people is above	31 *per cent.*
Therefore the Monopolies and Ill-judged Laws that affect this cloth may be about	20 *per cent.*
Together	51 *per cent.*

A bale of *Engliſh* cloths now coſting	*L.*	100
Has included in that price an artificial value ariſing from Taxes, Monopolies, and Ill-judged Laws, with their conſequences, as above		51
Which being ſubtracted, the natural value of this bale of cloths, if freed from Taxes, *&c.* would be only	*L.*	49

L 51 charged by Taxes, Monopolies, Ill-judged Laws, with part of their conſequences on 49 *l.* is above 104 *per cent.* and is ſo far an artificial value added to our goods, at a low computation.

Beſides the prejudice done to trade by this artificial value we give our goods, it likewiſe weakens and diſtreſſes the Government, which is forced to raiſe above double the ſums neceſſary on the people for every piece of ſervice; whereby murmurs and diſcontents ariſe, the people grow ſooner impoveriſhed, and unable to raiſe the ſupplies; for above half the value of every thing we want being fictitious, *we are forced to raiſe the ſame money to maintain* 112,500 *men, as the* French *do to maintain* 300,000; as appears by the *Britiſh Merchant, vol.* 1. *page* 7.; and if the ſame difference of expence holds in the fleets, that ſingle conſideration ſhould, I think, open our eyes to make our ſecurity greater, by throwing out all fictitious value from our labour and goods, to be able to cope with theſe our only dangerous enemies on more equal terms.

IV. *Our large National Debt.*

This is fraught with many inconveniences.

Firſt, It has ruined our trade, by ſerving for a pretence to continue thoſe taxes on commodities; the deſtructive conſequences of which to trade I have before proved.

Secondly, It deſtroys private credit. The *Annals of Europe* for the year 1739, *p.* 444, juſtly remark, "That theſe funds firſt drew "out of private hands moſt of that money "which ſhould, and otherwiſe would have "been lent to our Merchants and Tradeſmen; "this made it difficult for ſuch to borrow "any money upon perſonal ſecurity; and "this difficulty ſoon made it unſafe to lend "money upon ſuch ſecurity; which of "courſe deſtroyed all private credit, and "greatly injured our trade in general.

Thirdly, It encourages idleneſs; for ſeveral people making from 3 to 4 *per cent.* of their money ſleeping, are mere drones in the hive, improving no land, nor extending any trade.

Fourthly, It encourages luxury; idleneſs is the mother of vice; and a mere ſtock-holder being the idleſt perſon upon earth, has nothing to ſtudy but how to kill time by vanities and luxuries, in which this nation has of late days made a great proficiency.

Fifthly, It waſtes the body-politic; for a great part of our National Debt (computed by ſome at 20 millions) belonging to Foreigners

not

not reſiding here, but whoſe intereſt is remitted abroad, they are in the ſame ſtate with reſpect to the nation as landholders-abſentees, thoſe cankers to the riches of a country, ſuppoſing the intereſt remitted abroad to Foreigners to be only 750,000 *l. per annum.*

If our trade prove but a little beneficial, ſo large a ſum going out yearly will certainly keep us poor.

If our trade brings us in neither profit or loſs, and the current caſh of the nation is 12 millions, the intereſt paid Foreigners in 16 years will run away with it all.

But if the general balance of our trade comes to be againſt us, the ſending abroad yearly money to pay that balance, joined to the above 750,000 *l. per annum* intereſt, muſt bring deſtruction upon us like a whirlwind. So fine a ſituation have our debts brought us to!

Having thus made ourſelves tributaries to foreigners, poverty muſt be our portion; for a foreigner, who for fifty years paſt has received from us for his dividends in our funds 1000 *l.* yearly, computing the intereſt of money at 4 *per cent.* only, has drained us of 156,115 *l.* having his capital ſtill unſatisfied. Nay this plunder, tho' monſtrous, is much under-rated; for the intereſt of money at the beginning of this term of years was much greater than 4 *per cent.*; but not being able

able to learn the exact times of the reductions of intereſt, the reader muſt content or diſcontent himſelf with a modeſt, though ſhameful account,

That theſe Taxes, Monopolies, Ill-judged Laws and National Debts, are the true cauſes of the decline of our Foreign Trade, will appear by demonſtrating them to be the cauſes of the ſmuggling of our wool to *France*.

It has been proved under this firſt head that theſe Taxes, *&c.* cauſe dear labour; it only now remains to prove that dearneſs of labour cauſes the ſmuggling.

The beſt bidders for wool are the buyers, and that muſt be theſe who work the cheapeſt. The value of the labour in the bale of cloth coſting 100 *l.* mentioned in *page* 77. according to the *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* 2. *p.* 400. is 75 *l.* In the *Obſervations on Britiſh wool*, *p.* 21. the author aſſerts *French* labour to be ¼ cheaper than *Engliſh*, that is 50 *l.*; therefore an *Engliſhman* can afford to give but 25 *l.* for the ſame wool for which a *Frenchman* can afford to give 50 *l.* juſt double the *Engliſh* price; which diſproportion of price, cauſed by theſe Taxes, *&c.* while they continue, will carry away our wool to *France*, in ſpite of all the penal laws we can make, hanging, that is loſing our people, to ſave our wool.

And

And this wool ſmuggled to the *French* is by them manufactured and ſent to foreign markets, to rival and ſink our own manufactures; ſo that by the above cauſes we furniſh them with the weapons wherewith they cut our own throats.

To conclude this firſt head.

The Foreign Trade of every country muſt decline, that

Lays unequal taxes and oppreſſive exciſes on its people.

Cramps its trade, the fountain of riches, by high cuſtoms and prohibitions.

Suffers many monopolies.

Oppreſſes its people by prohibiting the importation of victuals, under the pretence of raiſing the value of its lands.

Gives bounties to feed foreigners cheaper than its own people.

Encourages idleneſs by bad laws relating to its poor.

Tempts foreigners to carry away its coin for leſs than its intrinſic value.

Makes the obtaining juſtice chargeable.

Suffers a heavy national debt, contracted in time of war, to continue unpaid in time of peace.

Theſe are the cauſes of the decline of our Foreign Trade, which having made appear, they naturally lead us to treat of.

PART

PART II.

THE Reaſons why the decline of Foreign Trade ſinks the value of land.

First, *By ſinking the markets at home.*

For the produce of land being rendered exceſſively dear, by the cauſes before-mentioned, foreigners will not take its ſuperfluities; and labour being by the ſame cauſes rendered exceſſively dear too, we cannot manufacture or improve that produce, nations that can afford cheaper ſupplying the markets abroad: ſo that the produce of the lands not being carried off as uſual, muſt become a dead ſtock on the farmers hands, and cauſe great quantities to be crowded into the markets; where being encouragement but for few buyers, the price naturally falls: as for inſtance, the declining demand for our woollen goods abroad, falls the price of wool at home.

Suppoſe that in 1699 we exported to *Turkey* 40,000 cloths, the value of raw wool in each being 2 *l.* amounts to	*L.* 80,000
Suppoſe that in 1738 we exported to *Turkey* 8,000 cloths, the value of raw wool in each being 1 *l.* 10 *s.* amounts to	12,000
The difference of the value of wool exported in thoſe two years,	*L.* 68,000

Wools

Wools of this value lying yearly on hand, muſt make a glut; the farmers puſh to ſell at market, but in vain, unleſs at under prices; for the Wool-ſtaplers, finding the demand decreaſe, decreaſe in number themſelves; ſome break, ſome leave off trade, ſome take to other trades; for many ſellers with great ſtocks on hand, and few buyers, naturally fall the markets, and the Landlords preſſing the Tenants for rent, and threatning to ſeize if payments are not made, the wool muſt be ſold at any rate to raiſe money; and there being yearly 68,000 *l.* leſs money brought into the nation to be laid out in wool than in former times, the price muſt be ſtill lower on that account; the lower the produce ſells, the leſs rent the Farmer can give for land; the worſe the markets, the greater arrears of rent the Farmer runs into; and Taxes, Monopolies, *&c.* making labour and neceſſaries grow dearer, and the decay of foreign trade making the wool ſell cheaper, muſt break him in the end, and then the farm is thrown on the Landlord's hands, who, unwilling to fall the rent, keeps it in the management of Stewards or Bailiffs, whoſe profit and charges ſeldom make it pay the old rent, but generally ends in mortgaging the land, or ſelling it; and as theſe caſes grow more frequent, more eſtates will be at market, and conſequently the leſs prices they will fetch.

Secondly,

Secondly, *By increaſing the number of poor to burden the land.*

The poor, wanting employment, muſt be ſupported by the land; if foreigners give them work, they give them bread; but when trade cannot maintain them, land muſt. When the Poor's Rates are heavier than the Tenant can bear, the Landlord muſt pay them, either by allowance in the rent, or by taking the farm into his own hands; or elſe by the breaking of his Tenant, who has paid that money to the Poor's Rates his Landlord ſhould have received.

Suppoſe in 1699 the labour of the above 40,000 cloths to have given employment to	40,000 people	
Suppoſe in 1738 the labour of the above 8,000 cloths to have given employment to	8,000 people	
The difference is	32,000 people	
Suppoſe theſe 32,000 people to have earned by their labour formerly from foreigners 6 *l. per annum* each, it amounts to		*L.* 192,000
But, wanting employment, they come on the pariſh at 1 *s.* 6. *d. per* week each, which for one year amounts to		124,800
The difference to the land-holder in one year is		*L.* 316,800

For as the land by the decay of Foreign Trade, receives not the firſt ſum, and is by the

the ſame cauſe ſaddled with the latter, it makes an annual difference of the above two ſums to the landholders in this ſingle branch of labour; and is the ſame in proportion for all other decayed branches of trade.

Thirdly, *By decreaſing the ſtock of people.*

For as employment leſſens, the moſt induſtrious, rather than ſtarve here, will fly to other countries where trade can maintain them; ſo the conſumption of theſe being taken away, the demand at market muſt grow leſs, and of courſe rents muſt fall; yet the Farmers charges muſt grow greater; for the fewer hands, the higher wages are. This muſt break him in the end, and produce all the conſequences following that misfortune, mentioned in the firſt remark: Beſides, 'tis men that trade, and bring in money; therefore the fewer they are, the leſs money will be brought in; and the leſs money, the leſs rent can be given for land.

Fourthly, *By decreaſing our riches.*

This is a conſequence of the above three remarks; for having fewer goods capable of being exported by reaſon of their dear price, and our manufactures declining, muſt in time be loſt; therefore the importation of foreign goods muſt naturally increaſe, and more money go out to pay for them.

I have laid it down as an undoubted truth in *page* 1. "That nations which have no

" mines of gold and ſilver, have no means to " get them but by foreign trade; and accord- " ing to the degree of theſe metals they poſ- " ſeſs, the prices of their commodities, and " therewith the value of their lands, riſe and " fall in proportion; which I ſhall now " prove.

The *Britannia Languens*, *page* 12. ſays, " If " there were but 500 *l.* in *England*, an ox " could hardly be worth a penny;" therefore the rent muſt bear its proportion to the riches. This appears by *Maitland's Hiſtory of London*; for he ſays, that in the year 961 land ſold at 1 *s. per* acre. The reaſon that land then bore ſo low a price, was, the low price the produce ſold at; for he ſays that in the year 1000, *an Ox ſold for* 2 s. 6 d. *a Cow for* 2 s. *a Sheep for* 1 s. *and a Swine for* 8 d. This could be only owing to the little foreign trade the nation then had, and conſequently to the little quantity of gold and ſilver trade had then brought in.

But if it ſhould be aſked, What is the reaſon that at preſent all things are naturally ſo much advanced in price, to what they were in thoſe days? the anſwer is, That the quantities of gold and ſilver brought to *Europe*, ſince the progreſs made by the *Spaniards* and *Portugueſe* in *America*, have made thoſe metals more common and of leſs value than formerly;

ly; ſo that 20 *s.* will hardly purchaſe what 1 *s.* would before the diſcovery of the *Weſt-Indies*.

The *Spaniards* and *Portugueſe* don't throw away their gold and ſilver for us to pick up: we have no mines of theſe metals, therefore could not get ſuch quantities as we have but by our trade to *Spain* and *Portugal*, or to thoſe countries that had an over-balance upon them, and were over-balanced by us.

So that the preſent natural price of land, and its produce, is the proportion of gold and ſilver that foreign trade hath brought into and left in the nation. If the preſent quantity was to be doubled by foreign trade, the natural price of land, and its produce, muſt be ſo too; for according to the price the farmer can ſell his commodity at market, he can pay for the rent of land, and no otherwiſe. If our foreign trade decays until the preſent money in the nation be half ſwept away, the produce of land muſt ſell for half the natural price it does now, and land muſt let at half the rent it naturally bears now; but if we ſhould go on declining, until we have no more money left in the nation than there was in 961 or 1000, the prices of land and its produce, can be no more than they bore in thoſe days, Taxes, *&c.* deducted.

Therefore if the landed-gentlemen have a mind to raiſe or ſink the value of their lands,

the encouraging or diſcouraging our foreign trade is the only means to do either; ſo cloſely united are land and trade; their true intereſts are the ſame; they muſt ſtand or fall together.

The ſum of all is this: that

What foreigners take from others inſtead of us,
What the poor have given them inſtead of buying,
The ſcarcity of people,
The ſcarcity of money,
} ſinks the value of lands.

Taxes, Monopolies, Ill-judged laws, and National Debts, are the cauſes of the decline of our Foreign Trade; the decline of Foreign Trade cauſes the above four calamities; and they ſink the value of lands. The Taxes, Monopolies, Ill-judged Laws, and National Debts, are the cauſes of all; therefore they are the cauſes of the decline of the value of lands.

PART

PART III.

Of the means to reſtore the Foreign Trade of Britain, *and conſequently the value of its lands.*

It is a manifeſt inſtance of the great natural advantages in trade this nation enjoys, that it hath not been ruined long ago by the conſequences of our own ill-management; as I ſhall have frequently occaſion to mention the former, it will be proper here to ſhew what they are; and, as the *Dutch* and *French* are our great rivals in trade, to compare our natural advantages with theirs.

Firſt, Our ſituation is the ſecureſt of any in *Europe*, not liable to the incurſions of our neighbours, as the *Dutch* and *French* are; we have more good harbours than any nation on the continent, open all the year; whereas the *French* ports for ſhips of any burden are few, and thoſe far aſunder; and the *Dutch* ports few, dangerous, and froze up in the winter. Our country is healthy and pleaſant; whereas *Holland* is cold, marſhy, and unwholſom.

Secondly, Our government is the moſt mild and excellent of any in *Europe*; whereas the government in *France* is arbitrary, and in *Holland* very ſevere.

Thirdly, Our plenty of proviſions exceeds all *Europe*; no nation having that plenty of corn, fleſh-meat, and fiſh, that we abound in; for *Holland* is deficient in the two firſt, and buys of us; and *France* cannot well victual ſhips without *Iriſh* beef; and its harveſts being more precarious than ours, the *French* are forced to make frequent purchaſes of corn from us. We are ſurrounded by the greateſt fiſhery in the world, which the *French* and *Dutch* are both deficient in, and ſeek at great hazard and expence on our coaſts.

Fourthly, Our Iſlands abound in excellent wool, coals, lead, tin, leather, butter, and tallow; all which both *French* and *Dutch* are deficient in, and forced to buy of us.

We have oak for ſhip-building, which both *Dutch* and *French* want. In our plantations we build vaſt numbers of ſhips, which the *French* are deficient in, and forced to buy of us.

As the *Dutch* are forced to purchaſe every thing, they are out of the queſtion; but the *French* have vaſt quantities of wines and brandies; they have ſilk, oil, hemp, and flax; in theſe, at preſent, we are deficient; but we have lands in our colonies for a trifle, fit to raiſe them all cheaper than the *French* can do; beſides other commodities which they want, ſuch as rice, tobacco, pitch, tar, and maſts.

Fifthly,

Fifthly, Our Sailors are the moſt expert, and our ſhips the beſt built of any; ſo that we could have the preference in the carrying trade; no merchant but would ſhip his goods on an *Engliſh* veſſel at equal freight preferable to one of any other country; and the former can be inſured at the cheapeſt premium.

To all this may be added, that our people are brave, laborious, and ſtrong; extreme neat workmen, improving to the utmoſt the inventions of others: and our merchants the moſt generous and honourable in trade, with whom all nations are fond to deal.

With all theſe ſuperior natural advantages, we cannot be hurt but by ourſelves; 'tis our own covetous folly only that can undo us. Had our trade been ſuffered to take its natural channel, foreigners could not have diverted its courſe, nor ever can, unleſs theſe natural advantages are annihilated; and they may as well attempt to ſink our iſlands in the ocean, as while they remain to deprive us of the benefits reſulting from their ſituation and produce, if we take only a reſolution to open our eyes; ſo that tho' our wounds are deep, and have brought us ſomewhat low, yet are they not incurable; if they are neglected, the general decay muſt be compleated in our ruin, but with proper care we may riſe to a more flouriſhing condition than we ever yet knew. And tho' all the means neceſſary thereto cannot

not be ſuppoſed to fall within the compaſs of any one man's capacity, yet is it the duty of every man, in time of need, to contribute ſomething, though in part only, and by way of eſſay. As ſuch, the following propoſals are offered.

PROPOSALS.

I. *To lay one Tax on the Conſumers of Luxuries, to take off all our other taxes, exciſes, and cuſtoms; and when that is done, to make all our ports free.*

II. *To aboliſh our Monopolies, unite* Ireland, *and put all our fellow-ſubjects on the ſame footing in trade.*

III. *To withdraw the Bounties on exported Corn, and erect public Magazines in every County.*

IV. *To diſcourage Idleneſs, by well-regulating our poor.*

V. *To pay off our Debts by public bonds, bearing intereſt, negotiable by indorſement, and liquidating part of our debts yearly.*

Firſt

First PROPOSAL.

To lay one Tax on the Conſumers of Luxuries, to take off all our other taxes, exciſes, and cuſtoms; and when that is done, to make all our ports free.

The plan of a Tax on the Conſumers of Luxuries.

It is hereby propoſed, That all perſons uſing, wearing, or drinking the following articles of luxury as particulary ſpecified, be obliged to take out a licence yearly, paying each one ſubſidy for each article of three halfpence in the pound only, on the computed income they ſhould have to ſupport the ſtation of life they voluntarily place themſelves in, by the article of luxury they uſe, wear, or drink, as by the example underneath.

All perſons	Computed incomes	Three halfpence in the pound, *L.*	*s.*	*d.*
1. Keeping two coaches and ſix for their uſe,	8000	50	00	0
2. Uſing diſhes or plates of ſilver at their tables, commonly called Services of plate,	4000	25	00	0
3. Keeping a coach and ſix for their uſe,	2000	12	10	0
4. Keeping a coach and four for their uſe,	1000	6	5	0
5. Keeping a coach and a pair for their uſe,	800	5	00	0

N. B. Chariots, four-wheel'd chaiſes, *&c.* are included in the term *Coach*.

6. Wearing

6. Wearing jewels for their dreſs, beſides necklaces, ſolitaires, rings, or ear-rings,	800	Three halfpence in the pound,	5 00 0
7. Keeping a ſedan-chair for their uſe,	800		5 00 0
8. Wearing gold and ſilver, men on their coats, and women on their gowns,	500		3 2 6
9. Uſing ſilver plate for their ſide-boards or tables, not having ſervices,	500		3 2 6
10. Uſing china ſervices of diſhes and plates at their tables,	500		3 2 6
11. Wearing necklaces or ſolitaires of jewels for their dreſs, beſides rings or ear-rings,	250		1 11 3
12. Keeping a chair or chaiſe with one horſe for their uſe,	250		1 11 3
13. Drinking wine in their houſe, lodging, or ſervice,	100		0 12 6
14. Wearing gold or ſilver for their dreſs, except on coats, gowns, hats or ſhoes,	100		0 12 6
15. Wearing jewels in rings or ear-rings,	100		0 12 6
16. Uſing no ſilver plate but ſpoons,	50		0 6 3
17. Drinking brandy, rum, or any ſpirits, in houſe, lodging, or ſervice,	50		0 6 3
18. Drinking tea, coffee, or chocolate, in houſe, lodging, or ſervice,	25		0 3 1½

All articles of the ſame degree, or under the article paid for, are included in it.

Huſbands to pay for their wives the ¼ of the

the article they pay for themſelves, to entitle them to uſe the ſame.

Fathers, or mothers (if no father), to pay for each child under age the $\frac{1}{8}$ of the article they pay for themſelves, to entitle them to uſe the ſame.

Bachelors to be double-taxed, if of 21 years of age.

No perſons keeping public-houſes to have muſick, nine-pins, ſhuffle-boards, cock-pits, card, dice, draught-playing, or any gaming in their houſes, out-houſes, ſheds, yards, gardens or grounds, for money or liquors, except they pay in the ſame manner as the perſons uſing article 9. Theſe people being the great encouragers of idleneſs, luxury, and gaming, the great corrupters of the common people, ſervants, labourers, and manufacturers, out of whoſe induſtry they idly live, to the ruin of many poor families, and are a great cauſe of the vaſt increaſe of the poor's tax.

It is not pretended that every article of luxury neceſſary to be taxed is here hit on, with the ſeveral rates proper to be laid on each; ſuch things are too preſumptuous for any private man, and befit only the wiſdom of the legiſlature: all that is here attempted is only to give a ſpecimen of one tax on the conſumers of luxury only, the method of raiſing

ſing it, with ſome remarks on the benefits ariſing thereby to the nation.

The method of raiſing this Tax.

The Receiver-General of every county to keep an open office to receive this tax, during the months of *January* and *February*, *April* and *May*, *July* and *Auguſt*, *October* and *November*, in the moſt convenient town in each county; and to cauſe attendance to be given on ſuch days in the week as the Commiſſioners ſhall judge neceſſary.

All perſons to bring or ſend their money to the Receiver-General's office in their county, with a fair written note, containing the name of the county, town, and pariſh, their titles or names, places of abode, wives, and number of children under age; with the number, title, and amount of the article they pay for ſubſidies.

Every Receiver-General to deliver to the perſons, paying their ſubſidies, a licence for that year, in which the above deſcriptions ſhall be ſpecified.

All perſons paying their ſubſidies in the months of *January* and *February*, to have 3 *per cent.* on their licences allowed them; in the months of *April* and *May*, 2 *per cent.*; in the months of *July* and *Auguſt*, 1 *per cent.*; and no allowance afterwards; whereby it will be the

the people's intereſt to raiſe the ſubſidies with the greateſt expedition.

All perſons before the end of the year muſt regiſter their licences with the Church-wardens of the pariſh they live in; perſons living in extraparochial places, to regiſter their licences in the pariſh neareſt to their dwellings.

Perſons having houſes of reſidence in ſeveral pariſhes to regiſter their licences in each pariſh; lodgers, and ſervants, to regiſter their licences only in one pariſh.

One or both Church-wardens to attend at the Veſtry every *Wedneſday* at ten in the morning, to regiſter the licences of the year, during ſuch a number of hours as the Veſtry ſhall judge neceſſary; whereby needleſs attendance from their private affairs will be avoided.

Church-wardens not regiſtering licences as before directed, and tendered before witneſſes, to pay themſelves the penalty incurred by their neglect,

Church-wardens to keep a ſeperate account of all thoſe licences which have not the name of their pariſh, and are brought to be regiſtered on account of Pariſh-rates, by perſons having more than one houſe of reſidence.

Church-wardens to depoſite in the Veſtry, on the firſt day of *January*, the laſt year's re-

giſter of licences in their pariſh, for the inſpection of the pariſhioners, and to form a judgment of the income of the pariſh.

After the firſt regiſter, as above, is delivered in, the Veſtry of every pariſh within fourteen days to compute their rates for the current year, and how much in the pound on the licences computed to be regiſtered in the current year will fully defray them, and order the ſame to be paid to the Church-wardens in the Veſtry every *Wedneſday* by public notice.

No perſon to be liable to pay any pariſh-rates whatever, by any other rate.

Church-wardens after the firſt year not to regiſter any perſon's licence, until they have received their pariſh-rates, on the penalty of paying themſelves the fines of the delinquents.

Perſons not regiſtering their licences as aforeſaid, before the end of the year, for the higheſt article of luxury they themſelves uſe, their wives, or children under age, to forfeit on conviction three times the ſums not paid for ſubſidies and pariſh-rates, to be divided as follows; $\frac{2}{3}$ to their pariſh, to eaſe their rates, and $\frac{1}{3}$ to the Receiver-General.

The Receiver-General to pay no money but into the exchequer, on the penalty of 500 *l.* to the informer.

The Receiver-General, or his Deputy, not to ſue the county for a robbery, unleſs the perſons

perſons carrying the money be three in company.

The Receiver-General to ſend up his accounts to the exchequer, of every two months receipts as ſoon as poſſible, deducting from the ſum received 100 *l.* for his ſalary for one year, and ½ *per cent.* for his charges.

The Commiſſioners of the Land-tax to be the Commiſſioners of this, for each county.

No perſon after the firſt year, who does not pay for article nine, capable to be a Commiſſioner.

Veſtries may order any in the pariſhes they ſuſpect of not having regiſtred, or fully paid their laſt year's ſubſidies, to be apprehended by their Conſtable or Beadle, and carried before one of the Commiſſioners of the county to be examined; and ſuch perſons not producing their laſt year's licence, and Churchwarden's receipt or receipts, and not proving that the ſaid licence was for the higheſt article they uſed, or elſe that they had not any article to pay, not having uſed any; the ſaid perſons not clearing themſelves to the ſatisfaction of the Commiſſioner, to be by him committed to the houſe of correction, to appear at the next Commiſſioners ſittings, unleſs they depoſite the penalty in the Commiſſioners hands, or give ſecurity to appear at the ſaid ſittings.

Perſons giving ſecurity, or depoſiting the

penalty, to regiſter their names and the names of their ſureties, or the ſums depoſited, at the Receiver-General's office for the county, before the firſt day of the Commiſſioners ſittings; otherways to be proceeded againſt as guilty.

Keepers of houſes of correction to deliver into the Receiver-General's office, before the firſt day of the Commiſſioners ſittings, a liſt of the perſons names in their cuſtody committed by the Commiſſioners.

The Receiver-General, or his Deputy, to make a regiſter of all perſons names committed, depoſiting, or giving ſecurity to be laid before the Commiſſioners at their ſittings; to attend there as their Clerk, and record the proceedings.

Commiſſioners to ſit to hear cauſes in the town the Receiver-General keeps his office in, during the months of *March*, *June*, *September*, and *December*.

Every Commiſſioner to take an oath in open court the firſt day he ſits, that he will vote according to juſtice, without favour or partiality; otherways to have no vote.

Commiſſioners, every day they meet, to chuſe their Preſident, who ſhall collect the votes, and order the Receiver-General, or his deputy, to record the proceedings.

Three or more Commiſſioners to make a court, and determine cauſes by majority of votes:

votes: if the votes are equal, the defendant to be diſmiſſed.

In all cauſes determined by a leſs number than ſeven Commiſſioners, there may be an appeal to ſeven or more, whoſe determination to be final.

No Commiſſioner to have any vote in his own cauſe.

Perſons convicted, not paying the penalty, to be ſent to the houſe of correction, and kept to hard labour during the ſpace of ſix months.

Perſons depoſiting, or giving ſecurity, not appearing, to be proceeded againſt as guilty, their depoſite to be forfeited, and paid as directed, or diſtreſs-warrants iſſued out againſt them and their ſecurities, to levy the penalty.

Any two or more Commiſſioners to determine differences about diſtreſs.

Perſons whoſe cauſes are delayed by any neglect of the Receiver-General, or Keeper of a houſe of correction, to petition the Commiſſioners for ſatisfaction to be made them by the ſaid perſons for what loſs they may have ſuſtained thereby, which the Commiſſioners may award at their diſcretion.

The Receiver-General of every county within three months after the end of every year to publiſh his accounts, ſhewing the ſums received the preceeding year from each pariſh of his county, and how he hath account-

ed with the exchequer for the ſame, and to deliver when demanded at the price of 2 *s.* and 6 *d.* one of the ſaid accounts, to every Commiſſioner and Church-warden in the county, on the penalty of 50 *l.* for each refuſal: and one to be tranſmitted to the King's Remembrancer's office in the Exchequer.

The Receiver-General not accounting with the Exchequer for the whole money he receives, to forfeit on conviction, to every pariſh whoſe ſums he hath given in ſhort, three times the ſum received in that pariſh and not accounted for, to eaſe their rates. Church-wardens to prefer their complaints againſt the Receiver-General before the Commiſſioners in open court.

Church-wardens to depoſite in the Veſtry one of the Receiver-General's accounts for to examine the regiſter by.

Before making any remarks on the benefits ariſing by this propoſal, the general prejudice againſt the poſſibility of carrying into execution, any tax on the Conſumers of luxuries, ariſing from the ſuppoſed evaſion and fraud ſuch a tax is liable to, muſt be firſt removed: in order to effect which, I hope to convince the Reader by the following conſiderations, that this tax by its very nature and method of raiſing, is ſo far from being liable to the above objection, that it is on the contrary

contrary capable of a more exact and equal collection than any tax we have at preſent.

Firſt, *By its nature:*

For what every perſon ſhould pay, muſt be publicly known; friends, neighbours, and ſervants, muſt ſee whether we drink wine, tea, brandy, *&c.* in our houſes, lodgings, ſervices, or no; and as to our fineries, 'tis our intent they ſhould be manifeſt, ſo that concealments are almoſt impoſſible.

Secondly, *By the method of raiſing.*

Which obliges all pariſh-rates to be raiſed at the ſame time and in the ſame manner; for 'tis very obſervable that moſt people are more prying into the proportion they themſelves or their neighbours pay for pariſh-rates, than into any taxes raiſed for the Government; therefore, as by this method no perſons can pay any pariſh-rates at all, until they have paid their ſubſidies to the Government, nor pay leſs than their due to the pariſh without making their neighbours pay more than their dues, and proving beſides the diſproportion paid to the Government, which muſt appear by a regiſter open to the inſpection of all the pariſh, whereby every one can, and will keep a particular eye upon his neighbours, to ſee not only that they pay, but that they pay fair; and the Veſtry can and will keep a general

neral watch on all, in order to eaſe their rates by the fines of delinquents.

Which allowing no private reward to informers, no ſcandal can be incurred by any perſons moving in the Veſtry to detect the fraudulent; whereas at preſent the character of an informer being odious, the taxes grievous, the concern not general, and informations requiring attendance and trouble, there is the greateſt remiſſneſs poſſible in bringing to light the frauds in the revenue; no perſon of credit, either out of buſineſs, or of a different buſineſs, does now inform againſt any Trader for defrauding the Cuſtoms or Exciſe; people do not care to give themſelves the trouble of meddling where they think they have no concern. But, by this method of taxing, the trouble of attending the Veſtry on pariſh-affairs ſerves for this, and every one is concerned in point of intereſt and honour to detect frauds; intereſt with regard to himſelf, and honour with regard to his neighbours, by taking care that the innocent do not ſuffer for the guilty.

Which directs the Receiver-General's accounts to be publiſhed, whereby every Veſtry will have a check to examine its regiſter by, and detect frauds; for if any perſon does not pay at all to the Government, his name will be wanting both in the Receiver-General's account

account and his pariſh-regiſter; if he does not pay enough, the deficiency will appear againſt his name in both; if he pays to the Government but not to his pariſh, his name will appear in the Receiver-General's account, but be wanting in his pariſh-regiſter; if a forged licence is regiſtered, the perſon's name will be wanting in the Receiver-General's account; if the Receiver-General conceals any of the money, the pariſh-regiſter detects it; and he incurring a penalty to that pariſh, it will not fail to proceed againſt him. The Receiver-General's account checks the regiſters, and they him, both in his receipts and payments. Perſons of fortune, who will pay the largeſt ſums by having houſes of reſidence in more pariſhes than one, will have an additional check on them in each pariſh where their licences muſt be regiſtered, to make them pay fair.

Which giving $\frac{1}{3}$ of the fines of delinquents to the Receiver-General, makes it become his intereſt as well as duty, to make his accounts as public as poſſible to detect frauds.

Which laying the *onus probandi* on the ſuſpected perſon, will make every one endeavour to appear fair, in order to avoid the trouble and expence that ſuſpicion will make him liable to.

Which makes it not worth while for the lower claſs of people to attempt frauds; a penalty

penalty of three times the ſums unpaid, is too great a riſk to avoid paying a trifle; which likewiſe ſubjects them to the jealouſy of their comrades, who will look out ſharp to prevent others from ſhifting their burdens to their backs; where money is ſcarce, the greater care is taken in paying no more than is due: beſides, theſe people being often quarrelling, will revenge themſelves, by detecting each other's frauds; ſo that a few being made examples of at firſt, will ſhew the reſt the improbability of eſcaping.

I know of no tax at preſent having ſo many checks, nor ſo many perſons intereſted to detect frauds as this; conſequently none ſo capable of an exact and equal collection: for if thoſe who pay fair, won't detect the fraudulent, they muſt pay the deficiency themſelves; whereby they puniſh themſelves for their own neglect. Detect, or pay, is the caſe.

Remarks on the benefits ariſing by this propoſal.

1. The Government, by this method of taxing, need never borrow any money, nor have the uſual clauſes of credit every year, whereby part of the expence of advanced money will be ſaved; for it being the intereſt of all to pay as ſoon as they can, the greateſt part would be raiſed the firſt four or five months, and, by thus giving ſpeedy vigour, add weight to our reſolutions.

2. All

2. All perſons tax themſelves voluntarily, than which nothing can be eaſier or more equal; and an eaſy equal way of raiſing taxes, will always produce the moſt money and the feweſt murmurs.

3. Thoſe that would abate of their taxes, may abate of their luxury; as thoſe that won't pay for a licence to keep a coach and ſix horſes, may keep only four, or a pair, and pay for no more, or need not keep any, nor drink wine, tea, brandy, *&c.* in houſe, lodging, or ſervice, neither wear on their garments gold or ſilver, nor wear jewels, nor uſe plate, and ſo not pay any thing; conſequently no individual can be oppreſſed, an advantage that no people in *Europe* have at preſent.

4. When 'tis propoſed to oblige all perſons to take out a licence to drink wine, tea, brandy, *&c.* in ſervices, as well as houſes and lodgings, 'tis done to mend our ſervants manners, by curing their luxury, or making them pay for it.

5. Few that can afford to live high, will retrench; thoſe that cannot afford it, ſhould be obliged to it. This will be a ſumptuary-law to keep all people in their proper ſtations, and prevent the ruin of ſeveral; it will reform, as well as raiſe money ſufficient.

6. When it is propoſed that all Bachelors of twenty-one years of age ſhould be double-taxed,

taxed, it is done as well to proportion all payments as equally as poſſible to people's ſituations in life or circumſtances, as alſo to encourage marriages; for tho' Bachelors are double-taxed, yet they will then not pay equal to the Married-men, who pay their wives taxes as well as their own, and may be ſome children's; conſequently, compared with bachelors, are at leaſt double-taxed: for theſe laſt may, if they pleaſe, always live equal to a Married-man with half the expence, and have not that anxious neceſſary care of ſaving, to provide for the preſent as well as future well-being of their families: add to which this political truth, that inhabitants being the riches of a country, and marriage a prevention of debauchery, all wiſe States have made it their care to diſcourage celibacy: in particular, the *Switzers* will not ſuffer a Bachelor to enjoy any Balliage, and the ſuperior rank there being almoſt all married, makes the inferior be ſo too; ſo great is the force of example, and accounts for their country, tho' ſmall, being ſo very populous. Whereas, one of the reaſons why *England* is not ſo, is the abandoned looſe lives our ſingle people lead, whereby they get a diſreliſh to the married-ſtate, and are enervated by debauchery, which, unleſs remedied, muſt render us a poor deſpicable depopulated nation;

'tis

'tis therefore the higheſt policy to make marriage faſhionable by the example of the rich, ſince it tends ſo much to the public good, and the grandeur of our country.

7. But the greateſt benefit of all is, that this propoſal hath not thoſe extending, pernicious, trade-deſtroying conſequences of our preſent taxes; for it will not raiſe the value of any one commodity, but rather, by checking luxury, the bane of virtue and induſtry, we ſhall become a rich and flouriſhing people. In vain would the luxurious tradeſman lay the expences of his coach, his wine, his plate, or his laces, on the prices of his goods; his frugal neighbour, who indulged not himſelf in thoſe vanities, would ſo much underſel him, that he could have no trade; and while the former declined, the latter would be raiſing an eſtate able to afford him all the gaieties of life independent of his buſineſs; and tradeſmen ſhould wait for vanities until they have raiſed eſtates to ſupport them.

8. The firſt year or two, perhaps, will not demonſtrate the exact produce this tax may give, on account of the receivers not being ſufficiently verſed in their buſineſs; the evaſions that wicked people may make to defraud, which ſeldom can be intirely guarded againſt until they appear; or the conſideration that the firſt year's tax being the only one that will be felt, will be the ſhorteſt: for one

ſubſidy being laid on the firſt year, nothing can be taken off until that produce appears, which will not be until the ſecond year; but then 6 *d*. in the pound may be taken off land, and as many of the other taxes on commodities as that ſubſidy hath provided for; ſo that until all our other taxes are ſupplied by this, in every year following, the people will have remitted to them in the taxes on land and neceſſaries, with their conſequences, more than an equivalent for what they paid the foregoing year, whereby they will be enabled yearly to pay more to this tax; ſo that every year's ſubſidy muſt increaſe.

Whatever appears moſt burdenſom ſhould be the firſt taken off, ſuch as the duties on ſope, candles, ſalt, coals, or foreign materials of manufacture.

9. This propoſal being different from the method of raiſing taxes now uſed, and deſigned to take off our preſent oppreſſions, every body will be gainers; the poor Manufacturer will not pay any thing, nor ſhould he. But here then will appear a ſort of paradox, the rich proportionably are to pay all the taxes, yet each of them to have beſides a particular gain by it. To ſolve this, we may fairly divide the rich into three claſſes, *viz.* Land-holders, Traders, and Stock-holders.

1. *To begin with the Land-holders:*

Suppoſe

Suppoſe a Gentleman to have an eſtate of 1000 *l. per annum*; that the land-tax is 4 *s.* in the pound; but he being in an eaſy-rated county pays but 2 *s.* in the pound, which amounts to a 100 *l.* in lieu of which land-tax, exciſes, cuſtoms, *&c.* are allowed eight ſubſidies, preſuming they would raiſe a ſum equal to the amount of our preſent duties:

Suppoſe then this Gentleman to pay by this propoſal,

For himſelf 8 ſubſidies for the article 4, is	*L.* 50 00 00	
For his wife the $\frac{1}{4}$ of what he pays,	12 10 00	
For four children $\frac{1}{8}$ each of what he pays,	25 00 00	
		87 10 00
He remains a clear gainer		*L.* 12 10 00

By this it appears, that where the land-tax is but half-paid, ſuch a Land-holder hereby ſaves 12 *l.* 10 *s.*

But thoſe Gentlemen who have born the the unequal burden of the land-tax for many years, paying from 2 *s.* even up to 4 *s.* in the pound, will be hereby greatly relieved, enabled to live better, and ſo add to the amount of this propoſal.

The following great advantages ariſe likewiſe to the Land-holders.

The difference in the price of neceſſaries, when the taxes on them are taken off, muſt be much ſuperior to the above ſubſidies; for the preſent taxes, and their conſequences, affect the Land-holders above 13 *s.* in the pound. *Vide* p. 59.

The Poor's Rates, ſo heavy a burden on the land at preſent, will be hereby reduced to a mere trifle.

The rents of lands will be better paid when the Farmers are eaſed of their heavy taxes.

The Farmers will be likewiſe more able to improve the lands they rent.

Eaſy equal taxes increaſe trade, and trade increaſes rents.

Well-paid increaſed rents will augment the capitals of thoſe that have occaſion to ſell their lands.

Land untaxed muſt yield a conſiderable better price than when heartily taxed, as at preſent.

All which duly conſidered, it may be aſſerted, That upon this propoſal's being paſs'd into a law, every Landholder will actually find the value of his eſtate at leaſt doubled.

As the benefits ariſing to our Landholders have not been ſo fully calculated as they are capable of, the calculation above being only comparative to the land-tax, I ſhall with pleaſure ſet them forth, by way of anſwer to the following

following objection, and to illuſtrate what has been already advanced on this head.

Some have thought it a fatal objection againſt this propoſal's ever being practicable, that our nobility will think it contrary to their intereſt, and never come into it.

This I own would carry great weight, if it was poſſible for the public good not to be proportionably the undoubted good of every individual; or if our nobility were not conſiderable Landholders: whereas many of them are the moſt conſiderable; and as all our misfortunes center on our lands, ſo muſt our benefits; the greater the property, the greater of either; therefore as our Nobility are the greateſt Landholders, ſo by this propoſal they ſhould and will receive the greateſt benefit; of which I hope to convince them, if ever this humble Eſſay ſhould have the honour of their peruſal, by laying before them the ſtate they are now in, and the ſtate they would be in by this propoſal; the difference of which they will be pleaſed to conſider.

Suppoſe a Nobleman to have a nominal eſtate of 8000 *l. per annum*, out of which, by the various reductions in theſe wretched times, he hardly receives in caſh 6000 *l.*; and I appeal to the whole body of Nobility if upon a medium they receive ſo much.

The expences of a Man of Quality generally are and ſhould be in the richeſt

and beſt commodities that can be had, conſequently the deareſt; and as a common *Engliſh* cloth is proved in *p.* 76. to have a fictitious value ſuperior to a *Dutch* cloth loaded with 50 *per cent.* the latter having beat out the former at the *Portugal* market, and only 1 *per cent.* allowed to turn the ſcale; I may ſafely affirm, that the expences of a Nobleman have a fictitious value included in them of 51 *per cent.* if not more; there being great difference between a Nobleman's buying and a Merchant's. However 51 *per cent.* fictitious value included in a Nobleman's expences of 6000 *l.* amounts to 3060 *l.* which being deducted, leaves only 2940 *l.* and is the only real, true, intrinſic value, that a Nobleman receives from a nominal eſtate of 8000 *l.* *per annum* in the ſtate he is now.

What elſe can be the reaſon that our Nobility can have no taſte but they are ruined; if a Nobleman has a *goût* either for building, equipage, or entertainments, we preſently hear of mortgages and ſales of eſtates; how few places or penſions come in aid to prevent them? whilſt a foreign Nobleman perhaps does all with half the nominal eſtate, and yet keeps within bounds. Is it not hereby plain, that tho' the rental of the *Engliſh* Nobleman's eſtate is great, yet, the taxes and their conſequences are ſo monſtrous, that the intrinſic

trinſic value is by them reduced to a ſmall pittance?

Whereas, by this propoſal, a Nobleman with a nominal eſtate of 8000 *l. per annum* pays

For himſelf 8 ſubſidies for the firſt article is,	L.	400
For his lady $\frac{1}{4}$ of what he pays,		100
For four children, each $\frac{1}{8}$ of what he pays,		200
	L.	700

700 *l.* being deducted from 8000 *l.* leaves 7300 *l.* of a real, true, intrinſic value; which will purchaſe as much, go as far, conſequently be equal to 14,897 *l.* of our preſent fictitious value; and if his ordinary expences in the ſtate he is now are but 2940 *l.* of real value, he would have by this propoſal 4360 *l.* of the ſame real value remaining, for building, equipage, entertainments, *&c.* equal to 8897 *l.* of our preſent fictitious value.

So that by the ſtate he is now in, he is reduced either to his ordinary expences, or to ruin his eſtate, if he launches out in any taſte; whereas, by the ſtate he would be in by this propoſal, he might live equal to what he did before, and yet have remaining for improvements a ſum ſuperior in real value to the preſent nominal value of his whole eſtate.

And

And whenever our improving trade ſhall advance the natural value of our commodities, ſo that the expences of the Nobility will be enhanced, they may reſt aſſured that the natural value of their lands will keep pace with them, and their incomes conſtantly riſe in proportion to bear them. The ſame in proportion to the value of their eſtates will be the caſe of all our Land-holders.

11. *With reſpect to the Trader.*

The difference in the prices of neceſſaries, when the taxes on them are taken off, muſt be much ſuperior to the ſubſidies he ſhould pay for luxuries; I ſay ſhould, for he need pay no more than he pleaſes, or can afford, as appears by the third remark; ſo he cannot be oppreſſed.

This puts him in a better ſituation than any of our rivals in commerce, who all pay taxes on neceſſaries, always attended with ſome oppreſſions.

When thoſe taxes that are burdens upon our trade are removed, then may we ſend our manufactures to foreign markets as cheap or cheaper than our neighbours, whereby loſt markets may be recovered, and new ones found out.

The demand for our goods muſt hereby increaſe at thoſe markets where at preſent they have ſome vent.

An

An increaſing demand makes profitable ſales and quick returns.

Quick returns are the ſoul of commerce, and enable the merchant to give conſtant employment to all our working hands.

Commiſſions for buying will be always ſent by foreigners to the cheapeſt markets; and the cheaper they are, the more commiſſions they may expect.

A flouriſhing commerce will enable the Trader to live more comfortably for the preſent, and at the ſame time lay up a future proviſion for himſelf and family.

Our rival neighbours, ſome of whom are our natural enemies, and the beſt but ſelf-intereſted friends, will find the ſcene ſhifted upon them from their riſing and our ſinking, I mean in trade, the greateſt bleſſing that can happen to a people; for, as a late Patriot obſerved, "It brings food and nouriſhment to "a nation, preſerves and increaſes its ſtock, "and diſtributes a convenient portion of "maintenance to every part of it."

12. *In regard to the Stockholder.*

His gain will appear by conſidering that this propoſal being calculated to raiſe as large or larger fund, in a more eaſy and equal manner than all our other taxes.

He will be more certain than he is now, in any time of war, of his intereſt being duly paid.

He

He will be better ſecured in the value or reimburſement of his capital.

He will reſt aſſured that the Government will never be driven to lay a tax on the funds, which would not only leſſen his income, but conſiderably diminiſh the price of his capital.

By this propoſal he will gain ſecurity; no ſmall conſideration.

Even the difference in the price of neceſſaries, when the taxes on them are taken off, muſt be more advantage than any mere Stockholder will or need pay for luxuries.

13. As by this propoſal the rich will pay all with advantage even to themſelves, ſo the poor will receive great benefit.

They will be able to work as cheap as foreigners at leaſt, conſequently monopolize the manufacturing of their own wool.

They will have leſſer wages, but of more value, 4*d* per day untaxed being more than 6*d*. charged with 3*d*. for taxes.

They will have more conſtant employment by working cheaper, conſequently a better maintenance.

They will have foreigners ſettling here continually, to teach them new branches of trade.

They will not be drove by neceſſity to fly their country, to ſtarve, beg, or ſteal.

They will find better ſupport in their miſfortunes,

fortunes, when their ſuperiors are in a more flouriſhing way.

They will have more opportunities of riſing to be maſters, or ſeeing their children become ſuch.

14. If it ſhould be aſked, How, by this propoſal, a larger fund than our preſent taxes can be more eaſily raiſed?

The anſwers are, That no extenſion of ſubſidies for any ſum of money equal to what the Government now annually raiſes, can be ſo grievous to the ſubjects, as the conſequential extending burden of our preſent taxes on commodities only, excluſive of the Land-tax.

Therefore, if the ſubjects can ſave by raiſing larger ſums for the ſervice of the Government, there can be no doubt of their doing it.

It is remarked, with great humour as well as truth, "that a Prince who draws his re-"venues from the vanities of his ſubjects, "will be richer than another who hath "mines of gold, becauſe vanity is an inex-"hauſtible mine;" to which I beg leave to add, that it is worked much the eaſieſt, and is exactly the affair now offered to the conſideration of the public.

Tho' all feel, yet as thoſe who are oppreſſed more immediately by our preſent taxes, *viz.* our people in trade will be hereby revived; yea an increaſing trade will bring in ſuch a flow

flow of wealth, as will make our lands ſtill more valuable, and our people rich; riches will make them gay, and gaiety will make them pay larger, if equal eaſy taxes: therefore this propoſal muſt prove a growing fund, and produce every year more and more to ſupport the King and nation in ſo great a figure, and raiſe us to ſuch a formidable height of power that we may be the envy or dread of all our rivals, and an overmatch for any one nation in *Europe*.

15. Beſides, this tax will leſſen the expences of the Government by untaxing commodities, which of courſe makes them cheap; therefore every thing will be to be purchaſed with leſs money; all proviſions, ammunition, naval ſtores, *&c.* come cheaper to the Government; ſailors, ſoldiers, placemen and penſioners, be enabled to live upon leſs wages, yet as well as they now do; ſo that this method making the money raiſed go the further, the fewer ſubſidies will ſuffice, two or three millions may do as much as four or ſix millions now: therefore the Government can never be ſtraitned, or the people oppreſſed.

16. This tax will likeways increaſe the civil liſt: for as goods grow cheap, money goes the further; therefore the preſent civil liſt of 800,000*l.* *per annum*, when of real, true, intrinſic value, may go as far, and be as valuable as one of 1,632,653*l.* of the preſent fictitious

fictitious value: and the value of the pay of Officers and of the ſalaries of places increaſe in the ſame proportion.

17. This tax will ſerve for a political barometer to know the ſtrength of the people in any time of war: for as long as the laſt ſubſidy adds to the produce of the former, ſo long may they be increaſed; as for inſtance, ſuppoſe eight ſubſidies to have produced ten millions, which on an average is 1,250,000 *l.* each, tho' on laying on an 11th it ſhould produce but half the laſt ſum, yet a 12th ſubſidy may without any danger be added, and ſo on until the laſt produces but a trifle; and that with advantage to the nation: becauſe, many misfortunes happening in time of war, people ſhould therefore be more frugal in their expences, to enable them to bear thoſe the better; to effect which a tax of this ſort naturally tends, and they may be taxed in this manner as long as they can or will bear, even for their good; quite contrary to the method of laying taxes on the neceſſaries of life, or on trade, practiſed in all countries, which, in proportion as they are increaſed, conſtantly bring on decay of trade, poverty and miſery, not recoverable in many years, if ever.

18. But it may be objected that this tax will cauſe a reduction of the officers of the revenue, diminiſh the power of a miniſter, be

contrary to his intereſt, and not being to be carried into execution without his countenance, makes it become impracticable.

Anſw. What is the intereſt of a Miniſter, but the favour of his Prince and the love of the people, to continue himſelf in power? Neither of theſe ſingly will always do, but both united are infallible.

The increaſe of the civil liſt, the increaſe of the revenue, the freedom from oppreſſive taxes, the increaſe of riches, are conſequences of this tax proved in the above remarks. By all theſe the favour of the Prince and the love of the People are ſecured to a Miniſter. What more glorious to a Prince than a ſplendid court, powerful revenue, free and rich ſubjects? What more delightful to a People than the ſplendor and power of their King, their freedom and their riches? It becomes then the intereſt of both Prince and People to continue that Miniſter in power, who procures ſuch mutual happineſs. And what better foundation for the continuance of power can be deſired, than that which has the general intereſt for its ſupport?

How does the increaſe of the Officers of the revenue give power to a Miniſter? by influencing elections: but theſe Officers diſguſt many who know that they are locuſts; conſequently they cauſe and give weight to an oppoſition. Let the Miniſter gain the love of the

the people, he influences them himſelf, with more effect than this partial influence of Officers, which then becomes uſeleſs; and he likeways deſtroys the foundation of an oppoſition.

Beſides, an increaſing revenue furniſhes means for uſeful public employments, whereby more Officers may be better provided for than at preſent; and with this difference, that a ſmall number of Officers detrimentally employed raiſe clamours, whereas large numbers beneficially employed will gain the love of the people. Now he muſt be but a ſorry politician, who cannot gain a greater intereſt by the proſperity than by the ruin of his country.

If then we have reaſoned rightly, and the favour of the Prince with the love of the people, are the foundations of a Miniſter's continuance in power, and are the neceſſary conſequences of the carrying of this tax into execution; it follows, that the doing of it is the true intereſt of a wiſe Miniſter, and therefore practicable.

19. *Of the benefits ariſing by a free-port trade.*

By which I mean, that all ſorts of merchandize be imported and exported at all times without paying any cuſtoms or fees.

1. *It will increaſe trade.*

By increaſing the number of merchants;

for ſmall ſtocks ſerve where there are no cuſtoms to pay, and there are ten people of ſmall fortunes in trade to one of a great one; the more there are, the leſs liable are they to combine together to impoſe on the people extravagant prices for their goods, to ſupport themſelves in luxuries.

By increaſing the capitals of our merchants; for if they pay ¼ or ⅕ of their capitals for cuſtoms, they can trade but for the ¾ or ⅘ left; but when they have no cuſtoms to pay, they can carry on a greater trade with the ſame ſtock, ſell their imports cheaper, have more money to buy up the ſuperfluous produce of our lands, and give better encouragement to our manufacturers.

By making our country an univerſal ſtore-houſe; for when our merchants have no cuſtoms to advance, they will be importing continually, upon ſpeculation, for better markets, all ſorts of goods that were to be ſold cheap in all parts of the world, whereby ſuch ſortible cargoes as were vendible to advantage, being always ready to ſeize the favourable opportunity, would be as continually exporting, giving employment to a vaſt number of watermen, carmen, porters, coopers, packers, *&c.* beſides ſupplying hereby our own manufacturers with all foreign neceſſaries and materials in the cheapeſt manner. To which may be added, that where the beſt aſſort-

ments

ments of goods are to be had, there will be the greateſt trade, one ſort helping off another; conſequently vaſt quantities of our own commodities will be required to aſſort our imports of foreign goods, and be exported with them. A free port cauſes the beſt aſſortments of goods; conſequently a free port cauſes a great exportation of home-commodities.

By increaſing our navigation. This is a conſequence of the laſt obſervation; for by the vaſt quantities of goods continually going out and coming in, we muſt have an immenſe number of ſhips conſtantly employed, and ſeldom ſend them out in ballaſt; and whenever our ſailors are eaſed of their taxes, they will be able to navigate as cheap, or cheaper than any; and being indiſputably the moſt able, and expert in *Europe*, muſt have a great ſhare in the *Greenland* and herring fiſhing-trades, and in the navigation of the *Baltic*, with other nations whoſe navigations are vaſtly increaſed by thoſe trades: all which, joined to our *Mediterranean* trade, would make us the chief carriers of *Europe*.

By increaſing the vent of our goods abroad; for all foreign neceſſaries and materials coming a great deal cheaper to our people, who having no taxes they need pay at home (if our monopolies were but once aboliſhed) our labour would be ſo cheap, that we could ſend

all our goods to foreign markets cheaper than any people, by reaſon of our ſuperior natural advantages. It is a juſt obſervation of Sir *William Temple*, in his account of *Holland*, "There is no ſort of goods but what will "find a market at one price or another, and "they will be maſters of it that can afford "it cheapeſt." It ſhould therefore be our chief ſtudy to make all our goods bear only their natural value, which nothing contributes more to than a free-port trade: add to which, that our merchants being enabled to barter away our goods for whatever commodities they could find in any country where money was ſcarce, muſt increaſe their ſale prodigiouſly.

By putting all traders on the ſame fair footing; for where no cuſtoms are to be paid, ſmuggling muſt ceaſe.

By preventing the ſmuggling of our wool, without regiſtries, dragoons, or cruizers; for as our taxes, monopolies, *&c.* have been proved, in page 80, to be the cauſes of ſmuggling, ſo is the removal of them the certain remedy for this evil; as thus,

Engliſh labour in a bale of cloth of 100 *l.* price, is computed in page 80 to be 75 *l.* having, in page 77, an artificial value ariſing from taxes, *&c.* of 51 *per cent.* which being deducted, the natural value of that labour is but 36 *l.* 15 *s.* *French* labour for the ſame,

in

in page 80. is eſtimated at 50 *l.* 'Tis plain the *Engliſhman* can give 63 *l.* 5 *s.* for the ſame wool for which a *Frenchman* can only give 50 *l.* which is 26 *l.* ½ *per cent.* under the *Engliſh* price; conſequently our people being able to afford the beſt prices, ſmuggling of wool muſt ceaſe, and the whole manufacture of it be ſecured to ourſelves.

By gaining us the herring-fiſhery; for the *Dutch* having liberty to ſell their fiſh on the coaſts of *England*, would ſnap at ſuch a market, and ſome of them ſettle with us of neceſſity, by trading on the beſt footing; for thoſe who would not ſettle, muſt make two expenſive hazardous voyages, one back to *Holland* to cure and pack the fiſh, and the other from thence to the coaſts of *Britain* to ſell them, eſpecially the weſt coaſts, which thoſe ſettled here would be free from, and the *Dutch*, by living among our people, muſt inſtruct them in the trade.

By ſecuring to us all growths, fiſheries, and manufactures the nation is capable of; for what *French* or *Dutch* growers, fiſhers, or manufacturers could pay taxes at home, the charges of package, putting on board, freight, inſurance, poſtage of letters, relanding, houſing, warehouſe-rent, and commiſſion on their goods to ſell to our people, being growers, fiſhers, or manufacturers themſelves, untaxed,

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taxed, free from the above charges, and bleſſed with ſuperior natural advantages? 'tis ridiculous to ſuppoſe it; unleſs that in the beginning of a free-port trade, the demand for our goods ſhould be ſo great, that we ſhould ſell what ſhould be our own ſupply, and content ourſelves with inferior ſorts of goods from abroad, as the *Dutch* do.

The farther benefit that trade receives by a free-port, the reader will find in the anſwers to the objections raiſed by ſome authors againſt it, which will be conſidered hereafter.

2. *It will employ our poor.*

This is a conſequence of the laſt remark; for neceſſaries and materials being by a free-port trade, and the reduction of taxes rendered cheap, labour muſt be ſo too; and by the ſame cauſes the vent of our goods be enlarged, the poor find conſtant employment on the wool we ſhall keep at home, on the hemp and flax we ſhall raiſe, in all manufactures we are capable of, in the herring and *Greenland* fiſheries, and in the increaſe of our navigation by the great demand for ſailors, ſo that none can want employment that won't be idle. *Holland* is an example of this, whoſe cuſtoms are ſo low that their trade is almoſt free, and there is no country in the world where the poor are ſo well employed, or in ſickneſs better provided for.

One

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM

One flouriſhing manufacture promotes all others; for the better employment the people have, the better they live, and the more they ſpend for a comfortable ſubſiſtence: a manufacturer who earns by his induſtry enough to purchaſe warm cloathing and hearty food, is a greater encourager of the induſtry of others than a beggar covered with rags and ſtarving with hunger; therefore it need not ſeem a wonder, that when our woollen trade flouriſhed, all others proſpered, and the poor's rates were low; and that the reverſe happens by the decline of it. If *Engliſh* wool was intirely kept at home, the manufacturing of it muſt employ at leaſt one million of people, who may be ſuppoſed to maintain at leaſt another million of helpleſs infants, women whoſe labour is in part diverted by the care of their families, ſick and aged people; and the ſame in proportion for *Scotland* and *Ireland*.

The ſilk manufacture, at leaſt for our conſumption, muſt, by taking off our taxes and making our trade quite free, be intirely ſecured to us: and ſuppoſing the quantities of *India*, *French*, and foreign wrought ſilks ſmuggled in upon us by the temptation of high duties, and conſumed here, to amount only to the value of 200,000 *l. per annum*, the labour whereof to be $\frac{1}{4}$ of the value, and the medium earned *per* head to be 6 *l.* the ſupply-

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ing this conſumption by our own people would employ about 25,000 of them, and they maintain an equal number, as was obſerved of the woollen trade above.

The linen manufacture is of ſuch vaſt conſequence, that the *Dublin* ſociety, in the firſt volume of their *Weekly Obſervations*, No. 7. reckon the conſumption of linen in *England*, at the loweſt computation, allowing only 10 *s. per* head, to amount to four millions, the greateſt part of which, they ſay, is imported every year: but as they take no notice of the vaſt quantities of linens we import for our plantations, which may overbalance what is made in *England*, yet I ſhall only compute, that we pay foreigners for this article three millions, the labour at ¼ of the value, and the medium earned *per* head 6 *l.* which a reduction of taxes, and a free-port gaining, will thereby employ about 370,000 of our people, and they maintain an equal number, as was obſerved of the woollen trade above.

It is impoſſible to eſtimate the numbers of people that a free-port trade would give additional employment to, ſuch as watermen, carmen, porters, coopers, packers, *&c.* or the additional numbers of ſailors employed in the carrying-trade, the amount of all which muſt be prodigious.

Sir

Sir *Walter Raleigh*, in his *Obſervations on Trade*, ſays, That thirty ſeveral trades are ſet on work by the fiſhing ſhips; and as this herring-fiſhery is on our own coaſts, we can carry on this trade that promotes thirty others, cheaper than the *Dutch*, and of courſe beat them out of it; they muſt make long voyages out and home for the fiſhery, and receive their ſupplies in the ſame dangerous and expenſive manner; whereas we are at home, and can land our fiſh and receive ſupplies without almoſt any charge: we can victual in *Ireland*, and ſome parts of *Britain*, at half the charge they can do in *Holland:* in blowing weather the *Dutch* muſt lie ſtill, they cannot take in their caſks and ſtores in a rolling ſea; whereas we can run into Port, and the unloading, repacking, and diſpatching our fiſh go on in all weathers. All fiſhing-veſſels puſh to get firſt to market; ſo our people, from ſome parts of our dominions, can be at the markets of *Spain*, *Portugal*, or *Italy*, almoſt as ſoon as the *Dutch* can arrive in *Holland*, whereby we may always foreſtal them. The *Dutch* have heavy taxes on neceſſaries, we need not have any. All which duly conſidered, cannot fail ſecuring us this trade, with the navigation belonging to it. The *Scotch Iſlanders* are expert fiſhermen, neceſſity forces them to it for their own ſupply; but their poverty prevents their giving the trade

trade that extent abroad it is capable of, and the preſent clogs upon our trade cut off the people of *England* from any conſiderable correſpondence with them, ſo that they are in a manner loſt to each other; whereas was our trade free, the *Dutch* by ſettling with us, and trading backwards and forwards, would create an intercourſe between the *Engliſh* and the *Iſlanders*, whereby the ſtocks of the former would aid the induſtry of the latter, make them outdo all foreigners, and beſides expert fiſhermen render them good ſailors, and raiſe the greateſt nurſery for ſeamen in the world.

The importance of this fiſhery will appear from the following authors. In the *Memoirs* of *De Wit*, *p.* 24. there is a quotation from *Emanuel de Materen*, who ſays. "That in "the year 1610 there ſailed from *Holland* in "three days time 900 ſhips and 1500 buſſes "for the herring-fiſhery:" and he quotes *Gerard Malines* and Sir *Walter Raleigh*, who agree "That the *Dutch* ſell yealy 300,000 tons of "herrings and ſalted fiſh, and that there went "out yearly above 12000 men for the north "and whale-fiſheries." And *De Wit* in *p.* 25. ſays, "That trade and navigation "being increaſed above $\frac{1}{3}$ ſince that time, it "is eaſy to conceive that the ſea produces "yearly above 300,000 tons of ſalted fiſh "to the *Dutch*. And the author of *Britannia*

nia Languens, p. 31. informs us, " That ac-
" cording to modern calculations the mere
" fiſhing-trade for herring and cod, on the
" coaſts of *England* and *Scotland*, employs
" above 8000 *Dutch* ſhips or veſſels." Beſides, this fiſhery will ſupport our manufactures, as appears from *De Wit*, in *p.* 29: his words are, " Tho' it appears from hiſtory
" that many manufactures were made in the
" towns of *Holland*, at the time that the trade
" and navigation of *Europe* were carried on
" by the Hanſe-towns and the Eaſt-country
" people, and before the Fiſhing and Carry-
" ing-trades were eſtabliſhed in the country;
" ſo that it might be ſaid, that the navigati-
" on has been produced by the manufactures;
" it is nevertheleſs very certain, that the
" fiſhery and navigation give all the motion to
" manufactures; for 'tis what brings in all raw
" materials to be worked up in the country,
" and to ſell afterwards the ſtuffs when they are
" made, by the ſeas and rivers in all foreign
" countries.

" We ſee then, by theſe reaſons, that the
" *Dutch* can make, with the greateſt advan-
" tage to themſelves, ſea-ſalt, manufactures of
" ſilk, linen, wool, hemp for cordage, cables,
" and nets; beſides the ſhip-building Trade."

The reaſons whereof are plain:

Firſt, A fiſhery furniſhes a cargo to purchaſe raw materials with inſtead of money,

and prevents a nation's being impoveriſhed, and its manufactures languiſhing through a ſcarcity of money.

Secondly, Theſe raw materials are thereby rendered cheaper; for the better profit the fiſh give, the cheaper the returns can and will be afforded, the general profit of the voyage being computed on the firſt diſburſe and incidental charges.

Thirdly, It affords a cheap ſuſtenance to the poor, whereby wages and labour are kept low, to the encouragement of all trade.

Fourthly, It creates a multitude of Seamen, whereby their wages are kept low, and of courſe freights, conſequently a great navigation is maintained, which brings in raw materials cheap, and carries out our manufactures the ſame, by which means only their vent can be extended abroad; therefore the fiſhery and the navigation are the cauſes of manufactures.

Fifthly, "It is the Sailor who is the "life of trade; without him the ſkill of the "Merchant, the beauty and cheapneſs of "the manufacture, and the quantity of ſhip-"ping are uſeleſs and vain. *Glover*'s ſpeech, "*page* 28.

It has been already proved, that we can outdo the *Dutch* in the herring-fiſhery, conſequently we can employ therein more of our poor than they; let us ſee how many people the

the fiſhery employs in *Holland*. *De Wit*, in his *Memoirs*, *p.* 34. computes the fiſhing-trade to give employment to 450,000 people in the province of *Holland* only. The author of *Britannia Languens*, *p.* 31. divides the employment of the above people thus: "200,000 "Seamen and fiſhers, and 250,000 people more "employed at home, about this particular na- "vigation, making of fiſhing-nets, and the "curing, ordering, and preparing of the fiſh." *Zealand* is not included in this account, tho' it be a great province for fiſhers; nor the *Hamburgers*, *Lubeckers*, and *Bremers*; nor the *French* fiſhing-veſſels that ſwarm round our coaſts. So that, upon the whole, it may be ſuppoſed, that double the above number of people are employed in this trade by thoſe ſeveral nations that fiſh upon our coaſts, beſides the *Greenland* fiſhery. So that was our trade eaſed according to theſe propoſals, this branch only would maintain moſt of our preſent poor; and one trade belonging to the fiſhery is ſo eaſy, *viz.* the making nets; that the moſt helpleſs of our people may work at it, ſuch as women, children, cripples, and aged people; and the employment is ſo great, that Sir *Walter Raleigh*, in his *Obſervations on Trade*, affirms, "That 300 per- "ſons are not able to make one fleet of nets "in four months time for one buſs."

Thirdly, It will increaſe the ſtock of people.

By inviting merchants to ſettle where buſineſs can be tranſacted with ſo little trouble.

By furniſhing employment to our own poor, they will be kept from deſerting their country, preſerved from want and diſeaſes, conſequently from death; by their induſtry they will procure themſelves a comfortable maintenance, and thereby be enabled to marry and raiſe families.

By ſecuring the manufacture of our own wool, we ſhall reduce the woollen-trade of our neighbours; which, joined to the extenſive vent our natural advantages enable us to give this manufacture, will oblige us either to enlarge our growth of wool, or import foreign; whereby we ſhould have occaſion for more hands than we ever yet employed, conſequently gain them; for it is a maxim in trade, That ſuch as your employment is for people, ſo many will your people be.

By gaining the ſilk, linen, and other manufactures, we muſt gain ſome of the manufacturers; for what *Dutchman* or *Frenchman* would pay taxes at home, and the heavy charges mentioned in *page* 127. on the goods he ſent to *Britain*, when he could remove thither, live untaxed in that plentiful country under an eaſy Government, and add all theſe ſavings to his profits? it would not be in the power of any laws to keep him at home;

home; he would remove, nay ſome muſt; for as our manufactures increaſe, the foreign will of courſe decreaſe, the poor want work, and they muſt either ſtarve or fly; and where would the fugitives find an aſylum ſo inviting as that of *Britain?* beſides, when we became thoroughly verſed in the linen and ſilk trades, our own ſupply would not confine us, but we ſhould rival other nations at foreign markets.

By gaining the herring-fiſhery, we ſhall gain ſome of the *Dutch* fiſhers, who will find it more convenient and cheap to remain here than to go home; add to which what is obſerved in *page* 60. that our own country being better than *Holland*, nothing but our cramping of trade could keep multitudes of its people from us.

By drawing in foreign ſailors, which is a conſequence of the increaſe of trade and navigation; for our number of ſailors is even now too ſcanty for our confined trade, as appears by the difficulty of manning our ſhips of war, and the high wages our merchants give; which latter temptation is defeated by the high price of all neceſſaries: but were theſe to bear only their natural price, our pay in our ſhips of war would be of ſo great value, that we ſhould have the picking of all *Europe*, have no need of that arbitrary expedient of preſſing; for a free-port furniſhing

employment for more ſailors than we now have, vaſt numbers would flock here to enjoy our plenty, riches, and eaſy government.

Fourthly, It will increaſe our riches.

By giving a greater vent to our manufactures by their cheapneſs, foreigners will be the more indebted to us, which will be paid in money or in goods; if in the latter, and they are laid by for better markets, muſt reſolve at laſt into more money: by gaining manufacturers from abroad, our wants will grow leſs, conſequently leſs money need go out to ſupply them: *A penny ſaved, is ſo much won. Gee* in his *Diſcourſe on Trade, page* 186. computes, "that we have one million of "people ſuppoſed to be out of work." I have already proved, that a free-port, with a reduction of taxes, can give employment to all our poor, and the labour of individuals makes the riches of the whole; therefore ſuppoſing theſe people to earn at a medium ſix pound *per annum*, each, it makes ſix millions, as true as if dug out of a mine in our country; nay better with regard to the people's healths. That this is not all imagination, will appear by viewing what a Free-port is capable of gaining us in four branches only, *viz.* the herring-fiſhery, the woollen, linen, and ſilk manufactures.

It is proved in *page* 131. that we can outdo the *Dutch* in the herring-fiſhery; the value

value whereof will appear from Mr. *Smith*, in his book called *England's improvements revived*; who informs us in *page* 249. and 250. "That he was ſent in 1633 to *Shetland*, to "diſcover the manner and way of trading, "*&c.* and the manner of the *Hollanders* fiſh- "ing with buſſes and other veſſels, for ling "and cod." And in *page* 270. he ſays, "that, "during the war between *Spain* and *Holland*, "the Fiſhermen agreed among themſelves to "pay a dollar on every laſt of herrings, to "maintain ſhips of war to ſecure the fiſhing; "that a record was kept, the amount of "which was 300,000 laſt of herrings taken "in one half year, which, at a medium of "the ordinary prices, was worth five milli- "ons Sterling; whereunto if we add the cod, "ling, and hake, and the fiſh taken by the "*Hollanders* and our neighbours on our "coaſts all the year long, the total will evi- "dently ariſe to above ten millions yearly."

Now though we may be proved capable of gaining the whole of this, I ſhall compute our gain to be only of the half, or *L* 5,000,000

If 100,000 of the above million of unemployed poor are woollen manufacturers, (though I imagine they muſt be much more in the preſent declining condition of that trade); however, that number earning ſix pound *per* head, makes 600,000 *l.* and the value of the material

being

Brought over	*L* 5,000,000
being computed at $\frac{1}{7}$ of that, or 200,000 *l.* makes altogether 800,000 *l.* which as a Free-port will gain, we may ſet down as ſo much additional profit	800,000
The linen manufacture that we ſhall gain, and which we now buy of foreigners, is proved in *page* 130. to amount to	3,000,000
The ſilk is computed at	200,000
Total value of the four branches of trade gained by a Free-port,	*L* 9,000,000

If $\frac{2}{3}$ of this ſum are paid to the people's labour, it makes exactly ſix millions, or the employment of one million of people at ſix pounds *per* head.

As to the value of the materials above, which are included in the profit, I muſt obſerve, that the abatement made in the value of the herring-fiſhery doubly over-balances their value.

But it will be ſaid, that this proves only the employment of our own people, but does not prove that we ſhall draw in foreigners; or if we do, that what foreigners come over will ſtarve our poor, who will have but juſt employment to maintain them. To this I anſwer, That the value of the herring-fiſhery is computed only at the half, our woollen-trade is computed only to recover what we have loſt, our linen and ſilk manufactures are computed only for our own conſumption, but not for what we ſhall export when the manufactures are well eſtabliſhed; therefore double the

the number computed to be employed in theſe ſeveral branches of trade may be drawn in; there is no computation for the improvement a Free-port will give our navigation and other branches of trade, which will all want hands. In ſhort, there is no computing what numbers a Free-port can maintain here; conſequently no aſcertaining the extent of the riches it will bring in: only this I muſt obſerve, that trade maintains in *Holland* ſeven times more people than the land deprived of it could ſubſiſt.

Beſides, 'tis the nature of Free-port trades to be hoarding up in cheap times all ſorts of goods, to ſell again when the markets are advanced, whereby they take advantage of the neceſſities of all the world, and muſt amaſs immenſe over-balances, beſides ſupplying their own wants; and if the goods are only for foreign account, when one conſiders what a vaſt ſum the freights, boat-hire, porterage, cartage, warehouſe-rent, merchants commiſſion, and often package and cooperage, before the goods are ſent out again, do amount to, it muſt be concluded, that the univerſal ſtore-houſe of a Free-port muſt bring a vaſt profit to a country.

Fifthly, It will increaſe the value of our lands. By increaſing trade, which carries off our ſuperfluities, furniſhes employment, conſequently a livelihood to our poor, and eaſes the

the land of the burden of maintaining them; increaſes the ſtock of people, which of courſe increaſes the demand for neceſſaries and materials of manufacture; and the greater the demand, the greater price will the produce of lands bear; 'tis people that trade and bring in money; and the more people there are in the nation to do it, the more money will be brought in; and the more money the people have, the better price will the produce of lands bear. In all countries, the natural price of home-commodities is according to their plenty; the demand and the proportion of money that trade circulates, and the more of it is circulating, the better rent can the farmers afford to give for the lands: add to which, that it is people with plenty of money that improve lands; and the more they are improved, the better rents they bear, which in purchaſe increaſes the value of lands.

The gradations from the encouragement of trade to the benefit of lands are ſolid and certain, *viz.* whatever cauſes trade, employs the poor; employment increaſes the ſtock of people, the increaſe of employed people, cauſes an increaſe of money; the increaſe of money, cauſes the value of lands to riſe. A Free-port is proved to be the cauſe of trade, which is the cauſe of all the reſt; therefore a Free-port is a great increaſer of the value of lands.

Objections

Objections againſt a Free-port here having been made by *Joſhua Gee* an author of good credit, for that reaſon muſt not be left unanſwered. In his *Tract on Trade*, *page* 165. he expreſſes himſelf thus.

" But to think it would be an advantage " for a trading nation to admit all manner " of foreign commodities to be imported free " from all duties, is an unaccountable notion, " and ſtill leſs ſuitable to the circumſtances " of our Iſland than to the Continent; for " we have no inland countries beyond us " (as they have) with whom we may carry " on trade by land; but what is of the utmoſt conſequence to us, is, that by laying " high duties, we are always able to check " the vanity of our people in their extreme " fondneſs of wearing exotic manufactures: " for were it not for this reſtraint, as our " neighbours give much leſs wages to their " workmen than we do, and conſequently " can ſell cheaper, the *Italians*, the *French*, " and the *Dutch* would have continued to pour " upon us their ſilks, paper, hats, druggets, " ſtuffs, rattens, and even *Spaniſh* wool " cloths."

To this the following remarks may ſerve for anſwer.

Firſt, " But to think it would be an advantage for any trading nation to admit " all manner of foreign commodities to be " imported

" imported free from all duties, is an unac-
" countable notion." I ſhall prove this no-
tion to be highly beneficial even from this
ſame author, who in *page* 164. ſays, " The
" *Dutch* duties are ſmall, and the nature of
" their trade abſolutely requires it." And
again, " They know very well, that if they
" ſhould load their imports with duties, other
" trading places would underſell them, and
" ruin their traffic that way." The duties
on the imports in *Holland* are a mere trifle;
the nature of all trade abſolutely requires it,
viz. not to be underſold. The *Dutch* know
it, and, by practiſing what they know, pre-
vent the ruin of their trade. If this is an
unaccountable notion, the reader will judge
from this ſame author again; who, in *page*
191. ſhews the conſequence of their know-
ledge in the following words. " As *Holland*
" is a magazine or collection of all the pro-
" ducts and manufactures of the world, which
" they diſperſe all over *Europe*, the Mer-
" chants and Shopkeepers are every where
" their debtors, and money is brought them
" from almoſt all countries." *Gee* here con-
feſſes, that, by their univerſal ſtore-houſe, the
Dutch have every where the balance in their
favour; and the purport of his whole book is
to prove how greatly the balance of trade lies
againſt us. With what conſiſtency then can
he argue againſt our adopting ſome of thoſe
wiſe

wiſe methods the *Dutch* take to procure themſelves ſuch advantages?

Secondly, " And ſtill leſs ſuitable to the " circumſtances of our Iſland than to the " Continent; for we have no inland coun- " tries beyond us (as they have) with whom " we may carry on trade by land." But we have in our three kingdoms a large populous inland country of our own (which the *Dutch* have not) to ſupply with neceſſaries and materials in the cheapeſt manner, or elſe we raiſe the prices of our manufactures to the prejudice of their ſales, beſides the ſupplying our vaſt poſſeſſions in *America*. But no Inland-trade can be compared to the Free-port trade, any more than an inland country-town can be to the ſea-ports of *London* and *Amſterdam*, or the navigation of the *Rhine* and *Maes* to that of the *Baltic* or *Mediterranean*; for a Free-port muſt have a finger in all the trade of the world, even in all thoſe Inland-continent trades that *Gee* ſo much praiſes, *viz.* by trading to and ſupplying the ſea-ports that are the inlets thereof in all countries; and the cheaper we can come to market, and with the beſt aſſortments, which a Free-port trade only can effect; the more of that Inland-continent trade muſt we have, the more vent for our manufactures, and the greater navigation.

Thirdly, " But what is of the utmoſt con- " ſequence to us, is, That, by laying high

" duties, we are always able to check the " vanity of our people in their extreme fond- " neſs of wearing exotic manufactures."—— *Gee* ſays, " We are always able, by high du- " ties, to check the vanity of our people, " *&c.*" The great *De Wit*, in his *Memoirs*, *p.* 170. ſays juſt the contrary, " For it is " generally found, that theſe great and too " exceſſive cuſtoms fall of themſelves ;" the reaſon whereof is obvious, the higher the duties, the more profit by ſmuggling. Extreme fondneſs checked, naturally breaks out into madneſs ; which appears at court every *Gala* day, in the number of *French* brocades and trimmings then worn, when that perſon is thought the happieſt who hath the moſt and deareſt *French* fopperies. But what will put this affair quite out of queſtion, will be the conſideration of the balance of our trade with *France*, (which ſhall be hereafter treated on ;) if it is more in our favour than formerly, then *Gee*'s opinion will triumph, and the efficacy of reſtraints and high cuſtoms appear ; but if the reverſe appears, we may ſafely conclude they have none.

Fourthly, For were it not for this re- " ſtraint."—In the *Memoirs* of *De Wit*, *p.* 34. it is ſaid, " that reſtraint is always hurt- " ful to trade :" the reaſon whereof is plain ; for nature has given various products to various countries, and thereby knit mankind in an

an intercourſe to ſupply each other's wants: to attempt to ſell our products, but to buy little or none from foreigners, is attempting an impoſſibility, acting contrary to the intent of nature, cynically and abſurdly; and, as ours is a populous manufacturing country, highly prejudicial to our own intereſts: for could we raiſe all neceſſaries and vanities within ourſelves, this intercourſe deſigned by nature would be deſtroyed; and then, how is a navigation, our only bulwark, to be maintained? To ſell all, and buy none, is to have no back-carriage, no freights home; if ſo, this will raiſe the freights outwards; a veſſel that makes but one freight out and home, muſt make that one pay all the wages, wear and tear, charges, and living-profit, conſequently makes our goods come dearer to market, and naturally ſtops their ſales; by which, in time, freights outwards would be as much wanted as freights home, and our trade muſt be deſtroyed. But where freights are to be had out and home, they eaſe each other, conſequently bring goods cheaper to market; and the encouraging our people by the utmoſt freedoms in trade, will enable them, by cheap labour, to carry all manufactures we are naturally capable of to the utmoſt height, and in them foreigners could not hurt us, no reſtraint being ſo effectual as cheap prices; and to attempt more, is laying our people under

difficulties, by taxes, to no purpoſe; as ſuppoſe, for inſtance, we ſhould take it into our heads, in ſpite of all taxes and diſadvantages, to make all our own linens, and, in order to reſtrain the importation of foreign linens, put on them all the ſame duties we lay on the *French*; well, now, money is to be ſaved to be ſure! the poor employed, and fine things done: but alas! this reſtraint won't make our own labour one farthing cheaper, but the dearer; for our own linen manufacturers having a monopoly againſt the reſt of the people, and a vaſt demand, will certainly raiſe their prices; but not being able to ſupply quantities ſufficient, ſome foreign may pay the high duties, ſome will be ſmuggled, and ſold cheaper than what pays duties, but ſtill dearer than before the laying on this additional duty, which we will ſuppoſe to advance the price of linens to the people only 1 *s. per* head. Is not this laying a duty of 1 *s. per* head on our Woollen, Silk, and Iron Manufacturers, on our Sailors, on our Labourers of all ſorts? Certainly it is. Do the ſame in favour of Iron, it will prove a tax on the reſt; and ſo of any one of them. Do the ſame by them all, and they all tax one another, all raiſe each other's prices at foreign markets, and ſtop their ſales; foreigners gain upon us; we diſtreſs our whole trade, upon the pretence of gaining only a ſingle branch; and this

ſingle

ſingle branch will grow ſtill dearer, becauſe, it being a burden on the Woollen, Silk, and Iron Manufacturers, Sailors, and Labourers, the Linen Manufacturers will pay dearer for thoſe goods, pay dearer freights, dearer for all neceſſaries; it will be

Linen dearer to Woollen.
Woollen dearer to Linen.
Linen and Woollen dearer to Silk.
Silk dearer to Woollen and Linen.
Linen, Woollen, and Silk, dearer to Iron.
Iron dearer to Silk, Woollen, and Linen.
Linen, Woollen, Silk, and Iron, dearer to Sailors.
Sailors dearer to Iron, Silk, Woollen, and Linen.
Linen, Woollen, Silk, Iron, and Sailors, dearer to Labour.
Labour dearer to Sailors, Iron, Silk, Woollen and Linen.

The dearer our linens grow, the more foreigners will ſmuggle in upon us, and ſtifle our fabric; all our artifices will prove vain to maintain it, and, after injuring all our other trades, find to our coſt, That nothing but freedom can ſecure trade.

By the above account, may be alſo ſeen, how prolific the miſchiefs of our reſtraints by cuſtoms are to trade; how our many taxes on commodities are oppreſſive; how they add an artificial price to goods; how our country has grown univerſally dearer, without being richer; and how foreigners ruin our trade, who ſoon ſeeing through our mean deſigns of engroſſing every thing, grow angry, and ſtir

up their Governments to diſtreſs us in their turn, by eaſing their trade, which we ſhamefully neglect. Has the linen manufacture in *England* increaſed by the prohibition of *French* linens and high duties on *German*, *Dutch*, and *Flemiſh?* ſo far from it, that it is decreaſed by our dear labour, taxes, and diſadvantages: *Scotland* and *Ireland* attempt it with ſome ſucceſs by their cheap labour, and when our people are eaſed of their oppreſſions, ſo may we.

Beſides, diſcouraging to a great degree the uſe of foreign products by the reſtraint of high cuſtoms, is prejudicial; tho' the contrary is the common received opinion, ariſing from a mean ſelfiſhneſs that would let none live but itſelf; as for inſtance, ſuppoſe *Portugal* to take annually to the value of 800,000*l.* of our woollens, and pay it all in wines, What is the reſult of this? Why nothing more, but that our rich people drink ſuch an amount of woollens, which they would not conſume otherwiſe; double the preſent duty on that wine, thinking that leſs would be drank, and we ſhould drain *Portugal* of her gold: ſee what would be the conſequence, only that the king of *Portugal* would lower the duties on the *French* and *Dutch* woollens; 800,000 *l. per annum* would be uncirculated amongſt us; the price of wool muſt ſink, whereby the *French* and *Dutch* would get it eaſier

eaſier to ruin the reſt of our trades; about 100,000 of our poor would be deprived of a diligent ſubſiſtence, and come upon their pariſhes for an idle maintenance, while perhaps at the ſame time *Portugal* wine, by its dearneſs, would become more faſhionable, great quantities would be drank and paid for with our money, and inſtead of our draining the *Portugueſe*, be drained by them.

Fifthly, " As our neighbours give much " leſs wages to their workmen than we do, " and conſequently can ſell cheaper, the *Ita-* " *lians*, the *French* and the *Dutch*, would have " continued to pour upon us their ſilks, paper, " hats, druggets, ſtuffs, ratteens, and even " *Spaniſh*-wool cloths.

Gee would have done well to have pointed out the reaſons why our neighbours give leſs wages, and conſequently can ſell cheaper, and ſince he has not done it, I ſhall attempt it. As the *Italians* are more remote, and pay dearer freights on their goods to *England* than the *French* and *Dutch* our neighbours, I ſhall confine myſelf wholly to the latter.

The reaſon why the *French* work cheaper than we, is the care their Government takes of not taxing many neceſſaries of life, or materials of manufacture, but that the Manufacturers ſhall be ſupplied with them in the cheapeſt manner; whereby neceſſaries bearing

ing only their natural price, they can afford to work and ſell cheaper than we; 'tis the taxes that make the difference. To prove this, I ſhall quote the Author of a pamphlet called *Obſervations on Britiſh wool*, publiſhed in 1739, ſaid to be wrote by a perſon ſent abroad by the Miniſtry to inquire into the ſtate of the woolien manufactures among our neighbours, and what wool was ſmuggled to them; he informs us in *page* 8. "That "the *French* ſend vaſt quantities of ſtuffs, "ſtockings *&c.* to *Spain*, *Portugal*, and *Italy*, "and underſell us 10 or 12 *per cent.* And in *p.* 21. "the reaſon that goods are to be "bought cheaper in *France* than in *England* "is, becauſe the labour is $\frac{1}{3}$ cheaper there." And he accounts for labour's being $\frac{1}{3}$ cheaper here in *p.* 28. "At *Liſle* the Magiſtrates "have built a ſtorehouſe, in a convenient "part of the town, ten ſtories high; in the "upper rooms of it, they lay wheat, rye, "barley; and in the cellars, they lay wine, "oil, and brandy: thoſe goods are bought "up when they are cheap, and ſo ſoon as "the markets are ſhort, and goods begin to "riſe in the price, then the ſtorehouſe is "opened to the poor, that they may buy "what they have occaſion for at the old mar-"ket-price. This ſtorehouſe was built ſince "the woollen manufactory hath ſo increa-"ſed in this town, in order to ſupport that fabrick;

" fabrick; which is a great encouragement " to the manufacturers, and a means to keep " labour low. All other things that are " needful to the poor are alſo cheap in pro- " portion, as candles, oil, ſope, *&c.*

Far from raiſing their prices with taxes, as we do, their ſtudy is to make neceſſaries cheap; and can we wonder that they beat us by 10 or 12 *per cent.* in the markets of *Spain*, *Portugal*, and *Italy?*

Having ſhewn how the *French* run away with our trade by reaſon of our heavy taxes, I ſhall examine how the *Dutch*, tho' the moſt taxed in the neceſſaries of life of any people, beat us out of our trade too, by ſtating the diſadvantages of an *Engliſh* woollen manufacturer, and the advantages of a *Dutch* one.

The diſadvantages of an *Engliſh* Woollen Manufacturer are, 1. That he muſt buy bread made of *Engliſh* corn, tho' dearer than foreign, whereby the farmer has a monopoly againſt the manufacturer, and all monopolies enhance the prices of goods. 2. He has no drawback on his corn. 3. He has no drawback on his malt. 4. He has no drawback on leather. 5. He pays a duty on his coals of 10*s.* *per* chaldron in *London*, and 5*s.* in the Out-ports. 6. He muſt buy *Engliſh* beef, pork, mutton, lamb, and butter, tho' he can have *Iriſh* cheaper, whereby the grazier has a monopoly againſt him, to make his meat dear. 7. He muſt buy fiſh caught by *Britiſh* (except

(except a few ſorts) tho' he can have it cheaper from the *Dutch*, *French*, *&c.* whereby the fiſherman has a monopoly againſt him to make his fiſh dear. 8. He muſt not buy foreign hats, cloths, ſtuffs, ſtockings, or any coarſe woollens for his uſe that are cheaper now than *Engliſh*, even tho' he could ſell his own to greater advantage than wearing them himſelf, whereby theſe ſeveral branches have a monopoly againſt each other and the reſt of the nation, to make all ſorts of cloathing dear. 9. He muſt not buy *French* linens for his uſe, tho' ever ſo cheap, whereby the other linen countries have a monopoly againſt him to make his linen dear. 10. He muſt not buy for his uſe foreign ſhearmen's ſhears, iron, or tin wares, tho' ever ſo cheap, whereby thoſe manufacturers have a monopoly againſt him to make his iron or tin wares dear. 11. He may not have ſeveral ſorts of goods imported for his uſe bought at the cheapeſt market, but only at the uſual port of ſhipping *, whereby thoſe countries have a monopoly againſt him to make thoſe goods dear. 12. He may not have thoſe above goods ſhipped at the cheapeſt freights, but muſt be ſhipped on *Britiſh* ſhips, or ſhips of the country, and at the uſual port of ſhipping, whereby thoſe ſhips have a monopoly againſt him to make thoſe goods ſtill dearer. 13. He has heavy cuſtoms to pay on

* *Vide* the Index to the Book of Rates, goods inward, article 6.

on the oil and ſope he uſes in manufacturing his goods, which helps to advance their dearneſs. 14. And laſtly, He has long expenſive land-carriages to pay to *London*, the chief market for his goods, the navigation of our rivers not being ſufficiently improved.

A *Dutch* Woollen Manufacturer is in a ſituation juſt the reverſe of this; his advantages are, 1. That he may buy always the cheapeſt corn that can be got to make bread, has no corn-monopoly on him. 2. He has 5 *s. per* quarter drawback on *Engliſh* wheat; computing freight, and charges, at 1 *s.* 6 *d. per* quarter, he is fed by the *Engliſh* cheaper than their own people by 3 *s.* 6 *d.* in every quarter of wheat. 3. He has 2 *s.* 6 *d. per* quarter drawback on *Engliſh* malt, to make his drink come cheaper to him than to our own people. 4. He has 1 *d. per* pound drawback on *Engliſh* leather. 5. He has *Britiſh* coals at 3 *s. per* chaldron duty, which is 2 *s.* cheaper than the Out-ports, and 7 *s.* cheaper than the *Londoners*. 6. He may buy beef, *&c.* in *Ireland*, or any country where it can be had cheapeſt; has no monopoly on him in this caſe. 7. He may buy fiſh of any that ſell cheapeſt; has no monopoly on him in this caſe. 8. He may buy and wear the cheapeſt woollens he can get from any country; and if he can buy cloth for his uſe at 4 *s. per* yard, he will, provided he can ſell his own of 5 *s. per* yard value with the uſual profit; no branch

branch of the trade has a monopoly againſt the reſt of the people. 9. He may buy the cheapeſt linens he can get; no country has a monopoly againſt him in this caſe. 10. He may buy the cheapeſt iron and tin wares he can get; has no monopoly againſt him in this caſe. 11. He may have all thoſe goods (ſpecified in the *Index to the book of rates* in Article 6. of *Goods Inward*) bought where cheapeſt; no country having a monopoly againſt him. 12. He may have all the above goods ſhipped on the cheapeſt ſailing ſhips, no ſhipping having a monopoly againſt him. 13. He has cuſtoms ſo light, that they are a mere trifle; has not the prices of his goods raiſed by heavy cuſtoms on his oil and ſope. 14. He has cheap water-carriage almoſt every where.

I ſhall now prove, that, was our trade quite free, no nation could hurt our ſtaple, the woollen manufacture; and that if cheapneſs pours in goods to a country, we ſhould do it on the *French* and *Dutch*, inſtead of they on us; conſequently that *Gee*'s objection is void.

By the above-mentioned obſervations on *Britiſh* wool, we find that the *French* can ſend to *Spain*, *Portugal*, or *Italy*, 50 ſtuffs that ſhall now coſt in *England* 100 *l.* cheaper by 10 or 12 *per cent.* ſay 12 *per cent.* cheaper, or at *L.* 88

In *page* 77. I have proved that above half the preſent value of our woollen goods is fictitious, that our taxes, monopolies, and ill-judged laws advance the natural value of our woollen goods

Brought over	*L.* 88
goods above 104 *per cent.* and that the true natural value of 100 *l.* worth of our woollen goods at preſent is but 49 *l.*	
So that were our taxes, monopolies, and ill-judged laws removed, 50 ſtuffs that now coſt 100 *l.* might be ſent to market at	49
The difference is	*L.* 39

39 *l.* charged by *French* or *Dutch* taxes and natural diſadvantages on 49 *l.* is an advance of almoſt 80 *per cent.* on the *Engliſh* price.

Therefore the *French* and *Dutch*, who now beat us by 10 or 12 *per cent.* might be beat by us exceſſively; they could not ſell woollens at any foreign market until all ours were ſold, much leſs pour them in here to ruin our manufactures, as *Gee* imagined; but the reſt of their trade muſt decline greatly wherever we came in competition with them: and where would be the nation in *Europe* that could hurt us?

By this it appears, that 'tis only our ill regulations of our trade that give theſe nations any advantages againſt us.

Silks and paper are ſtill poured in upon us, and the boaſted benefit to the woollen trade by reſtraints at preſent is a farce; for as our foreign demand declines, our people naturally turn all their ſtocks to ſupply the home-conſumption, until it is ſo overglutted that

great quantities have been ſold for leſs than they coſt making, or at *French* prices, which muſt break an over-taxed *Engliſhman*. Our people manufacture neater than any in felt and wool; ſo that foreign hats, cloths, *&c.* being ill made, ſuit not the *Engliſh* taſte; for which reaſon, if it ſhould take ten years time to break the remainder of our Clothiers, their ſtocks would ſell ſo cheap, that the *French* could do very little during that time; but afterwards, by getting ſome of our fugitive manufacturers to improve their own people, and underſelling us ſo vaſtly, they will run woollen goods as much as they do teas, brandies, and rich goods now, and reduce us to the ſtate we were formerly in with reſpect to *Flanders*, *viz.* they to buy our raw wool, and return it us in manufactures improved three times its firſt value.

Two more objections may be made.

Firſt, That it ſeems contrary to reaſon to take off the duties or prohibitions on the goods of any nation that will not do the ſame by ours.

Secondly, That the balance againſt us with *France* muſt increaſe by taking off the duties on *French* goods.

To the firſt objection I anſwer, That with regard to Duties, it is already proved, that they

they deſtroy trade, and conſtant experience ſhews us that Free-ports increaſe it. If other nations will deſtroy their trade, ours muſt riſe upon their ruins; and would it not be abſurd for us to refuſe, by a contrary conduct, to increaſe ours? If our enemies will commit ſuch follies, why ſhould we? or rather, could we wiſh them to do worſe?

Nothing makes a country's goods ſo cheap as a Free-port, conſequently the fewer foreign goods could be conſumed here; more might be imported to lay by for better markets, the profits on which muſt enrich us; for the cheaper our goods are, the greater vent they will have; and the higher the duties foreigners lay on them, the more will be ſmuggled upon them.

Beſides, thoſe nations that are our rivals in trade, and perſiſt in keeping high cuſtoms on our goods, perſiſt alſo in refuſing to make their country an univerſal ſtorehouſe, deny their people the advantage of it, and force their cuſtomers to buy at other markets thoſe goods they lay high cuſtoms on to prevent their coming in. If a mercer, being a weaver, ſhould refuſe to admit into his ſhop damaſks, becauſe he did not make them, and think thereby to improve the vent of his other ſilks, he would ſoon find his miſtake; for his cuſtomers that went to other places for damaſks, would be importuned and induced, if only to

ſave themſelves trouble, to buy other ſilks they wanted at the ſame time. *The Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* III. *p.* 298. remarks, "That "it is natural for us to buy every thing we "want at the ſhop where we are obliged to "buy any thing." And would it not be ſtrange, if another Mercer, being alſo a Weaver, ſhould be angry with ſuch a man, and refuſe to admit into his ſhop the other's ſatins, becauſe he refuſed to admit his damaſks, and thereby drive away his trade to thoſe general traders that were wiſe enough to improve upon their errors, by admitting every thing that could be ſold with profit? The caſe is the ſame with nations.

Cuſtoms on foreign goods hurt ourſelves more than foreigners, tho' our falſe notions of trade make us think the contrary, by confining our thoughts to the ſeller, without regarding the buyer, who being our own ſubject, ſhould be the perſon moſt conſidered: as for example, in the caſe of *Spaniſh* oil; we have laid a duty on it, no doubt to retaliate on the *Spaniards* the duties they lay on our woollens. But whom does our duty affect? not the *Spaniard:* it cannot hurt him; for he being paid for his oil, has parted with his property in it, and has nothing more to do with it. But 'tis the *Engliſh* merchant whoſe property, on payment, this oil becomes, and which might be called *Engliſh* oil, for ſuch in reality

reality it then is; he is cramped by this duty; part of his capital in trade is taken away to pay it, the intereſt of which, and officers fees in and out, make the oil too dear to export; he is not allowed that profit; he muſt ſell at home, and muſt ſhift the load from his ſhoulders on the Manufacturer who uſes it, and he on the Conſumer; whereby our goods are rendered dearer, and leſs capable of exportation.

Here is a duty on a foreign commodity indeed, but to be paid by our own people; 'tis their feet that are entangled in the net laid for theſe *Spaniards*.

With regard to a prohibition, this acknowledges the goods it is laid on to be good and cheap, otherwiſe it were needleſs; for what trader will buy bad or dear goods, if he can get better or cheaper; and they muſt be neceſſary, otherwiſe they would not be demanded, conſequently would not be imported; for who will import goods where there is no demand?

A prohibition on the goods of any one nation, gives a monopoly to other nations that raiſe the like growths: thus the prohibition of *Spaniſh* oil in the late war, gave a monopoly to *Galipoly*; all monopolies raiſe the prices of goods; thus *Galipoly* oil, that before our *Spaniſh* prohibition was ſold for 15 to 16 ducats the ſalm, was thereby raiſed to 26 and

27 ducats; the ſame with all other ſorts of goods uſed inſtead of *Spaniſh*, whereby the Merchant's profit on the advanced price, and that of the ſeveral tradeſmen whoſe hands theſe goods paſſed thro', did further enhance their prices vaſtly to the Conſumer; which, ſince my making this remark, hath been verified by a petition of the Clothiers of *Stroud-water* (and of moſt of our greateſt clothing-towns) preſented to the Houſe of Commons, *February* 2. 1742, complaining, that, ſince the prohibition, the price of oil is advanced from leſs than 29 *l.* to 60 *l.* a-tun.

But it will be objected, that, on the declaration of war, *Spain* prohibited our goods.

To which I anſwer; That heavy taxes, with many other difficulties, are the conſequences of war; and in a time of ſuch a general calamity, is it not abſurd to diſtreſs our trade in making our people buy bad or dear goods of foreigners, by a prohibition againſt any one nation, which other nations having the like commodities, take the advantage of and raiſe their prices upon us? is not this adding an unneceſſary tax upon our people, whereby they grow ſooner impoveriſhed and unable to ſupport a war? if the *Spaniards* will commit ſuch blunders, why ſhould we imitate them?

Trade cannot, will not be forced, let other nations prohibit by what ſeverities they pleaſe, intereſt

intereſt will prevail; they may embarraſs their own trade, but cannot hurt a nation whoſe trade is free, ſo much as themſelves. *Spain* has prohibited our woollens, but had a reduction of our taxes brought them to their natural value only, they would be the cheapeſt in *Europe*, of their goodneſs, conſequently muſt be more demanded by the *Spaniards*, be ſmuggled into their country in ſpite of their government, and ſold at better prices; their people would be dearer clothed with duties and prohibitions than without, conſequently muſt ſell their oil, wine, and other commodities dearer; whereby other nations raiſing the like growths, would gain ground upon them, and their balance of trade grow leſs and leſs. But ſhould we for that reaſon prohibit their commodities? By no means; for the dearer they grow, no more than what are juſt neceſſary will be uſed; their prohibition does their own buſineſs; ſome may be neceſſary; what are ſo, we ſhould not make dearer to our own people; ſome may be proper to aſſort cargoes for other countries, and why ſhould we prohibit our people that advantage? why hurt ourſelves to hurt the *Spaniards?* if we would retaliate effectually upon them for their ill-intent, handſom premiums given to our Plantations to raiſe the ſame growths as *Spain*, might enable them in time to ſupply us cheaper than the *Spaniards* could

could do, and eſtabliſh a trade they could never recover. Premiums may gain trade, but prohibitions will deſtroy it; of which let the following example ſuffice.

Portugal being united to *Spain* in the reign of *Philip* the II. during the revolt of the *Dutch*, *Puffendorf* in *p.* 78. of his *Introduction to the hiſtory of Europe*, tells us, "That *Philip* "being intent upon the reducing of the "Netherlands, thought that nothing could "do it more effectually than to ſtop their "trade and commerce with *Spain* and "*Portugal*; for hitherto the *Dutch* had "traded no further, being uſed to fetch "away their commodities from thence, and "to convey them into the more northern "parts of *Europe*. Upon this conſideration, "*Philip* concluded, that, if this way of getting money were once ſtopped, they would "quickly grow poor, and thereby be obliged "to ſubmit. But this deſign had a quite "contrary effect, for the *Hollanders* themſelves being excluded trade with *Spain* and "*Portugal*, tried about the end of the latter "age to ſail to the Eaſt-Indies; and as ſoon "as they had got footing there, they greatly "impaired the *Portugueſe* trade, who hitherto had been the ſole managers of it, and "afterwards took from them one fort after "another. And the *Engliſh*, with the aſſiſt-

"ance

" ance of *Abbas* King of *Perſia*, forced from " them the famous city of *Ormus*. Nor " was this all, for the *Hollanders* took from " them a great part of *Brazile* and ſeveral " places on the coaſt of *Africa*; which the " *Hollanders*, in all probability, would have " had no reaſon to attempt, if *Portugal* had " remained a kingdom by itſelf, and had not " been annexed to *Spain*.——*i. e.* If no pro- " hibition had happened."

Second Objection, That the balance againſt us with *France* muſt increaſe, by taking off the duties on *French* goods.

Anſwer: Here experience can decide, by comparing the difference of the balance againſt us when we had a Free-trade formerly, and later times, when moſt ſorts of *French* goods are loaded with ſuch high duties as amount to a Prohibition.

No perſon who has read the *Britiſh Merchant* will ſay that he is a partial author in favour of the anſwer to this objection.

In *vol.* III. *p.* 106. he ſays, " the ſtated " maxim among Merchants to know whe- " ther the trade be for or againſt us, is to " have recourſe to the Courſe of Exchange; " it is a nicety many of our merchants are " themſelves unacquainted with; yet as the " exchange holds the balance of trade, ſo as " that is for us or againſt us, it immediately " decides the point."

" If

" If the exchange be above the par of the " money of the country we trade with, it is " a plain argument that the balance is on their " ſide; for no man will bring ſilver from a " country, when the exchange is more fa- " vourable than the coin."

The author of the *Political reflections on the commerce and finances of France*, elegantly calls the Exchange the *Barometer of commerce*.

In the year 1683, it appears by the *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* I. *p.* 332. that tho' there was a prohibition; yet he tells us, in *p.* 338. " the court hindered the execution of it." Dr. *Tancred Robinſon* the phyſician, favoured me with the ſight of a *memorandum* he made in that year, on his ſetting out for *Paris*, *viz.* for 60 *l. Sterling* paid in *London*; he received a bill of exchange on *Paris* for 259 crowns 1 livre.

The *Britiſh Merchant* in *vol.* III. *p.* 118. informs us, the *par* of the exchange was 54 *d. Sterling*, for the old *French* crown: therefore he ſhould have paid only 58 *l.* 7*s.* for 259 crowns 1 livre; conſequently the exchange was in the diſfavour of *England*, not quite 3 *per cent.*

In the year 1686, the prohibition being quite taken off, the *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* I. *p.* 318. informs us, the exchange was at 56 *d. per* crown, the par as above being 54 *d.* the exchange was in the diſfavour of *England* about $3\frac{3}{4}$ *per cent.*

In

Brought over	3 ¾ *per cent.*
In the year 1729, the *French* goods having been loaded ever ſince king *William* III.'s reign, with ſuch high duties on moſt artieles, as amount to a prohibition, by *Caſtaing*'s paper of *March* 28. the exchange was at 32 ½ *d. per Ecu Tournois.*	
By Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s *Table of Aſſays, Weights,* &c. *of Foreign Coins,* publiſhed by *Willock* in 1740. the *par* is 29 *d.* 149 *dec.* was in the disfavour of *England* above	11 *per cent.*
In the year 1740, by *Caſtaing*'s paper of *February* 3. the exchange was at 32. ⅝ *d.* The *par,* as above, was in the disfavour of *England* almoſt	12 *per cent.*

	L.	*s.*	*d.*
By the cuſtomhouſe books our imports from *France* in 1686, exceeded our exports, as by the *Britiſh Merchant, vol.* I. *p.* 305.	769,190	16	0
He adds for goods clandeſtinely imported, *p.* 306.	428,139	16	9
Total over-balance that year	*L* 1,197,330	12	9

The *Britiſh Merchant* ſays above, " That " the exchange holds the balance of trade, " ſo as that is for us or againſt us, it imme- " diately decides the point." By the *ſo as* he muſt mean proportionably, that is, that the exchange is affected by the balance of trade, agreeable to the *French* author above, as the quickſilver

quickſilver in the barometer is by the atmoſphere. As no man that underſtands trade can deny this truth, I ſhall leave it to the curious to determine, what proportion an overbalance that affects the exchange almoſt 12 *per cent.* muſt bear to one of 1,197,330*l.* 12*s.* 9*d.* that affected it only about $3\frac{3}{4}$ *per cent.*

France takes from *Britain* wool, corn, dyeſtuffs, hard-wares, and tobacco in great quantities, ſome *India* goods, tin, lead, ſhips, horſes, *&c.*

But ſince *France* is increaſed in the woollen manufacture, in navigation, and in ſugar-planting, ſhe takes vaſt quantities of wool and proviſions from *Ireland*, to improve her manufactures, victual her ſhips, and ſupply her colonies, which amount to vaſt ſums yearly; and tho' theſe articles are vaſtly increaſed, yet ſtill the balance of trade cannot be brought in our favour; prohibitions and high duties have made it vaſtly more diſadvantageous to us than in the times of a free-trade, the difference in the exchanges being almoſt 12 to 3.

As the general intereſt of the nation, with reſpect to our trade, ſeems to have hitherto been little underſtood, let us examine this *French* trade a little farther.

Our great dealings with this *French* ſhop formerly, were occaſioned by its cheapneſs,

(an

(an excellent cauſe) and its being near us occaſioned cheap carriage *(better and better)*, and tho' the *French* had a great balance againſt us, yet other nations had the leſs; but party-prejudice running high againſt the *French* King's ambitious deſigns, in King *Charles* II. and King *William* III.'s time; this balance being conſidered abſtractedly, without any view to our general trade, an inconſiderate zeal hurried our anceſtors into the vain ſcheme of diſtreſſing the *French* King by prohibitions and high cuſtoms on his goods, not conſidering the hurt we ſhould thereby do ourſelves, and without ever effectually putting in motion thoſe means that were practicable to eaſe our own trade, ſo that we only diſperſed, during our laſt wars, our trade to dearer nations; we bought dearer *German* and *Dutch* linens, dearer *Italian* and *Dutch* ſilks, paper, *&c.* as if it was better to pay thoſe nations 15 or 18*d.* for what the *French* would ſell for 1*s.* diſtreſſing our people by dear prices, and thereby draining us of our money the faſter; for ſuch large quantities of cheap *French* goods as were conſumed here, being prohibited, made the demand greater for the *Dutch*, *German*, and *Italian* dearer goods, giving them at the ſame time a monopoly againſt ourſelves, which made them raiſe their prices on us ſtill higher.

One would be apt to think that our fore-fathers had a mind to drive all the money out of the nation. For God's ſake! let us have wit in our anger, and not pay dear prices to pretended friends, when enemies will ſell us cheaper; let us befriend ourſelves a little, by ſaving our money, which is the life of trade, and the ſinews of war; let us keep this power in our own hands, to command weight and reſpect from our neighbours, not ſquander it away to them, and be forced to court the aſſiſtance of thoſe we give power to, and ſometimes even court in vain. So much for times of war.

But, in times of peace, the ſmuggling-trade goes on eaſier; high duties are temptations that promote it; Miniſters of State may be bribed to brow-beat or diſcharge officers for doing their duty. Goods that, in a free-trade, coſt but 100 *l.* being charged with 50 *per cent.* duty, a ſmuggler will ſell for 120 or 125 *l.*; for the riſk muſt be paid for, tho' the duties are ſaved; ſo that even the ſmuggling-trade coſts us more than a free-trade, and may perhaps be one of the reaſons that the exchange with *France* is ſo much againſt us: whereas, had our country been made a free-port in King *Charles* II.'s time, and all taxes laid on the conſumers of luxuries, the *French* themſelves, during their laſt wars with *England*, would have fled from miſery

miſery at home, to a country that, by its freedom from taxes and eaſe in trade, ſeems to invite the eſtabliſhment of all manufactures, our balance to *France* could not have aroſe to that deſtructive height it has been at, nor had the *French* ever made the figure in trade they now do.

The courſes of the exchanges are facts notorious to people converſant in trade; upon thoſe facts I reſt my arguments, in anſwer to the above objection; by which it appears plainly, that a free port trade would leſſen the balance againſt us, even with *France*. Agreeable to the author of *Britannia Languens*, who in *p.* 281. ſays, "now, if we "look back to the grounds and reaſons of "the decay of our *Engliſh* trade, we ſhall "find them to be no other than our own ill "conſtitutions in trade; which are not a "bit remedied by the *French* prohibition, "and therefore will prevent any advantage "we might, perhaps, otherwiſe receive from "it." And in *p.* 286. "ſhould we ſuppoſe "that it (*i. e.* the prohibition) would re"ſtore the balance, nay, that it ſhould ren"der the national trade of *England* ſome"what beneficial, yet it muſt be confeſſed, "that a compleat regulation of our trade "would render it prodigiouſly more bene"ficial, (perhaps more than all the trade of

" *Europe* beſides), conſidering how our ad-
" vantages in trade would reduce the trade
" of our neighbour nations, as ours does im-
" prove."

Notwithſtanding what has been ſaid in favour of a free-port, ſuch ſtrong prejudices againſt a free trade with *France* have been raiſed by moſt of our late authors on this ſubject, that few people have any but frightful ideas of it. The *Britiſh Merchant*, a work in great reputation, has brought heavy objections againſt a trade with *France*; the ſtrength of which, it may not be improper to examine. In *vol.* I. *p.* 12. he ſays,

I.

Goods imported to be re-exported, is certainly a national advantage; but few or no French *goods are ever exported from* Great-Britain, *except to our Plantations, but are all conſumed at home, therefore no benefit can be reaped this way by the* French *trade.*

II.

Letting ſhips to freight cannot but be of ſome profit to a nation; but it is very rare if the French *ever make uſe of any other ſhips than their own; they victual and man cheaper than we, therefore nothing is to be got from them by this article.*

III.

III.

Things that are of abſolute neceſſity cannot be reckoned prejudicial to a nation; *but* France *produces nothing that is neceſſary, or even convenient, but which we had better be without.*

Each of theſe objections is introduced with a general maxim which the *French* trade is aſſerted to be inconſiſtent with, and if underſtood according to the preſent or then ſtate of our trade, are founded in truth; ſo that I would not be thought by the following remarks to reflect on the authors of the *Britiſh Merchant*, for ſeaſonably oppoſing our engaging in trade with the *French* on unequal terms during our preſent ill regulations. But theſe objections are founded only on thoſe ill regulations, for they otherwiſe have no weight, and will fall to the ground when they are removed; ſo that they affect not an *Engliſh* untaxed Free-port trade with *France*, which I ſhall endeavour to prove and ſhall farther confirm by proving, that had our trade no incumbrance on it, a trade with *France* muſt be beneficial.

To the *firſt* objection, I anſwer, That it can proceed only from our ill regulations of our trade; for high cuſtoms prevent Merchants engroſſing in cheap times, the duties running away with great part of their capitals, the intereſt of money lying dead for

duties, is ſuch a charge as no trade can bear that is rivalled by people free from ſuch clogs; beſides, great part of the duties on *French* goods are not repaid on exportation, ſo that it is impoſſible to ſend them to any market but our plantations; our monopolies and ill-judged laws that make navigation dear, prevent our giving that vent to the *French* goods which the *Dutch* are capable of doing, though they have not the natural advantages that we have, and they cheriſh this trade that we condemn as one of their beſt branches, being a great ſupport of their navigation.

According to the Repreſentation of the body of Merchants to the *French* king in 1658, a copy whereof was ſent to the States-General by their ambaſſador *Boreel*, the exports of *France* to *Holland* and *England* (*Vide Memoirs De Wit*, *p.* 211. the *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* 2. *p.* 232.) amounted to 30 millions of crowns making L. 6,750,000

The *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* 1. *p.* 306. makes our imports from *France* in 1686, by the cuſtom-houſe accounts, amount to L. 1,284,419 10 03

To which he adds of himſelf, for goods clandeſtinely imported, 428,139 16 09

L. 1,712,559 07 0

But to leave no room for cavil, in *vol.* 2. *p.* 238. he publiſhes

Brought over	*L.* 1,712,559 7 0	*L.* 6,750,000
publiſhes an account of Mr. *Fortrey*'s which made our imports from *France* amount yearly to	2,600,000 0 0	
	L. 4,312,559 7 0	
The medium of which two accounts is		2,156,279 13 6
Which being deducted, the remainder muſt be the *Dutch* imports, amounting to		*L.* 4,593,720 6 6

De Wit, in his *Memoirs*, *p.* 211. ſays, "The "greateſt part of the *French* exports are for "*Holland*." The above account verifies it; and, in *p.* 214. he ſays, "That the *Dutch* "conſume and ſell almoſt all the wines and "ſalt that go out of *France*;" and in *p.* 213. he ſays, "It is certain that the *French* gain "every year upon the *Dutch*, above 30 mil-"lions of money, beſides the goods they "ſend to *France*;" theſe I take to be livres, making 10 millions of crowns at 54 *d.* is 2,250,000 *l.*

The *Dutch* cannot conſume that quantity of *French* goods; for if they did, they could not have a ſhilling left in the country with ſuch an immenſe yearly over-balance for near a century; therefore the bulk of theſe imports muſt

muſt be for re-exportation, which the Objection ſays is certainly a national advantage. This the *Dutch* know, and feel the ſweets of; for they were ſo far from being, like us, frightened at the amount of the imports, or the over-balance above, tho' vaſtly ſuperior to ours, that neither the *French* war in queen *Ann*'s reign, nor the intreaties of their allies, could perſuade them to prohibit that trade; nay, they are grown exceſſively rich with double the importation that we thought would beggar us. Such clear perceptions have the *Dutch* of trade, and that true foundation of it, Freedom: ſuch enemies are they to prohibitions, or to give any foreigners monopolies againſt them, or to pay dearer to friends for what enemies will ſell them cheaper. Therefore, as the *Dutch* reap a benefit by this trade, much more may the *Engliſh*, whoſe natural advantages, if diſincumbered, are greater than theirs.

To the *ſecond* I anſwer, It is notorious that foreign ſhips frequent the *French* ports, and take in ladings, ſome of which I preſume are for *French* accompt: but that we can get nothing from them by freight, becauſe they victual and man cheaper than we, can ariſe only from our ill regulations in trade; for our natural advantages are ſuperior to theirs in navigation.

In

In the ſhipping-article the *French* are deficient, and forced to buy of us to a large amount yearly.

In the victualling-article the *French* are deficient, and forced to buy in *Ireland* to a large amount yearly.

Theſe articles bring ſome profit to our own people, and are attended with ſome charges in their tranſportation to the *French*, conſequently are enhanced in price to them.

By our bounties we furniſh the *French* with wheat for biſcuit at 3 *s.* 6 *d. per* quarter cheaper than our own people. *Vide p.* 155.

That the *French* man cheaper than we, I doubt, tho' they pay leſs wages; for not being ſo expert as we, they are forced to put more hands on board their ſhips, whereby their expences are enhanced by additional wages and conſumption of ſtores; to which add the advance of Inſurance they are forced to pay; no Inſurer in general will underwrite on *French* ſhips for ſo low premiums as on *Engliſh*.

Before the prohibition of *Iriſh* proviſions we victualled cheaper than any people, and ſold to both *French* and *Dutch*; and was that monopoly, with our taxes and bounties, taken of, we ſhould be in the ſame ſtate as before; conſequently victual cheaper than either.

As cuſtoms and exciſes enhance the prices of

of neceſſaries, they make all victualling and ſtores come dearer to our owners of ſhips.

As cuſtoms and exciſes enhance the prices of neceſſaries, they oblige the Sailor to demand high wages to ſupport himſelf and family.

We have more ſailors than the *French*, as appears by the liſts of ſhips at foreign ports, conſequently ſhould navigate cheaper; for it is a maxim in trade, The greater plenty of hands, the lower the wages.

But this benefit we defeat by our navigation-act, which gives the Sailors a monopoly againſt our Merchants; ſo that, on the leaſt ſpurt of trade, they extort exceſſive wages.

Let theſe ill regulations be removed, and will any one ſay that the people who are buyers of ſhips, and victuals for them, can navigate cheaper than the ſellers? that the people who put the moſt hands on board, and pay a high inſurance, can navigate cheaper than thoſe that put few hands on board, and can be inſured the cheapeſt of any people? that a nation that has a leſs number of ſailors can navigate cheaper than another that has a greater? that a people that pay arbitrary taxes can navigate cheaper than thoſe that pay voluntary taxes? It cannot be.

As no people by their natural advantages can navigate ſo cheap as we; ſo no people are enabled to give ſuch a vent to their growths,

growths, manufactures, and imports as we; and thoſe nations that would give theirs the ſame vent muſt employ our ſhipping, or trade to diſadvantage; therefore we can force the *French* either to give us freights, or ruin their trade, either of which muſt leſſen their navigation, riches and power, and increaſe ours.

To the *third* I anſwer, Theſe very authors, in *p.* 15. reckon, "that, had the duties on "*French* goods been lowered according to "the ſtipulations in the treaty of commerce "made at *Utrecht*, our annual conſumption of "*French* linens would have been 600,000*l.*" being the greateſt amount of any one article: This objection therefore is a miſtake, occaſioned by an over zeal; for it appears by the ſame authors, *vol.* I. *p.* 283. "that we "uſed to import from *France* ſeveral neceſ-"ſary articles, ſuch as prunes, ſalt, ſope, "thread, *&c.*"

I believe I need not prove linens to be either neceſſary or convenient, ſince no body can deny it; therefore *France* produces ſomething that we want; and until we can gain the manufacture of it ourſelves (which the removing the clogs on our trade only can effect) highly neceſſary to be bought where cheapeſt, which I preſume by the quantities imported, and the prohibition, to have been in *France*, otherwiſe the prohibition had been needleſs; and if we raiſe the price of *French* linens

linens by cuſtoms to exceed other foreign that are dearer, I have proved in *p.* 148. that we diſtreſs our whole trade; and in *p.* 130. that by a Free-port trade we muſt gain that manufacture, at leaſt for our own conſumption,

I come now to a bold attempt, and what at firſt view will ſtartle moſt people; and that is, to prove, that were all our taxes, monopolies, and ill-judged laws removed, or, in other words, if our trade had no incumbrance on it, but was quite free, that then our trade to *France* muſt be beneficial.

The authors of the *Britiſh Merchant*, writing againſt the treaty of commerce made with *France* at *Utrecht*, compute, "that had "the duties on *French* goods been lowered "according to thoſe ſtipulations, we ſhould "have paid to *France* yearly for

Wine.	*L* 450,000
Brandy,	70,000
Linen,	600,000
Paper,	30,000
Silks,	500,000
	L 1,650,000

Let us examine how much of this ſum we ſhould pay, if our trade was quite free.

As to the wine article, I agree, that being the moſt eſteemed of any in *Europe*, our importation might even exceed that ſum; but great

great part of it would be reduced by our re-exportation; for our natural advantages being greater than the *Dutch*, we ſhould give thoſe wines a greater vent than they were yet ever able to do, and be the common carriers of them; by which means our profits and freights would make our own conſumption come very eaſy, eaſier than ever it was to *Holland*. But to avoid all objection, I will allow for that expence the above ſum of 450,000 *l.*

As to the brandy-article, that could not coſt us any thing; for as our rum can be imported cheaper, and is more wholſom, our conſumption would be chiefly that; ſo the brandies imported would be chiefly for re-exportation; for which reaſon, I can't help thinking but the profits and freights muſt greatly exceed our conſumption in value.

But there is one conſideration that will reduce this wine-article, and that is, That as it is not a periſhable commodity, we ſhould hoard up in cheap times vaſt quantities; and when the markets were advanced by bad ſeaſons, or other accidents, make extraordinary profits by the ſtocks we had by us, which beſides would be a great benefit to our navigation.

As to the linen, paper, and ſilk-articles, them I ſtrike out entirely; for, by the en-

couragement of our trade, we muſt gain thoſe manufactures, as is proved in *p.* 130.

Therefore all theſe mighty conſumptive importations are reduced only to the wine-article above of — *L* 450,000

In *vol.* I. *p.* 15. the authors of the *Britiſh Merchant* compute our yearly Exports to *France* on the peace at only — *L* 200,000

Whereas in *p.* 305. by a cuſtom-houſe accompt they publiſh, *viz.* from Mich. 1685 to Mich. 1686, (in which are wanting the Michaelmas quarter for *Deal*, *Dartmouth*, *Whitby* and *Milford*) our Exports amounted to — 515,228

Note, In this account there is no mention either of the wool or ſhip-articles; the corn-article amounts but to 14285 *l.* 8 *s.* the hard-ware, under the heads of wrought-iron, clock-work, and nails, amounts but to 1646 *l.* 12 *s.* 6 *d.* and the tobacco but to 2793 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d.*

In *vol.* II. *p.* 238. they quote Mr. *Fortrey*, who makes our annual Exports amount to — 1,000,000

L 1,715,228

The medium whereof is — *L* 571,742

The *Dutch* can't be ſuppoſed to export leſs of their *French* imports than the amount of what *De Wit* ſays the over-

balance

balance of *France* is on them, *viz.* 2,250,000 *l.* which is a very moderate computation; for it makes their annual conſumption far ſuperior to whatever *England*'s was proved to be, and muſt be a great deal too much for that frugal people; now the freights, charges, and profits paid the *Dutch* on that re-exportation cannot be leſs than 10 *per cent.* amounting to 225,000 *l.* clear gain to *Holland* by that trade.

As the natural advantages of *Britain* are ſhewn in *p.* 89. greatly to exceed thoſe of *Holland*; ſo, by a free-port trade, we cannot be ſuppoſed to give a leſs vent to our *French* Imports than the *Dutch* did, or with leſs profit; therefore we may ſafely add to our Exports the gain *Holland* received by re-exporting *French* goods, amounting annually to 225,000

L 796,742

From that muſt be deducted the wine-article above, amounting to 450,000

Therefore the annual benefit to *Britain* from *France* by a Free-port trade muſt be at leaſt *L* 346,742

Our goods are ſo well manufactured, that their neatneſs recommends them every where; nothing obſtructs them but their dear price: but was their fictitious value once taken off, they would come cheaper than ever they yet were; ſo that our exports to *France* would naturally increaſe, and might exceed even

Mr. *Fortrey*'s computation of 1 million *per annum*.

The letter in defence of the *Eaſt-India* Company, printed in 1677. *p.*2. informs us, "That there was formerly vended in *France*, "annually, *Engliſh* drapery to the amount "of 600,000*l*." As we beat the *French* out of foreign markets, their manufactures muſt decay, and of courſe they will want the greater ſupply from us; if they prohibit them by high duties, they put themſelves in the caſe of the *Spaniards*, *p.* 163.

Here is, I think, demonſtration to thoſe that will open their eyes, that *Great Britain*, by diſencumbring and making its trade quite free, cannot be hurt by *France*, much leſs by any other power in *Europe*, but muſt of neceſſity hold the firſt rank in trade.

But now perhaps it will be ſaid, This favours of *French* deſigns; this author is a concealed *Frenchman*; the *French* are already too powerful; we muſt take care.

To this I anſwer, That *Britain* ſhould be always vigilant over the deſigns of *France*, but need not be afraid of her power; her wiſe regulations in trade ſhould be the objects we ſhould keep our eyes upon, and out-do her if poſſible; or elſe as ſhe riſes, we muſt ſink. But it is our comfort that our remedy is always in our own hands; nor can there be any ſolid reaſon for the nation's paying dearer

dearer to other countries for goods we could buy cheaper in *France*. Would any wiſe dealer in *London* buy goods of a *Dutch* ſhopkeeper for 15 or 18 *d.* when he could have the ſame from a *French* ſhopkeeper for 1 *s.*? would he not conſider that by ſo doing he ſhould empty his own pockets the ſooner, and that in the end he would greatly injure his family by ſuch whims? and ſhall this nation commit an abſurdity that ſtares every private man in the face? Do our good friends, the *Dutch*, commit ſuch a blunder in favour of us? They know their own intereſt too well, and have too good notions of trade to do it. The preſent power of *France* is indeed great; her dominions in *Europe* are bigger and more populous by at leaſt $\frac{1}{3}$ than ours; but as her naval force cannot match the half of what we have, our ſituation makes us the only one of her neighbours that need not fear her; beſides, her people are not in proportion ſo rich, her colonies not ſo populous as ours: but the certain way to be ſecure, is to be more powerful, that is, to extend our trade as far as it is capable of; and as reſtraints have proved its ruin, to reject them, and depend on freedom for ſecurity, bidding defiance to the *French* or any nation in *Europe* that took umbrage at our exerting our natural advantages. Before theſe taxes we

were more powerful, why not ſo again? 'Tis our own fault if we are not. By the *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* II. *p.* 232. *the exports of* France *in* 1658, according to *De Wit*, *were* L 6,750,000

And in *p.* 314. *the exports of* England *in* 1699 *were* 6,788,000

To which we may add the value of the four branches of trade gained by a free-port, *vide p.* 140. beſides the other benefits not enumerated, 9,000,000

L 15,788,000

Suppoſe the *French* to have now doubled their trade of 1658, we can not only double the value of ours of 1699, but more, as appears above: beſides, the progreſs we ſhould make in *Europe* and in the *Eaſt-Indies* by a free trade, and the vaſt improvements our colonies in *America* are capable of, muſt increaſe the demand for our manufactures beyond what was ever known. Let all theſe be duly conſidered, with the vaſt ſtrength of our navy, and the fear of the *French* power muſt vaniſh like a phantom. *Imperator maris, terræ dominus*, is a proverb applied by *De Wit* in his *Memoirs*, to a king of *England*. Let us examine whether this remark on our power will hold good at this time. If *France* can give laws by land, *Britain* can do it by ſea; and in a little time the ſea will command the land;

land; for our men of war can deſtroy their ſhips, ravage their coaſts, batter down their forts, and burn their ſea-port towns. This muſt ruin their trade; as trade goes, ſo muſt their money; and when the money is gone, the armies cannot be ſupported; they muſt be drawn from the countries they invade, or they will deſert rather than periſh with hunger for want of pay. Had we puſhed on the war in Queen *Anne*'s reign only by our fleets, we ſhould have given quicker relief to our Allies, ſaved our money, prevented a load of debts, and ſoon brought the war to a concluſion; for the ſtrong towns which we took in *Flanders*, with ſo much expence of blood and treaſure, muſt have been abandoned by the *French* troops for want of pay, want of ammunition and proviſion, and have fallen into our Allies hands without ſtriking a ſtroke, or making only ſuch a faint reſiſtance as the Queen of *Hungary*'s unpaid troops and unprovided towns did lately. We have never yet exerted our natural naval force; had the *French* ever felt the full weight of it, they would be more humble; they would not dare ſo wantonly to invade our Allies on the Continent, for fear of drawing down our vengeance upon them.

If any *Engliſhman* ſhould be ſo vapouriſh as to doubt whether trade and navigation can effect this, I deſire him only to conſider what

a few *Dutch* fiſhing-towns were enabled thereby to do in their revolt from *Spain*, whoſe power was then the dread of *Europe*; the mighty wars they maintained by ſea and land for fifty ſeven years againſt that crown, which at laſt gave ſuch a ſhock and reduction to the power of *Spain* as it hath not been ſince able to recover. The extending at the ſame time their trade all over the world, and making vaſt conqueſts in both *Eaſt* and *Weſt Indies*, until they aroſe to ſuch a prodigy of riches and power, that they became the envy and terror of all their neighbours; and that from ſo low a condition, that at the union of *Utrecht*, *Puffendorf*, in his *Introduction to the Hiſtory of Europe*, *p.* 226. ſays, "they coined a medal, wherein their State was repreſented by a ſhip without ſails or rudder, left to the mercy of the waves, with this inſcription, *incertum quò fata ferant.*"

And will not trade and navigation have greater effects in theſe three kingdoms, whoſe natural advantages exceed any in *Europe?* and had two years ago a greater naval force in commiſſion than all *Europe* could oppoſe againſt it in a twelve-month; and would we but exert it, ſhould hardly ſuffer our enemies to have a fiſhing-boat at ſea, or to gain a penny thereon to pay armies to invade their neighbours. This is the ſhorteſt, cheapeſt, and beſt way to reduce the exorbitant power

of

of *France*, which, when diſtreſſed on the ſea-coaſts, like a human body that has one part diſeaſed, will languiſh throughout, and afford an opportunity to its neighbours to make eaſy conqueſts upon it in their turn.

There are two farther conſiderations in favour of carrying on a *French* war by ſea only, and ruining their trade.

Firſt, What trade they loſe, we ſhall get; for by haraſſing their coaſts, their merchantmen could not, without great riſk, get out or in; the *Turkey*, *Eaſt-India*, Fiſhing and Sugar trades would be rendered impracticable to them, and the bulk of them fall into our hands again. Every 100 *l.* that we get by ſupplanting them in trade, or taking their ſhips, makes them ſo much weaker to defend themſelves, and we ſo much ſtronger to attack them; which is a double damage to them, and a double benefit to us; now the ſtronger our attacks are, and the weaker our enemy's defence, the ſooner muſt a war terminate to our honour: and the *Spaniards*, whom we are uncapable of attacking in any other manner with ſucceſs, have a proverb, *pax con Ingalaterra y con todo el mundo guerra*, *peace with* England *and war with all the world*; ſo ſeverely did they formerly feel the effects of our naval force.

Secondly, Money is the ſinews of trade as well as war. The bulk of our expences in a

ſea

ſea war, being laid out at home or with our colonies, circulates back again among our people, and prevents our trade from languiſhing by a ſcarcity of money: whereas the bulk of our expences in a land war being laid out abroad, circulates among foreigners, to the enriching of them, and the encouragement of their trade, but to the impoveriſhing of us, and the diſcouragement of our trade.

A ſea war is our natural ſtrength, and can preſerve our riches, our trade, and our power. A land war is our unnatural ſtrength, and always has proved and always muſt prove deſtructive to us.

But becauſe the incumbrances on our trade at preſent have given the *French* ſo much the ſtart of us in times of peace, that war ſeems abſolutely neceſſary to obſtruct their growing power: might not a compleat eaſing of our trade, put us in ſuch a ſituation as to be above fear, conſequently unconcerned at *French* quarrels, and make it contrary to our intereſt to be conſtantly embarking in them?

To this I anſwer, that ſuch a ſituation is one of the many happy effects of freedom in trade: for turbulent ambition defeats itſelf; to what a low condition has not a ſet of war-delighting kings reduced the kingdom of *Sweden?* War is ſo far from increaſing the ſtrength of any country that it really weakens it, by cutting off ſeveral channels of trade, by

by oppreſſing the people with grievous taxes, by waſting their numbers, by leſſening their riches, dragging away the laborious who bring them in, to recruit armies which diſſipate them: What perſon that can fly from ſuch calamities will ſtay to take part in them? what nation that can avoid them would wantonly bring them on? Countries are powerful by their numbers of people, not by their extent. *Spain* tho' larger than *France*, having ⅓ leſs people, is ⅔ leſs powerful; but *France*, by the calamities of war, may reduce its people and power to the ſtandard of *Spain*; and tho' it ſhould thereby equal the latter in extent, yet would that make it ſtill weaker; for the greater the extent of any country, the fewer the number of people to defend it, the more eaſy it is to be attacked with ſucceſs. The United Provinces, tho' not much above ¼ part of the extent of *Portugal*, yet being 4 times as populous, are 4 times as powerful. Where trade is moſt free, thither people flock, as may be ſeen in the United Provinces; therefore freedom in trade may make theſe kingdoms more populous, conſequently more powerful than *France*; and that ſooner and the more ſo, the oftener the latter embarks in deſtructive wars; which if ſufficiently attended to, or if our own intereſt only was conſulted, would make us ſit down quiet and eaſy, without frightening ourſelves at every

every motion made by *French* armies on the Continent, being aſſured that the more employment they have from their other neighbours, the weaker they grow, conſequently have the leſs inclination and ability to hurt us. 'Tis their cultivating the arts of peace that makes them truly formidable, and which we ſhould dread; not their loſing the ſubſtance by catching at the ſhadow, in attempting to extend their frontiers with the loſs of their trade and people; for then is our time, by preſerving a ſtrict neutrality, to have the trade and navigation of *Europe* left free and unrivalled to our ſhare, to increaſe our people, and therewith our power; the happieſt ſituation we ever can be in: a ſituation the *Dutch* ſo hugged themſelves in lately, that even the repeated moſt humble intreaties of our miniſters could not prevail with them to quit, by declaring war againſt *France*. And tho' it is a helliſh policy to ſet other people together by the ears for our own advantage, yet if of themſelves they will commit ſuch follies, it is the height of madneſs in us to diſtreſs ourſelves by entering into deſtructive land wars, to prevent the *French* from doing what we ſhould moſt wiſh they would do.

But now, methinks, I ſee ſome politicians who would be thought to underſtand foreign affairs,

affairs, ſhrugging up their ſhoulders, and aſking, whether we ſhall not be the laſt devoured, when our Allies are ſwallowed up?

To ſuch timorous Gentlemen, I anſwer, That foreign affairs, in the literal acceptation of the terms, have been ſhewn above to be affairs quite foreign to us; that when our Allies find that we are not ſo weak as to take their loads on our ſhoulders, or pay them for doing their own buſineſs, they would exert themſelves in a different manner to what they have done of late years; that they are not ſo eaſily deſtroyed as is imagined; that the *French* have no reaſon to boaſt of their late campaigns in *Germany*; that, ſuppoſing they ſhould deſtroy theſe dear Allies, they muſt by ſo doing in ſome degree deſtroy themſelves; that peace will increaſe our riches, and the calamities of war on the Continent increaſe our people, and both increaſe our power. Now, I would aſk theſe politicians, theſe men of foreign affairs, What probability there is of a weakened nation's devouring a ſtrengthened one. How, by underſtanding our own affairs, and purſuing them only, *viz.* in reviving our militia, eaſing our trade, and promoting good officers in our navy, the mercenary ſlaves of an abſolute Monarch could devour freemen in arms, ſuperior in

numbers, fighting *pro aris & focis*; and what inſtances there are in hiſtory to warrant ſuch a prodigy?

But to return; Our prohibitions and high duties have not ruined the *French*, who make a greater figure in trade, and empty our pockets more than ever; ſo that, unleſs we have thereby improved our trades to other countries, we are in a fine condition.

The authors of the *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* 2. *p.* 4. writing againſt the ſhameful treaty of commerce made with *France* at *Utrecht* in the year 1713, ſay, "We gain a million every "year by the balance of our trade with "*Portugal* and *Italy*, and near twice as much "as that with *Flanders*, *Germany*, and *Hol-*"*land*; and ſhall we venture the loſing the "gain of three millions every year from thoſe "countries, not for the ſake of gaining, but "of loſing a fourth million every year to "*France*?"

Let us ſee now how theſe advantageous balances have been ſecured to us by high cuſtoms and prohibitions.

By *Caſtaing*'s paper of *Feb.* 3. 1740,

London gave to *Genoa*	for the dollar	54	$\frac{1}{2}$ *d.*
to *Venice*	for the ducat banco	51	$\frac{1}{4}$ *d.*
to *Leghorn*	for the dollar	50	$\frac{5}{8}$ *d.*

By

By Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s tables,

Genoa, the *par* is 54 *d.*
Loſs to *England* about 1 *per cent.*
Venice, the *par* is 49 *d.* 492 *dec.*
Loſs to *England* about $3\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.*
Leghorn the *par* is 51 *d.* 69 *dec.*
Gain to *England* about 2 *per cent.*

To *Genoa* and *Venice* the balance is againſt us, and favourable only a ſmall matter to *Leghorn*.

Feb. 3. 1740.

London gave to *Liſbon* for the millree 65 *d.*
The *par* is 67 *d.* 166 *dec.* Gain to *England* about $3\frac{1}{4}$ *per cent.*

The *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* 3. *p.* 107. informs us, that "in ſome years, when corn "was cheap here, and dear in *Portugal*, "(he means during Queen *Anne*'s war) our "balance was ſo very great, that notwithſtanding we paid ſubſidies to the King of "*Portugal*, and paid for troops, there were "alſo vaſt ſums for ſupplies of our armies in "*Valentia* and *Catalonia*; yet ſtill the overbalance lay ſo much againſt them, that "the exchange has been at 5 *s.* 2 *d.* and 5 *s.* "a millree."

Portugal is a conſtant market for corn, either for *Britain* or its *American* colonies; the latter, together with *Ireland*, ſupply it with vaſt quantities of proviſions, great part of the payments of which centers in *London*. And tho' we have no ſubſidies or armies to pay, as in the laſt war; yet the *Liſbon* exchange

change is ſo far from falling to 5 *s.* or 5 *s.* 2 *d. per* millree, that it has not for many years been under 5 *s.* 3 *d.*; which can be only owing to the decline of the *Portugal* market for our manufactures, particularly the woollen. Foreigners working cheaper, ſteal it away by degrees: cloths between 8 and 11 *s. per* yard, the *Dutch* ſupply them with; and have beat out ours about that price entirely, as has been obſerved before. *France* begins to ſupply them with ſome woollens; but to *Italy* ſhe ſends vaſt quantities. So that it appears by the exchanges now, that not much of the ſuppoſed annual gain of a million from *Portugal* or *Italy* can now remain, great part of the *Portugal* gold brought here being for *Dutch* account; and the moidores circulated for 2 $\frac{1}{10}$ *d.* more than they are worth, by which the nation is cheated about $\frac{3}{4}$ *per cent.*

Feb. 3. 1740.

London gave the pound *Sterling* to *Antwerp* for 35 *s.* 10 *d.* The *par* is 35 *s.* 17 *dec.*
Gain to *England* about 2 *per cent.*

London gave the pound *Sterling* to *Amſterdam* for 34 *s.* 11 *d.* The *par* is 36 *s.* 59 *dec.*
Loſs to *England* about 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.*

London gave the pound *Sterling* to *Hamburgh* for 33 *s.* 11 *d.* The *par* is 35 *s.* 17 *dec.*
Loſs to *England* about 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.*

London exchanges with *Norway*, *Sweden*, and *Ruſſia*, by the way of *Hamburgh* and *Amſterdam*

Amſterdam. *Joſhua Gee*, who was alſo a writer in the *Britiſh Merchant*, as appears by the preface; in his *Treatiſe on Trade*, publiſhed ſeveral years after, ſuppoſes, *p.* 178. the balance we pay to

Norway to be	*L.* 130,000	
Sweden	240,000	
Ruſſia	400,000	
		L. 770,000
He ſuppoſes, *p.* 179. that we pay a balance to *Flanders* of 250,000 *l.*; but as the exchange to *Antwerp* appears to be advantageous, to avoid all exceptions, I ſhall ſuppoſe we gain as much,		250,000
The intereſt paid to foreigners, proprietors in our funds in 1740, being chiefly *Dutch*,		400,000
Neat annual balance due to *England* from *Germany* and *Holland*, to make the *Britiſh Merchant*'s calculation,		580,000
		L. 2,000,000

Such a formidable ſum due to us yearly, as 580,000 *l.* muſt make the *Hamburgh* and *Amſterdam* exchanges ſomething at leaſt in our favour. But is it ſo? alas! it appears by the courſe and *par* of the exchanges above, that this balance in our favour is not only all gone, but that we have a balance to pay ourſelves to both *Germany* and *Holland*; and it cannot be a ſmall one neither, ſince it makes the exchange to both ſo much in our diſfavour.

We are going headlong to deſtruction with carrying on loſing trades with our neighbours; and what has brought us to this low ebb? Certainly our exciſes, cuſtoms, prohibitions, ill-judged laws, monopolies and national debts; theſe are the cauſes; the effects are loſt trades, and decaying rents. No quacking with the effects will reſtore us to a ſound conſtitution; the cauſes muſt be removed or it is all loſt labour.

Before unloading our manufacturers of the above mentioned grievances, it would be an unaccountable notion (agreeable to *Gee*'s opinion) to make our ports free; but, after thoſe political fetters are taken off, having ſo many ſuperior advantages, nothing could be feared but by thoſe who envy our ſucceſs. Our natural advantages are ſo great, that they are the foundation of great part of the riches of our rivals; and that they may make the greater impreſſion on the reader's memory, *page* 89. where they are enumerated, ſhould be here turned to: and, after that view, will any one doubt, whether any foreign manufacturers can underwork a people untaxed, free from oppreſſions, and with ſuch advantages; 'tis an affront to the *Britiſh* nation to ſuppoſe it. We may rather ſuppoſe, that, by ſuch bleſſings, upon every war or calamity on the Continent, the declining manufacturers would fly to this aſylum with their arts,

arts, adding wealth and ſtrength yearly to the nation. We have acted upon narrow principles, as if the trade of the world could be made ſubſervient to our reſtrictions, which are inconſiſtent with its very nature, and always throw it into a new channel. Cuſtoms have been compared to a tradeſman's ſetting up a turnpike at his door to raiſe money on his cuſtomers; and would it be a wonder if they contracted their dealings with ſo wrong-headed a man? Sir *Walter Raleigh*'s remark on the fate of *Genoa*, fully proves this; which being formerly a free-port, was the ſtorehouſe of *Italy*; but ſetting a cuſtom of 16 *per cent.* on goods imported, they loſt their trade of foreign merchandize to *Leghorn*, made a free-port by the duke of *Tuſcany*; which continuing ſtill free, retains its flouriſhing condition. If ſuch a duty ruined the trade of *Genoa*, what will become of ours that is loaded on ſome articles from 50 to 100 *per cent.*?

Monſieur *Colbert* made *Lewis* the XIV. ſo ſenſible of the advantages accruing by eaſing the trade of *France*, that, after declaring in the introduction to the *Tariff* of 1664, that a large bounty ſhall be given to encourage manufactures and navigation; yet he lays not ſuch a ſtreſs upon the bounties as the leſſening the duties on the exports and imports, which he calls the moſt effectual means for the

the reſtoring of trade. What effect they have had, the ruin of our ſugar, *Turkey*, woollen, and home-fiſhing trades, declare.

The *French* now permit the landing the ſugars and indico of their colonies, at *Havre* and *Bourdeaux* for re-exportation, duty free.

To conclude the remarks on this firſt article. Whatever is neceſſary for life or manufactures, we ſhould ſtudy to let our people have in the cheapeſt manner, that the poor may maintain themſelves by their labour without burdening the rich, and raiſe taxes only on the luxurious; and, if low prices rather prevent than encourage the conſumption of foreign vanities, why ſhould we recommend them by raiſing an eſteem for them with high cuſtoms? Let us politically, like the wiſe *Dutch*, tempt foreigners to encourage our manufacturers, pay our ſhips freights, and to our merchants commiſſion, and warehouſe-rent for the goods they lodge here upon ſpeculation: no concern of ours what they are, we muſt get by them; ſo ſhall our poor have full employment, our country become the ſtorehouſe, and our ſailors the carriers of the world.

Second PROPOSAL.

To aboliſh our monopolies, unite Ireland, *and put all our fellow-ſubjects on the ſame footing in trade.*

By aboliſhing monopolies, I only mean all excluſive trades, not to prevent any from trading with a large joint ſtock who chooſe it, but that every one ſhould trade in the manner he found moſt beneficial.

Of the benefits ariſing by aboliſhing monopolies, &c.

1. *It will increaſe trade.*

By reſtoring our people to their natural rights, and allowing them to gain, by their induſtry, an honeſt livelihood, wherever they can find it.

By preventing any ſet of people from combining together to raiſe extravagant wages for labour, or prices for goods.

By furniſhing us with the cheapeſt neceſſaries, and at the cheapeſt freights, the market being open for all.

By taking away from our goods all their preſent fictitious value, whereby their cheapneſs muſt prodigiouſly increaſe their vent; eſpecially the woollens, whereby the price of

of wool will be raiſed, and its ſmuggling prevented.

By leſſening the *French* and *Dutch* woollen-trades, in depriving their people of our wool to aſſort their goods.

By extending our commerce to three-quarter parts of the globe, where it now languiſhes.

By ruining all foreign *Eaſt-India* Companies, who could not ſupport themſelves againſt our Free-traders.

By increaſing the number of buyers at home for our goods, conſequently raiſe their value; a company being but one buyer.

By increaſing the number of buyers abroad; private dealers trade at a leſs expence than companies, and puſhing againſt one another, muſt ſell for reaſonable profits; whereby a greater vent is given to our goods.

By gaining us the herring-fiſhery, for the reaſons mentioned in *p.* 127.

By increaſing our navigation vaſtly; for by the fiſhery, and by opening the *Eaſt-India* and *Turkey* trades, twenty ſhips would be employed where one is now. There go above twenty private ſhips to *Africa*, to one the Company ſends.

By opening the woollen-trade of *Ireland*, that of *Britain* will receive benefit (tho' the contrary is the common opinion); which I prove thus. Suppoſe one pack of *Iriſh* wool

of

of 6 *l.* value, to make four cloths, that pack of wool being ſmuggled to *France* works up two packs of *French* wool, making altogether twelve cloths.

A pack of *Iriſh* wool ſmuggled to *France*, hinders the ſale of twelve *Engliſh* cloths, ſuppoſing them of 6 *l.* value each, prevents the circulating of	*L.* 72
A pack of wool manufactured in *Ireland*, can hinder the ſale but of four *Engliſh* cloths at 6 *l.* each; can prevent the circulating but of	24
The difference is	*L.* 48
It is computed that one third of what *Ireland* gets, centers here at laſt; which on the four cloths at 6 *l.* each, making 24 *l.* is	8
The benefit that *England* receives by every pack of wool manufactured in *Ireland*, inſtead of being run to *France*, is	*L.* 56

The wool of *France* is too coarſe to manufacture for exportation; but being mixt with one third *Iriſh*, makes ſaleable cloth; every four cloths exported from *Ireland* as above, ſtops the exportation of twelve *French* cloths; the foreign conſumption is ſtill the ſame, let who will ſupply the market. *Ireland* can export no more manufactures of our ſorts than it grows wool; for, were the *Engliſh* untaxed, and unmonopolized, they would manufacture all their own wool; if twelve cloths are wanted at any market, and *Ireland* can ſupply but four, and *France* for want of *Iriſh*

Iriſh wool, not any, *Britain* muſt ſupply the remaining eight.

Our Colonies in *America* extend as far north, and farther ſouth than the latitudes of *Europe*, and ſeem capable of raiſing all *European* growths; they have a more convenient navigation to the *Baltic* and *Mediterranean* than they have to each other: they build ſhips cheap, have land for a trifle, therefore can ſupply the *Baltic* with the ſouthern growths, and the *Mediterranean* with the northern growths, cheaper than they can each other; therefore our ſhips with Plantation cargoes, muſt ſwarm in thoſe ſeas, by low freights, beat out other nations, and be the common carriers of *Europe*. The *Britiſh* Iſlands, when free-ports, by their natural advantages, muſt be the center of the trade of *Europe*; therefore cargoes home will preſent themſelves in abundance; and our manufactures, when reduced to their natural prices, becoming the cheapeſt in *Europe*, the ſupply for the Colonies muſt of courſe be here: the labour of their white people being at preſent very dear, our manufactures would come cheaper to them than they could make them; and a free trade cauſing a prodigious demand for their growths, theſe would give better profit than manufactures, conſequently cauſe them to be neglected. Beſides, there muſt be a large importation of negroes to raiſe theſe

theſe growths in our Colonies, which muſt increaſe the demand for our manufactures; and as the northern Colonies ſupply the *French* and *Spaniſh* Plantations with great quantities of proviſions, our people would have thereby opportunities to introduce the cheap manufactures of *Britain*, to which the ſaving the high *European* duties would be vaſtly conducive.

By this propoſal the taxes on *Britain* will be leſſened, ſuppoſe our numbers of people as follows,

In *England*	8 millions.
Scotland	2 ditto.
Ireland	2 ditto.
America	1 ditto.
Total	13 millions.

The general amount of our taxes and part of their conſequences, in *p.* 41. is 15,289,375 *l.*

If part of the people, the 8 millions in *England*, pay this, it amounts to 1 *l.* 18 *s.* 2 ½ *d. per head.*

But ſuppoſe the tax on the Conſumers of luxuries to take place, adding no artificial prices to goods; but diminiſhing the expences of the Government, yet that, by paying off our debts and carrying on public works, 8 millions of money are wanted, to which the

whole 13 millions of ſubjects contribute, it amounts but to 12 *s.* 3½ *d. per* head, not the one third of the above.

Thus, by putting all our fellow-ſubjects on the ſame happy footing, no diſcontents could ariſe, but a general improvement ſpread over our whole dominions.

2. *It will employ our poor.*

This is a conſequence of the laſt remark; for the more manufactures, navigation, and fiſheries flouriſh, the greater employment they provide for the poor.

3 *It will increaſe the ſtock of people.*

This is a conſequence of the firſt remark; for wherever trade is moſt free, thither people flock: if the door be opened to receive, whatever ſailors, fiſhermen, and manufacturers we want, will be drawn in.

4 *It will increaſe our riches.*

This is a conſequence of the foregoing remarks; for the aboliſhing monopolies, making our goods cheaper, and at the ſame time opening the trade of the whole world to vend them in; foreigners muſt be more indebted to us, and the people that flock here, teaching us new manufactures, or improving ſome of thoſe we already have, our wants muſt grow leſs, and the general balance of trade be brought more in our favour.

By opening the trade of *Ireland* and the Colonies, which countries being too poor to give

give it the extent it is capable of, muſt therefore be carried on for years to come by *Engliſh* ſtocks; conſequently a great part of the profit falls into the hands of the *Engliſh* merchants: add to which, that about one third of what *Ireland* and the Colonies get, is ſent here for goods, or ſpent by abſentees; therefore the richer they grow, the richer muſt *Britain* become.

5. *It will increaſe the value of our lands.*

This is a conſequence of all the above remarks; for whatever cauſes trade, employs our poor, increaſes the ſtock of people, and increaſes our riches, muſt increaſe the value of our lands; for the proofs of which the reader is referred to *p.* 141.

The aboliſhing of monopolies is proved to be the cauſe of trade, which is the cauſe of all the other remarks; therefore the aboliſhing of monopolies is a great increaſer of the value of lands.

Third PROPOSAL.

To withdraw the bounties on exported corn, and to erect public magazines of corn in every County.

Having ſhewen in *p.* 65. the prejudice we do our trade in feeding foreigners cheaper by

bounties than our own people, and that the pretence of keeping up the value of lands by any method that hurts trade muſt prove fallacious; I ſhall now ſhew how their value may be kept up without any bounties, *viz.*

By permitting each County to form a company at 100 *l.* each ſhare, to erect magazines of corn, to be managed by twelve or more Directors, one ſixth part of whom to go out yearly, uncapable ever to be elected again; their ſhares to remain one year unſold after they go out, as a ſecurity for their paſt conduct.

No perſon capable of being choſe a Director who is not poſſeſſed of ten ſhares.

Every ſhare to have a vote for Directors.

That the ſtock be not leſs than one quarter of wheat for each head in the County, after the computation of 5 perſons to each houſe.

That they never buy but at 20 *s. per* quarter of wheat preciſely.

That they never ſell but at 40 *s. per* quarter of wheat preciſely.

Except that to prevent its ſpoiling, with the conſent of a General-court, they may ſell the old corn, and replace the ſame quantity of new.

That they never ſell but to the Millers of the County, who ſhall give ſecurity to grind the wheat, and not export the flour.

That

That they never ſell more *per* week than the 52d part of the corn they have in the magazines at the time of opening.

That their General-courts be impowered to enact by-laws.

Of the benefits ariſing by erecting public magazines of corn.

1. *It will increaſe Trade.*

By creating this new branch which we never yet had, and by which the *Dutch* reap great advantage, and it cannot fail anſwering the ſame to us; for with regard to the proprietors, it may be obſerved, That this is a ſolid trade, not liable to ſeizures at the caprice of foreign princes, to captures by privateers, to ſtorms and ſhipwrecks at ſea, or to the frauds of officers in remote countries; here the provident, who ſtore up the exceſs of the bounties of nature againſt the unavoidable calamities of bad ſeaſons, beſides the pleaſure of ſeeing our own people fully ſupplied, whilſt our neighbours are complaining, will be benefited in their incomes, not by grinding the faces of the poor, but by preventing their miſeries; and as corn is ſeldom many years together under 40*s.* the magazines may pay better intereſt than any of our preſent funds.

By rendering all our other laws relating to the importing, engroſſing, exporting, *&c.*

of corn, needleſs; for when the fictitious value of our goods is taken away, we can raiſe corn as cheap or cheaper than our neighbours; therefore none can be imported for our own conſumption to ſink the value of our lands, but only upon ſpeculation for better markets abroad; which a Free-port trade giving encouragement to, we ſhould have thereby more corn in more hands in the nation than at preſent; conſequently be leſs liable to be impoſed on by engroſſers, who even could afford to ſell to our own people 10 or 15 *per cent.* cheaper than to foreigners by the freight, charges, and riſk being ſaved: and when any foreign demand happens, having not only our own public magazines for our own ſupply, but alſo more private granaries, the exportation of corn, ſo far from being dangerous, muſt create a trade vaſtly beneficial.

By encouraging manufactures, as being a means to keep labour low; for as the income muſt bear its proportion to the neceſſary expence, when corn in bad years is dear with our neighbours, their labour, and conſequently their manufactures, muſt grow dear in proportion; whilſt our own people, being ſupplied cheap from the magazines, are able, by cheap labour, to bring their manufactures cheap to market, whereby they make their way againſt foreigners, and eſtabliſh a reputation difficult to be removed.

By

By encouraging our navigation; for as freights muſt bear a proportion to the ſhip's expence, ſo, by this method, our ſhip-owners in general will be furniſhed with biſcuit cheaper than either *French* or *Dutch*; and the cheaper our freights, the more of the carrying-trade muſt we get: beſides, the importation of corn upon ſpeculation for better markets, and its re-exportation when the markets are advanced, muſt give conſtant employment to a vaſt number of ſhips.

2. *It will employ our poor.*

This is a conſequence of the laſt remark; for the cheaper labour can be performed, the more conſtant employment will be found; and this being a means to feed the poor cheaper in times of ſcarcity than foreigners, can give no pretence of raiſing their wages above them; but the miſeries the poor now ſuffer in hard winters be in a great meaſure prevented, and the granaries and corn-trade will furniſh employment to great numbers of Sailors, Watermen, Carmen, *&c. &c.*

3. *It will increaſe the ſtock of people.*

This is a conſequence of the encouraging trade, and employing the poor, as has been before proved; to which may be added, That all times of ſcarcity produce diſtempers, which carry off great numbers of people; whereas this will prevent that calamity, conſequently

ſequently preſerve many lives; and the better the means of living are in any country, the more people will be drawn in to partake of them.

4. *It will increaſe our riches.*

By bringing in vaſt ſums of money in ſcarce years from foreigners. Sir *Walter Raleigh*, in his *Obſervations on Trade*, preſented to King *James* I. ſays, "That *Amſterdam* is never "without 700,000 quarters of corn; a "dearth in *England*, *France*, *Italy*, or *Portu-* "*gal*, is truly obſerved to enrich *Holland* for "ſeven years after; that in a ſcarcity of "corn in his time, the *Hamburghers*, *Emb-* "*deners*, and *Dutch*, out of their ſtorehouſes, "furniſhed this kingdom; and, from *South-* "*amptom*, *Exeter* and *Briſtol*, in a year and "a half, carried away near 200,000 *l.* and "he computes their ſupply then for the "whole kingdom carried away two milli-"ons." Had magazines of corn been erected ſome years ago, what immenſe ſums might we not have brought into the nation in the year 1740?

5. *It will increaſe the value of our lands.*

This is a conſequence of all the above remarks; for whatever cauſes trade, employs our poor, increaſes the ſtock of people, and increaſes our riches, muſt increaſe the value of our lands; for the proof of which the reader is referred to *p.* 141.

The

The erecting public magazines of corn is proved to be the cauſe of trade, which is the cauſe of all the other remarks; therefore the erecting public magazines of corn is a great increaſer of the value of lands.

This propoſal will prevent the price of wheat from ever ſinking ſo low as to ruin the Farmer; but, on the contrary, keep up a good price, that muſt even increaſe the preſent natural value of our lands; 20 *s.* of real, true, intrinſic value *per* quarter of wheat, taxes, *&c.* taken off, being as good a price as 40 *s.* 9 *d.* $\frac{1}{28}$ of the preſent fictitious value: at which laſt price if wheat could be kept now, the value of our lands would riſe conſiderably; conſequently muſt do the ſame when a price equivalent to it is conſtantly preſerved.

Fourth PROPOSAL.

To diſcourage idleneſs by well regulating our poor.

Sir *Joſhua Child*'s ſcheme in his *Diſcourſe on Trade, chap.* 2. ſeems very conducive to this, with ſome few additions.

"That there be a Corporation eſtabliſhed "in every County for regulating the poor, to "conſiſt of fifty perſons with perpetual ſuc-"ceſſion, to be ſtiled Fathers of the poor."

That

That the ſaid number of fifty be conſtantly filled up by election of the freeholders once a year.

" That all the pariſh-officers within each County be ſubordinate and accountable to their reſpective Corporations."

" That the ſaid Corporations have power " to aſſeſs and compel the payment from " every pariſh in their County of the medi- " um of the poor's rates raiſed in the three " years preceeding."

That one tenth part of the ſaid ſum be abated yearly, until the whole in ten years time be done away, and the poor maintained by the donations of the charitable only.

That each Corporation do appoint a Treaſurer to receive the alms of all charitably diſpoſed perſons.

" That the ſaid Corporations have power " to erect workhouſes, Hoſpitals, working- " ſchools, houſes of correction, and to ex- " erciſe all other powers relating to the poor, " that any number of Juſtices of the Peace " may now do in their Quarter-ſeſſions, or " otherwiſe."

That they receive none but infants and perſons well recommended for their diligence and ſobriety, as proper objects.

That each of the ſaid Fathers of the poor have power to commit any vagrant, or perſon not having a viſible eſtate or trade, and their

their own diſorderly poor, to the County goal.

That the ſaid commitments be bailable.

That, at the Aſſizes for the Counties, the perſons names ſo committed be called over, and thoſe who cannot give a good account of themſelves be tranſported for three years.

" That the ſaid Corporations have power " to admit as Members, having equal power " with thoſe elected, every perſon paying in " 100 *l.* to the poor's uſe."

That ſeven or more Fathers of the Poor do make a Court.

That every Miniſter and Church-warden go together once a year to every houſe in their pariſh to collect the alms of charitably diſpoſed perſons, entering the ſame in a book.

That the whole collection being made, the money be remitted to the Corporation the pariſh belongs to, with the ſaid book ſigned by the ſaid Miniſter and Church-wardens.

" That all money given for the poor be " accounted ſacred; and that it be felony " to miſapply, conceal, lend, or convert it " to any other uſe or purpoſe whatſoever."

That every Corporation do publiſh its accounts yearly.

That whatever the ſaid Corporations want, be publicly bought of the loweſt contractor.

That whatever the ſaid Corporations diſpoſe

poſe of, be advertiſed to be ſold by public auction to the beſt bidder.

That whenever they want money, or whenever a time of general calamity brings on an extraordinary charge, they take care to give public notice thereof, to ſtir up the charity of all good people to relieve their diſtreſſed and ſtarving brethren.

Of the benefits ariſing by well regulating our poor.

1. *It will increaſe Trade.*

For our poor ſeeing that no idle vagrants can live here, but muſt be tranſported, and that none but thoſe well recommended for their diligence and ſobriety can be maintained by the Fathers of the Poor in ſickneſs or old age, they muſt of neceſſity become frugal, induſtrious, and work at ſuch prices as trade will afford; not ſpend half of their wages in drink, (as the *Britiſh Merchant*, *vol.* 1. *p.* 7. aſſerts it to be well known that ours do) whereby no nation can out-rival us on account of the plenty of proviſions of all ſorts that our country abounds with, and its natural advantages for trade ſuperior to any nation, the exemption from oppreſſion by taxes, the advantage of a Free-port, and other good regulations offered by theſe propoſals; ſo that our poor, by abating their luxury and idleneſs,

neſs, will be able to work as cheap as any people; the conſequence of which is a certain increaſe of trade.

By taking off our burdenſom and unjuſt Poor's Rates on the induſtrious, who now maintain the idle, our goods will become cheaper, conſequently more vendible.

2. *It will employ our poor.*

This is a conſequence of the laſt remark; for as 'tis certain that they who bring their goods the cheapeſt to market will have the moſt trade, ſo thoſe that work the cheapeſt muſt have the moſt employment; for 1. It will be more conſtant by being cheaper. 2. Though they receive a leſs number of pence for wages, yet they will be more valuable by the prices of neceſſaries being freed from taxes with their conſequences. 3. The poor being, by this propoſal, inured to labour and reſtrained from idleneſs, they will work more and ſpend leſs, therefore be enabled to lay up a better proviſion for their families than they now do.

3. *It will increaſe the ſtock of people.*

Though this has been proved before to be a certain conſequence of the two former remarks, yet as ſome people, out of a falſe tenderneſs, may think that the tranſporting of many vagrants may depopulate the nation, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew the contrary.

1. Idleneſs is the root of all evil, and two of the puniſhments of evil-doers with us are hanging and tranſportation; ſo that idleneſs deprives us of many people; but this propoſal, tending in its nature to make our people frugal and induſtrious, will preſerve and ſave many from thoſe two calamities.

2. Idleneſs brings on want, diſeaſes, death, and thins a nation; but frugality and induſtry cauſe plenty, health, long life, and people a country.

3. Idleneſs diſables men from ſupporting a family, therefore prevents marriage; frugality and induſtry enable men to marry, and ſtock a country with people.

4. If this propoſal drives away the idle, ſo much the better; they are a burden inſtead of a benefit to the community; it will ſupply their places by increaſing trade with more deſerving people from our neighbours, agreeable to this maxim, Such as your employment is for people, ſo many will your people be.

5. When our people ſee that idleneſs is deemed a crime, and puniſhed accordingly, but that frugality and induſtry are virtues, rewarded with good wages and a comfortable ſubſiſtence; a thorough reformation muſt enſue among them, the idle be few, and this objection vaniſh.

4. *It*

4. *It will increaſe our riches.*

This is a conſequence of the other remarks, and of the propoſal itſelf, which tends to make our people induſtrious; *the hand of the diligent maketh rich*; and the greater number of diligent hands we have, the more riches we ſhall get.

5. *It will increaſe the value of our lands.*

This is a conſequence of all the above remarks; for whatever cauſes trade, employs the poor, increaſes the ſtock of people, and increaſes our riches, muſt increaſe the value of our lands; for the proofs of which the Reader is referred to *p.* 141.

The well regulating our poor is proved to be the cauſe of trade, which is the cauſe of all the other remarks; therefore the well regulating our poor is a great increaſer of the value of lands.

Objection. But perhaps it will be ſaid, That the poor being left to ſubſiſt on charity only, will be ſtarved.

To this I anſwer, That the great number of idle beggars we now voluntarily maintain, proves the contrary; that in all times of general calamities our charity is eminent, as Sir *Joſiah Child* ſays it was after the fire of *London*, and was again proved in the hard winter in 1739; beſides, the Fathers of the Poor hereby propoſed, being perſons of character and fortune, will, for their own honour, by their

delicate ſenſe of public good, and their love for true charity, take care to diſtinguiſh between the real and pretended objects of want; by which the numbers of the former will appear to be but few, and they, by good management, maintained at a ſmall expence; whereby the encouragement to charity will be vaſtly increaſed, by people's knowing certainly where to give their money to do good; the want of which certain knowledge, is a great damp to our charity at preſent.

Therefore, as we now maintain voluntarily more idle people than really want, there can be no doubt but they will, when reduced to proper objects only, be ſufficiently provided for.

Fifth PROPOSAL.

To pay off our debts by public bonds, bearing intereſt, negotiable by indorſement, and liquidating part of our debts yearly.

That books be opened at the Exchequer for receiving money from any perſon or perſons deſiring public bonds, which money to be applied immediately to pay off our national redeemable debts; thoſe that bear the higheſt rate of intereſt, and are of the longeſt ſtanding, to be firſt paid off.

That

That the ſaid bonds, for the conveniency of trade, be for any ſums not lower than 5 *l.* nor exceeding 1000 *l.*

That they be divided into claſſes according to their rates of intereſt.

That the *1ſt* claſs do not exceed		3 millions *Sterling*,	at 3 *per cent.*
2d,		6	at 2½ *per cent.*
3d,		9	at 2 *per cent.*
4th,		12	at 1½ *per cent.*
5th,		15	at 1 *per cent.*
6th,	for the remainder of the debt,		at ½ *per cent.*

That the bonds of every claſs be numbered, and the numbers never altered.

That the intereſt be payable at an office to be erected for that purpoſe, whenever it be called for, and a new bond given in the name of the perſon receiving it, with its original number, and the date the intereſt is paid to.

That the bonds be negotiable by indorſement to any creditor, and for any taxes to the Government.

That the bonds for the amount of both principal and intereſt, be a legal tender for any tax, bill of exchange, note, or any debt whatſoever.

That a ſum equal to the amount of one ſubſidy be granted yearly by Parliament, to pay off our redeemable debts and public bonds; thoſe that bear the higheſt rate of in-

tereſt, and are of the longeſt ſtanding, to be the firſt paid off.

That public notice be given in the *Gazette* monthly, by the Commiſſioners of the office, how far they can pay off the bonds, ſpecifying the number of the claſs, and number of the bond they pay to; the intereſt on all the included numbers to ceaſe and determine at the expiration of three months after ſuch notice.

That accounts be delivered yearly to Parliament by the Commiſſioners.

That a curious ſtamp be added to the bonds; for though their being negotiable by indorſement only to creditors, may make forgery difficult, yet too much caution cannot be uſed to prevent it intirely, and give the bonds the greater credit.

Of the benefits ariſing by paying off our debts by public bonds.

1. *It will increaſe trade.*

By putting our debts that have almoſt ruined us, on a footing of being ſpeedily paid off with honour.

By creating a currency more valuable than our coin: money lying by, brings in nothing; but all theſe bonds pay ſomething for keeping, and I preſume that no perſons (much leſs the

the Bank or the Bankers) would keep money by them lying dead, when they could have current bonds that bore only a half *per cent.* intereſt. Would the Bank, who are computed to have always a dead caſh of above one million by them, refuſe making 5000 *l. per annum* profit of it at a half *per cent.* in bonds? Could the Directors anſwer to the proprietors the neglect of not adding ſuch a ſum yearly to their uſual profits? Would any perſon take out a bank-note that bore no intereſt, when he could have a bond carrying a half *per cent.* and equally convenient; for any trader would as ſoon give change for it, as for a bank-note?

By increaſing the currency of the nation; for as trade always languiſhes where money is ſcarce, ſo the benefit by taking off all monopolies might be defeated, for want of a proper currency to carry on the flow of trade thereby cauſed; whereas, adding an increaſe of currency to an increaſe of trade, muſt carry it to a greater height than we ever yet knew.

By reducing the intereſt of money, which is a great encouragement to trade, by forcing people to induſtry, who would otherwiſe live idle on the high intereſt of their money; whereas the intereſt of theſe bonds ſinking gently to a degree too low to indulge people in idleneſs, the poſſeſſors of them who have not lands to improve, muſt either find out new

new branches of trade, or ſtudy to improve the old; enter into partnerſhip with Traders of experience, or lend them their money to trade with; whereby private credit will be increaſed, and our Traders enabled to buy at home with ready money, and ſell at long credit abroad; which will make them ſteal away the trade of all thoſe nations, whoſe high intereſt will not enable them to do the ſame; and the lower the intereſt, the more moderate profits our Traders can content themſelves with, whereby the vent of our goods muſt be increaſed: for, was the natural rate of intereſt at 2 *per cent.* a Trader who borrowed money would think 4 *per cent.* good profit; whereas he who borrows at 4 *per cent*, cannot be ſatisfied with leſs than 6 or 7, and muſt neglect all trades that will not give that profit, which the *Dutch*, by their low intereſt, are glad to undertake; and when our caſe is the ſame, ſo ſhall we.

By making our people frugal; for a low rate of intereſt forcing a low profit in trade, people's expences muſt grow more moderate; and the leſs we conſume, the more we ſhall have to ſell, which is the moſt ſolid way to make a nation rich.

By gaining more experience; for low profits raiſing eſtates ſlowly, men cannot quit buſineſs ſo ſoon for idle country lives as they do now, but muſt bring up their children to their

their buſineſs, in order to aſſiſt them in their old age; which may go on to the fourth or fifth generation, before an eſtate is raiſed to turn country Eſquires upon, whereby a foreign correſpondency with the beſt houſes, the knowledge of proper workmen, and the characters of maſters of ſhips, are ſecured to the ſon by the father's experience; conſequently, from ſuch a foundation, the utmoſt ſkill in trade muſt be attained.

2. *It will employ our poor.*

3. *It will increaſe the ſtock of people.*

Theſe having been already proved to be the conſequences of the increaſe of trade, the Reader is referred back to theſe heads in the remarks on the foregoing propoſals.

4. *It will increaſe our riches.*

Not only as a conſequence of the above remarks, but alſo by reducing thoſe vaſt dividends the foreign proprietors of ſtocks have now remitted to them, whereby more money will be kept in the nation.

5. *It will increaſe the value of our lands.*

This is the conſequence of all the above remarks; for whatever cauſes trade, employs our poor, increaſes the ſtock of people, and increaſes our riches, muſt increaſe the value of our lands; for the proofs of which the Reader is referred to *p.* 141.

The paying off our debts by public bonds is proved to be the cauſe of trade, which is the cauſe

cauſe of all the other remarks; therefore the paying off our debts by public bonds is a great increaſer of the value of lands.

Beſides, where plenty of currency is to be had, there it will be borrowed by the Landholders, and employed in different manures, cultures, plantations, new products, whereby yearly improvements will be made; and when the corn magazines are compleated, there being no other employment for money but in trade or lands, thoſe who did not underſtand trade, or care to truſt their money to thoſe who did, or who had raiſed ſufficient eſtates by it, muſt become purchaſers of land; which number by increaſing, muſt increaſe their value.

Having thus attempted to ſhew that our natural advantages in trade are undoubtedly ſuperior to any nation's whatſoever; that if properly cultivated they would render us more formidable than *France*, conſequently than any country in *Europe*; that if we had no taxes but on the voluntary conſumers of luxuries, and if our trade was quite free, all fictitious value would be taken from our goods; whereby they might be afforded cheaper than any in *Europe*: and if thoſe vaſt ſums that now lie dead in our funds were circulating in bonds, we ſhould raiſe an immenſe

menſe trade all over the world, a vaſt navigation for our protection, increaſe the number of our people, give employment to all our poor, accumulate riches yearly; and that all this cannot be done without vaſtly increaſing the value of lands, which, in the Remarks on the ſeveral propoſals, I have endeavoured fully to prove, to the conviction, I hope, of thoſe gentlemen for whoſe benefit this *Eſſay* chiefly was intended, *viz.* our Country-Gentlemen, the Land-holders of theſe three kingdoms. Before concluding, I muſt repeat, That my chief intent herein was to remove that deſtructive prejudice ariſing from the falſe diſtinction of *Landed* and *Trading Intereſts*, by ſhewing, that there neither is or can be any difference of intereſt between them; for whatever clogs trade, muſt ſink the value of lands; and that any benefit to trade, how remote ſoever it may ſeem from land, will at laſt terminate in increaſing its value: therefore I dare boldly affirm, That the giving trade the utmoſt freedoms and encouragements, is the greateſt and moſt ſolid improvement of the value of lands. "It "muſt be evident, ſays the author of *Bri-* "*tannia Languens*, *p.* 290. that were our "trade eaſed as our neighbour nations, *Eng-* "*land* would have the ſuperiority, ſince the "ſame cauſes muſt produce greater effects in "*England*,

" *England*, being invigorated with these our
" national advantages, which no other na-
" tion doth or can enjoy."

Was our trade eased and encouraged by the foregoing proposals beyond that of our neighbours, to what a height of riches and power would not our natural advantages carry us! The consideration of which is hereby submitted to the Legislature, which can, whenever it pleases, make us the most flourishing people in the world.

FINIS.